agency rule in Illinois

1999App. 3d 579, 588 , 701 N.E.2d 135, 142 (1998). “ ‘Courts apply the same rules of construction used in construing statutes when interpreting the meaning of an agency rule.’ [Citation.]” Brown v. Chicago Park District, 296 Ill.

1999App. 3d 867 , 874- 75, 695 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1998). "'Courts apply the same rules of con struction used in construing statutes when interpreting the meaning of an agency rule.' Board of Trustees , 274 Ill.

2022See id. at 328 ([T]he fact that there are clear indications that the agency may or will rule adversely is generally inadequate to terminate the administrative process or to avoid the exhaustion requirement.) We need not address this exception any further, beyond referring to the discussion above.

2021Although these statements from the License Appeal Commission may indicate that outright reversal would be unlikely upon plaintiffs’ filing of a petition for rehearing, these statements do not imply that outright affirmance would be guaranteed. “[T]he fact that there are clear indications that the agency may or will rule adversely is generally inadequate to terminate the administrative process or to avoid the exhaustion requirement.” Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 328 . ¶ 31 Indeed, plaintiffs could have filed a petition for rehearing and attempted to re-argue how revocation as a punishment should b

1999App. 3d at 153. 'Each provision must be construed in connec tion with every other provision to produce a harmonious whole.' White v. Department of Employment Security , 264 Ill.

1999App. 3d at 153. ‘Each provision must be construed in connection with every other provision to produce a harmonious whole.’ White v. Department of Employment Security, 264 Ill.

2011See Hadley v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 224 Ill.2d 365, 370 , 309 Ill.Dec. 296 , 864 N.E.2d 162 (2007) (whether an agency rule appropriately implements a statute or conflicts with it raises an issue of law subject to de novo review).

2011See Hadley v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 224 Ill.2d 365, 370 , 309 Ill.Dec. 296 , 864 N.E.2d 162 (2007) (whether an agency rule appropriately implements a statute or conflicts with it raises an issue of law subject to de novo review).

2011See, e.g., Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 78 Ill.2d 235, 242 , 35 Ill.Dec. 758 , 399 N.E.2d 1286 (1980) ( res judicata did not bar a plaintiff's claim for malicious *117 prosecution because no action for that claim could have arisen until a favorable judgment was obtained in the plaintiff's favor in the underlying suit); City of Chicago v. Midland Smelting Co., 385 Ill.

2011See, e.g., Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 78 Ill.2d 235, 242 , 35 Ill.Dec. 758 , 399 N.E.2d 1286 (1980) ( res judicata did not bar a plaintiff's claim for malicious *117 prosecution because no action for that claim could have arisen until a favorable judgment was obtained in the plaintiff's favor in the underlying suit); City of Chicago v. Midland Smelting Co., 385 Ill.

2011See Djikas v. Grafft, 344 Ill.App.3d 1, 13-14 , 279 Ill.Dec. 84 , 799 N.E.2d 887 (2003) ("an application for fees and costs may be brought at any time where it is outside the issues in the underlying judgment and the statute sets no time limit for seeking the expenses" ( Town of Libertyville v. Bank of Waukegan, 152 Ill.App.3d 1066, 1073 , 105 Ill.Dec. 787 , 504 N.E.2d 1305 (1987))). ¶ 17 We believe plaintiff's complaint for litigation expenses was properly brought as a collateral proceeding to the underlying litigation.

2011See Djikas v. Grafft, 344 Ill.App.3d 1, 13-14 , 279 Ill.Dec. 84 , 799 N.E.2d 887 (2003) ("an application for fees and costs may be brought at any time where it is outside the issues in the underlying judgment and the statute sets no time limit for seeking the expenses" ( Town of Libertyville v. Bank of Waukegan, 152 Ill.App.3d 1066, 1073 , 105 Ill.Dec. 787 , 504 N.E.2d 1305 (1987))). ¶ 17 We believe plaintiff's complaint for litigation expenses was properly brought as a collateral proceeding to the underlying litigation.

2008Non-home-rule municipalities must derive their authority to act from the legislature (Village of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 347 Ill.

2008Non-home-rule municipalities must derive their authority to act from the legislature (Village of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 347 Ill.App.3d 504, 519 , 282 Ill.Dec. 966 , 807 N.E.2d 590 (2004)), and thus they "possess only those powers expressly granted, powers incident to those expressly granted, and powers indispensable to accomplish the municipalit[ies'] purposes" ( Thompson v. Village of Newark, 329 Ill.App.3d 536, 539 , 263 Ill.Dec. 775 , 768 N.E.2d 856 (2002)).

2008See also People v. Jacobs, 61 Ill. 2d 590, 592 (1975) (“From the record before us it appears that the defendant has been deprived of his right to direct appeal as a consequence of circumstances over which he had little, if any, control”); accord People v. Mims, 82 Ill. 2d 63, 66 (1980); People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill. 2d 579, 582 (1975).

2008See also People v. Jacobs, 61 Ill. 2d 590, 592 (1975) (“From the record before us it appears that the defendant has been deprived of his right to direct appeal as a consequence of circumstances over which he had little, if any, control”); accord People v. Mims, 82 Ill. 2d 63, 66 (1980); People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill. 2d 579, 582 (1975).

2008See also People v. Jacobs, 61 Ill. 2d 590, 592 (1975) (“From the record before us it appears that the defendant has been deprived of his right to direct appeal as a consequence of circumstances over which he had little, if any, control”); accord People v. Mims, 82 Ill. 2d 63, 66 (1980); People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill. 2d 579, 582 (1975).

2008See also People v. Jacobs, 61 Ill. 2d 590, 592 (1975) (“From the record before us it appears that the defendant has been deprived of his right to direct appeal as a consequence of circumstances over which he had little, if any, control”); accord People v. Mims, 82 Ill. 2d 63, 66 (1980); People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill. 2d 579, 582 (1975).

2008See also People v. Jacobs, 61 Ill. 2d 590, 592 (1975) (“From the record before us it appears that the defendant has been deprived of his right to direct appeal as a consequence of circumstances over which he had little, if any, control”); accord People v. Mims, 82 Ill. 2d 63, 66 (1980); People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill. 2d 579, 582 (1975).

2008See also People v. Jacobs, 61 Ill. 2d 590, 592 (1975) (“From the record before us it appears that the defendant has been deprived of his right to direct appeal as a consequence of circumstances over which he had little, if any, control”); accord People v. Mims, 82 Ill. 2d 63, 66 (1980); People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill. 2d 579, 582 (1975).

2003"However, the fact that there are clear indications that the agency may or will rule adversely is generally inadequate to terminate the administrative process or to avoid the exhaustion requirement." Castaneda, 132 Ill.2d at 328 , 138 Ill.Dec. 270 , 547 N.E.2d 437 (and cases cited therein); see AEH Construction, 318 Ill.App.3d at 1163 , 252 Ill.Dec. 946 , 743 N.E.2d 1102 .

2003“However, the fact that there are clear indications that the agency may or will rule adversely is generally inadequate to terminate the administrative process or to avoid the exhaustion requirement.” Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 328 (and cases cited therein); see AEH Construction, 318 Ill.

2002Due process requires the agency to provide a hearing “at a ‘meaningful time.’ ” Stull v. Department of Children & Family Services, 239 Ill.

2002Due process requires the agency to provide a hearing "at a 'meaningful time.'" Stull v. Department of Children & Family Services , 239 Ill.

1999App. 3d 579, 588 , 701 N.E.2d 135, 142 (1998). “ ‘Courts apply the same rules of construction used in construing statutes when interpreting the meaning of an agency rule.’ [Citation.]” Brown v. Chicago Park District, 296 Ill.

1999App. 3d 579, 588 , 701 N.E.2d 135, 142 (1998). "'Courts apply the same rules of construction used in construing statutes when interpreting the meaning of an agency rule.' [Citation.]" Brown v. Chicago Park District, 296 Ill.

2020According to defendant, based on DOC’s treatment of his request for eight hours of weekly therapy, “it would be the definition of futility for the Defendant to continue grieving his concerns with his treatment and care, as the Department clearly believes it has full authority over decisions regarding the Defendant’s care and treatment.” However, “ ‘the fact that there are clear indications that the agency may or will rule adversely is generally inadequate to terminate the administrative process or to avoid the exhaustion requirement.’ ” Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 378 (2003) (quoting

2008A party will not be required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies when it would be patently useless to do so. [Citation.] ‘However, the fact that there are clear indications that the agency may or will rule adversely is generally inadequate to terminate the administrative process or to avoid the exhaustion requirement.’ ” Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d at 378 .

2011See Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 274 Ill.App.3d 145, 148 , 210 Ill.Dec. 687 , 653 N.E.2d 882 (an agency rule or regulation which conflicts with a statute is invalid).

2011See Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 274 Ill.App.3d 145, 148 , 210 Ill.Dec. 687 , 653 N.E.2d 882 (an agency rule or regulation which conflicts with a statute is invalid).