agency motion in Ohio

2026The trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) supports the award of permanent custody. {¶ 71} In her assignment of error, mother argues that the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) is against the manifest weight of the evidence.2 Importantly, she does not argue that the trial court erred in making its 12-out-of-22 finding. {¶ 72} “‘[T]he findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, [and] each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the Agency’s motion for permanent custody.’” (Brackets in original.) In re A.M., 2

2026Importantly, she does not argue that the trial court erred in making its 12-out-of-22 finding as to A.B. or its findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) and (4). {¶ 66} “‘[T]he findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, [and] each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the Agency’s motion for permanent custody.’” (Brackets in original.) In re A.M., 2015- Ohio-2740, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.), quoting In re M.R., 2013-Ohio-1302, ¶ 80 (3d Dist.).

2018See Sterling Drug at 23-24, 406 N.E.2d 1363 ("We have concluded such initial agency determination can be fairly accommodated * * * by according to the agency rule a presumption that the agency conclusion of the existence of jurisdictional facts was reached upon sufficient evidence and placing upon a plaintiff challenging the existence of such facts the burden to prove such non-existence by a preponderance of substantial, probative and reliable evidence upon the whole record sufficient to rebut such presumption and to establish the facts are other than as found by the agency."). {¶ 76} Frye adv

2018See also Sterling Drug at 19, 406 N.E.2d 1363 ("the ultimate test as to the validity of an agency rule is whether it is unreasonable or unlawful").

2023Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000); In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997).

2013Nos. 9–06–12, 9–06–13, 2006–Ohio–4841, ¶ 9, citing In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997).

2026“Because ‘the first prong of the permanent custody test is satisfied where “one or more” of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies, the juvenile court’s undisputed finding under [Section (B)(1)(d)] is sufficient to establish the first requirement of the statute.’” (Brackets in original.) In re L.G., 2024-Ohio-4554 , ¶ 44 (6th Dist.), quoting In re R.A., 2022-Ohio-1748, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.). {¶ 73} Here, the trial court made findings under both (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d).

2026“Because ‘the first prong of the permanent custody test is satisfied where “one or more” of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e) applies, the juvenile court’s undisputed finding under [Section (B)(1)(d)] is sufficient to establish the first requirement of the statute.’” (Brackets in original.) In re L.G., 2024-Ohio-4554 , ¶ 44 (6th Dist.), quoting In re R.A., 2022-Ohio-1748, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.). {¶ 67} Here, the trial court made findings under both (B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(d) as it related to A.B.

2025Decision at p. 7 and fn. 3. {¶ 32} In this regard, R.C. 119.12(L) provides that “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, the court may grant a request for the admission of additional evidence when satisfied that the additional evidence is newly discovered and could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertained prior to the hearing before the agency.” “The decision to admit additional evidence lies within the discretion of the court of common pleas, but only after the court has determined that the evidence is newly discovered and that it could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertain

2006In Cincinnati City School District v. State Bd. of Edn. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 305 , 317 , this court stated: "The decision to admit additional evidence lies within the discretion of the court of common pleas, but only after the court has determined that the evidence is newly discovered and that it could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertained prior to the agency hearing." Northfield contends that the trial court's discretion to deny the motion did not arise because it had determined that the two legal requirements for admissibility were not established.

2026See In re B.D., 2023-Ohio-4052, at ¶ 23 (finding that temporary custody continues by operation of law upon the filing of R.C. 2151.415 motion). {¶27} To the extent that Brandon is attempting to argue the delays which took the case beyond the two-year sunset date divested the trial court of jurisdiction, that argument also fails.

2026See In re A.J., 2014-Ohio-2734, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.) (finding that the Agency’s motion to terminate temporary custody and obtain an order of protective supervision “is one of the specifically enumerated motions in R.C. 2151.415(A) that continues the [Agency’s] order of temporary custody until a disposition is made.”).

2026Manifest-Weight Review of Permanent-Custody Decisions {¶9} “When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court ‘“weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” In re Dn.R., 2020-Ohio-6794, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.), quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-21

2026Manifest-Weight Review of Permanent-Custody Decisions {¶9} “When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court ‘“weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” In re Dn.R., 2020-Ohio-6794, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.), quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-21

2026A trial court’s decision whether to continue a matter is “‘entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.’” In re Ka.C., 2015-Ohio-1158 , ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981).

2026(B.Y.’s Brief at 13, 18.) Ohio courts have consistently found that a juvenile court’s “findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are alternative findings, [and] each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the Agency’s motion for permanent custody.” (Brackets in original.) (Internal quotation marks deleted and citations omitted.) In re M.Y., 2026-Ohio-1892, ¶ 72 (6th Dist.).

2026On appeal, Jessica argues that the trial court should have granted her a two-month extension so that she could procure housing for herself and J.H. {¶42} “The decision as to whether to grant a parent’s request for an extension of temporary custody rather than granting permanent custody to the Agency is one left to the discretion of the trial court.” In re H.S., 2023-Ohio-3210, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.).

2026See also, In re W.W., 2023- Ohio-4112, ¶25 (5th Dist.); In re S.S., 2023-Ohio-2916, ¶14 (12th Dist.). {¶88} The record contains no indication that the juvenile court prevented Mother from presenting evidence, imposed an arbitrary time limitation, or otherwise restricted her ability to defend against the Agency's motion.

2025Sept. 29, 1994). {¶ 33} “ ‘Newly discovered’ evidence under R.C. 119.12 pertains to evidence that existed at the time of the administrative hearing; the term does not refer to newly created evidence, such as evidence created after the hearing.’ ” Beach v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing, 2011- Ohio-3451, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.), citing Golden Christian Academy v. Zelman, 144 Ohio App.3d 513, 517 (10th Dist. 2001). {¶ 34} Having examined all these records, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision not to admit or consider them.

2025See In re R.L., 2012-Ohio-6049, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.); In re M.R., 2011-Ohio-3733, at ¶ 18 . {¶18} Furthermore, although Emma was not present at the hearing, she was represented by counsel who made arguments in opposition to the Agency’s motion on her behalf and who engaged in a lengthy and robust cross examination of the Agency’s sole witness.

2024See, Matter of W.W., 5th Dist. Licking No. 2023 CA 00057, 2023-Ohio-4112, ¶ 30 . {¶58} Upon review, we find sufficient clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's decision to grant the Agency's motion for permanent custody, and do not find any manifest miscarriage of justice.

2023Licensing Bd., 9th Dist. Summit No. 18510, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 532 , 17-20 (Feb. 11, 1998) (rejecting argument that right to a fair and impartial hearing was violated because board was exposed to evidence during investigation that was not subject to cross-examination); Westlake v. Ohio Dept. of Agriculture, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 08AP-71 and 08AP-72, 2008-Ohio-4422, ¶ 19 (“[A]dministrative agencies are, generally, not bound by the strict rules of evidence applied in court. * * * Thus, hearsay is not precluded in administrative hearings. * * * [H]earsay evidence may be considered in administ