agency rule in Washington

2020“An agency rule may be invalidated only if the court determines it (1) is unconstitutional, (2) is outside the statutory authority of the agency, (3) is arbitrary or capricious, or (4) was adopted without complying with statutory rule making procedures.” Id. at 402-03 (citing RCW 34.05.570(2)(c)).

2012Ports Ass’n v. Dep’t of Revenue, 148 Wn.2d 637, 645 , 62 P.3d 462 (2003)).

2012We may declare an agency rule invalid as applied if it “ ‘(1) violates constitutional provisions, (2) exceeds statutory authority of the agency, (3) was adopted without compliance to statutory rule-making procedures, or (4) is arbitrary and capricious.’ ” Ass’n of Wash. Bus., 155 Wn.2d at 437 (quoting Wash. Pub.

2007By its plain language, RCW 34.05.570(2)(c) states the correct standard of review when a court is determining the validity of a rule. “ ‘This court may declare an agency rule invalid if it: (1) violates constitutional provisions, (2) exceeds statutory authority of the agency, (3) was adopted without compliance to statutory rule-making procedures, or (4) is arbitrary and capricious.’ ” Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 155 Wn.2d 430, 437 , 120 P.3d 46 (2005) (quoting Wash. Pub.

2012Ports Ass’n v. Dep’t of Revenue, 148 Wn.2d 637, 645 , 62 P.3d 462 (2003)).

2009Ports Ass’n v. Dep’t of Revenue, 148 Wn.2d 637, 645 , 62 P.3d 462 (2003).

2024Clausing v. State, 90 Wn.

2018Clausing v. State, 90 Wn.

2007In other words, an agency rule may have the "force of law." Manor v. Nestle Food Co., 131 Wash.2d 439, 445 , 932 P.2d 628 , 945 P.2d 1119 (1997) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 , 99 S.Ct. 1705 , 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979)). ¶ 45 On the other hand, an agency "policy statement" is defined as a written description of the current approach of an agency . . . to implementation of a statute or other provision of law, of a court decision, or of an agency order, including where appropriate the agency's current practice, procedure, or method of action based upon that approach.

2007In other words, an agency rule may have the “force of law.” Manor v. Nestle Food Co., 131 Wn.2d 439, 445 , 932 P.2d 628 , 945 P.2d 1119 (1997) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 , 99 S. Ct. 1705 , 60 L.

2002Black Corvette, 91 Wn.

2002Black Corvette, 91 Wash.App. at 323 , 963 P.2d 187 .

2004The legislature broadly defines “agency action” as “[The] licensing, the implementation or enforcement of a statute, the adoption or application of an agency rule or order, the imposition of sanctions, or the granting or withholding of benefits.” RCW 34.05.010(3); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Dep’t of Ecology, 112 Wn.

2004The legislature broadly defines "agency action" as "[The] licensing, the implementation or enforcement of a statute, the adoption or application of an agency rule or order, the imposition of sanctions, or the granting or withholding of benefits." RCW 34.05.010(3); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Department of Ecology, 112 Wash.App. 712, 722 , 50 P.3d 668 (2002), rev. denied, 150 Wash.2d 1016 , 79 P.3d 446 (2003).

2009Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 11 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183 , 11 P.3d 762 , 27 P.3d 608 (2000).

2006Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12 , 43 P.3d 4 . ¶ 9 In reviewing an agency rule, we will hold the rule invalid only if: (1) the rule violates constitutional provisions; (2) the rule exceeds the agency's statutory authority; (3) the agency adopted the rule without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures; or (4) the rule is arbitrary and capricious.

2007In other words, an agency rule may have the "force of law." Manor v. Nestle Food Co., 131 Wash.2d 439, 445 , 932 P.2d 628 , 945 P.2d 1119 (1997) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 , 99 S.Ct. 1705 , 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979)). ¶ 45 On the other hand, an agency "policy statement" is defined as a written description of the current approach of an agency . . . to implementation of a statute or other provision of law, of a court decision, or of an agency order, including where appropriate the agency's current practice, procedure, or method of action based upon that approach.

2007In other words, an agency rule may have the “force of law.” Manor v. Nestle Food Co., 131 Wn.2d 439, 445 , 932 P.2d 628 , 945 P.2d 1119 (1997) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 , 99 S. Ct. 1705 , 60 L.

1998App. 447, 451 , 843 P.2d 1092 (1993) (judicial review of an agency rule is governed by RCW 34.05.570(2)(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which permits review in the context of any review proceeding under RCW 34.05.570 so long as the rule-making agency is a party).

1998RCW 34.05.570(2)(a) provides in relevant part that "[i]n an action challenging the validity of a rule, the agency shall be made a party to the proceeding." See also Boise Cascade Corp. v. Washington Toxics Coalition, 68 Wash.App. 447, 451 , 843 P.2d 1092 (1993) (judicial review of an agency rule is governed by RCW 34.05.570(2)(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, which permits review in the context of any review proceeding under RCW 34.05.570 so long as the rulemaking agency is a party).

2021The 7 No. 80120-1-I/8 interpretation does not need to be a “formal adoption equivalent to an agency rule, but it must represent a policy decision by the person or persons responsible.” Cowiche Canyon Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d at 815 .

2005It need not be by formal adoption equivalent to an agency rule, but it must represent a policy decision by the person or persons responsible. 118 Wn.2d at 815 . ¶63 Because Friends did not meet their evidentiary burden to prove that DNR acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, we affirm the Forest Practices Appeals Board’s decision upholding DNR’s action.

2019An agency rule is invalid only if it “(1) violates constitutional provisions, (2) exceeds the agency’s statutory rule-making authority, (3) is arbitrary and capricious in that it could not have been the product of a rational decision-maker, or (4) was adopted without complying with statutory rule-making procedures.” Ass’n of Wash. Spirits, 182 Wn.2d at 350 (citing RCW 34.05.570(2)(c)).

2017Ass’n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs., 182 Wn.2d at 358 .

2017Kabbae v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 144 Wn.

2011The agency rule limited the judge’s powers by stating that the review judge could add findings only if “they are ‘essential’ and ‘consistent with the ALJ’s findings.’ ” Id. at 443 (quoting WAC 388-02-0600(2)(e)).

2013Nowhere does chapter 34.05 RCW, the state APA, define ''judicial 6 No. 30925-8-1111 In re Dependency ofA.P. review." Costanich v. Dep't ofSoc. & Health Servs., 164 Wn.2d 925,930 , 194 P.3d 988 (2008).

2013Nowhere does chapter 34.05 RCW, the state APA, define “judicial review.” Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 164 Wn.2d 925, 930 , 194 P.3d 988 (2008). ¶15 One Washington case partially defined “judicial review” for purposes of RCW 4.84.350.

2013Nowhere does chapter 34.05 RCW, the state APA, define ''judicial 6 No. 30925-8-1111 In re Dependency ofA.P. review." Costanich v. Dep't ofSoc. & Health Servs., 164 Wn.2d 925,930 , 194 P.3d 988 (2008).

2013Nowhere does chapter 34.05 RCW, the state APA, define “judicial review.” Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 164 Wn.2d 925, 930 , 194 P.3d 988 (2008). ¶15 One Washington case partially defined “judicial review” for purposes of RCW 4.84.350.

2009No. 1 of Clark County v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 137 Wash. App. 150, 157 , 151 P.3d 1067 (2007). [10] If a PCHB order is found to be inconsistent with an agency rule, no relief should be granted if "the agency provides facts and reasons to demonstrate a rational basis for the inconsistency." See Port of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d at 587-88 , 90 P.3d 659 . ¶ 16 Second, we may grant relief if we find that "the PCHB's order is `not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.'" Port of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d at 588 , 90 P.3d 659 (quoting RCW

2009No. 1 of Clark County v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 137 Wash. App. 150, 157 , 151 P.3d 1067 (2007). [10] If a PCHB order is found to be inconsistent with an agency rule, no relief should be granted if "the agency provides facts and reasons to demonstrate a rational basis for the inconsistency." See Port of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d at 587-88 , 90 P.3d 659 . ¶ 16 Second, we may grant relief if we find that "the PCHB's order is `not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.'" Port of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d at 588 , 90 P.3d 659 (quoting RCW

2011Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish Cnty., 73 Wash.2d 343, 346 , 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing Buell v. McGee, 9 Wash.2d 84 , 113 P.2d 522 (1941); White v. City of North Yakima, 87 Wash. 191 , 151 P. 645 (1915)). ¶ 56 Second, RCW 82.02.020 and WAC 197-11-792 differ in terminology and organization; *398 and these differences weigh against juxtaposing language from one provision with the other. [32] RCW 82.02.020 uses "direct" to modify both "impact" and "result"; WAC 197-11-792 does not use the word "result." The legislature did not organize RCW 82.02.020, which contains only

2011Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish Cnty., 73 Wash.2d 343, 346 , 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing Buell v. McGee, 9 Wash.2d 84 , 113 P.2d 522 (1941); White v. City of North Yakima, 87 Wash. 191 , 151 P. 645 (1915)). ¶ 56 Second, RCW 82.02.020 and WAC 197-11-792 differ in terminology and organization; *398 and these differences weigh against juxtaposing language from one provision with the other. [32] RCW 82.02.020 uses "direct" to modify both "impact" and "result"; WAC 197-11-792 does not use the word "result." The legislature did not organize RCW 82.02.020, which contains only

2011Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish Cnty., 73 Wash.2d 343, 346 , 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing Buell v. McGee, 9 Wash.2d 84 , 113 P.2d 522 (1941); White v. City of North Yakima, 87 Wash. 191 , 151 P. 645 (1915)). ¶ 56 Second, RCW 82.02.020 and WAC 197-11-792 differ in terminology and organization; *398 and these differences weigh against juxtaposing language from one provision with the other. [32] RCW 82.02.020 uses "direct" to modify both "impact" and "result"; WAC 197-11-792 does not use the word "result." The legislature did not organize RCW 82.02.020, which contains only

2011Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish Cnty., 73 Wash.2d 343, 346 , 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing Buell v. McGee, 9 Wash.2d 84 , 113 P.2d 522 (1941); White v. City of North Yakima, 87 Wash. 191 , 151 P. 645 (1915)). ¶ 56 Second, RCW 82.02.020 and WAC 197-11-792 differ in terminology and organization; *398 and these differences weigh against juxtaposing language from one provision with the other. [32] RCW 82.02.020 uses "direct" to modify both "impact" and "result"; WAC 197-11-792 does not use the word "result." The legislature did not organize RCW 82.02.020, which contains only

2011Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish Cnty., 73 Wash.2d 343, 346 , 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing Buell v. McGee, 9 Wash.2d 84 , 113 P.2d 522 (1941); White v. City of North Yakima, 87 Wash. 191 , 151 P. 645 (1915)). ¶ 56 Second, RCW 82.02.020 and WAC 197-11-792 differ in terminology and organization; *398 and these differences weigh against juxtaposing language from one provision with the other. [32] RCW 82.02.020 uses "direct" to modify both "impact" and "result"; WAC 197-11-792 does not use the word "result." The legislature did not organize RCW 82.02.020, which contains only

2011Beach v. Bd. of Adjustment of Snohomish Cnty., 73 Wash.2d 343, 346 , 438 P.2d 617 (1968) (emphasis added) (citing Buell v. McGee, 9 Wash.2d 84 , 113 P.2d 522 (1941); White v. City of North Yakima, 87 Wash. 191 , 151 P. 645 (1915)). ¶ 56 Second, RCW 82.02.020 and WAC 197-11-792 differ in terminology and organization; *398 and these differences weigh against juxtaposing language from one provision with the other. [32] RCW 82.02.020 uses "direct" to modify both "impact" and "result"; WAC 197-11-792 does not use the word "result." The legislature did not organize RCW 82.02.020, which contains only

2009Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 11 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183 , 11 P.3d 762 , 27 P.3d 608 (2000).

2009Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 11 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183 , 11 P.3d 762 , 27 P.3d 608 (2000).

2009The majority goes on to conclude that our decision in Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. University of Wash ington, 125 Wn.2d 243 , 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (PAWS II), requires that the agency provide a privilege log to complete its agency response and thus trigger the running of the statute of limitations.

2009The majority goes on to conclude that our decision in Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. University of Wash ington, 125 Wn.2d 243 , 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (PAWS II), requires that the agency provide a privilege log to complete its agency response and thus trigger the running of the statute of limitations.

2009Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 11 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183 , 11 P.3d 762 , 27 P.3d 608 (2000).

2009Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 11 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183 , 11 P.3d 762 , 27 P.3d 608 (2000).

2009No. 1 of Clark County v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 137 Wash. App. 150, 157 , 151 P.3d 1067 (2007). [10] If a PCHB order is found to be inconsistent with an agency rule, no relief should be granted if "the agency provides facts and reasons to demonstrate a rational basis for the inconsistency." See Port of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d at 587-88 , 90 P.3d 659 . ¶ 16 Second, we may grant relief if we find that "the PCHB's order is `not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.'" Port of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d at 588 , 90 P.3d 659 (quoting RCW

2009App. 150, 157 , 151 P.3d 1067 (2007). 10 If a PCHB order is found to be inconsistent with an agency rule, no relief should be granted if “the agency provides facts and reasons to demonstrate a rational basis for the inconsistency.” Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 587-88 . ¶16 Second, we may grant relief if we find that “the PCHB’s order is ‘not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.’ ” Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 588 (quoting RCW 34.05.570(3)(e)).

2008A bona fide dispute is a "`fairly debatable' dispute over whether an employment relationship exists, or whether all or a portion of the wages must be paid." Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 136 Wash.2d 152, 161-62 , 961 P.2d 371 (1998) (citing Cannon v. City of Moses Lake, 35 Wash.App. 120, 125 , 663 P.2d 865 (1983); Moran v. Stowell, 45 Wash.App. 70, 81 , 724 P.2d 396 (1986); Chelan County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 109 Wash.2d at 301 , 745 P.2d 1 ). ¶ 19 Determining willfulness is a question of fact reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.

2008Abona fide dispute is a “ ‘fairly debatable’ dispute over whether an employment relationship exists, or whether all or a portion of the wages must be paid.” Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 136 Wn.2d 152, 161-62 , 961 P.2d 371 (1998) (citing Cannon v. City of Moses Lake, 35 Wn.

2008App. 272, 287-88 , 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (citing Wingert, 146 Wn.2d at 848 ). 9 Pursuant to the WRA, an employer’s violation of an agency rule must be willful and with the intent to deprive its employee of wages. ¶18 A willful withholding under RCW 49.52.050(2) is a basis for exemplary damages in a civil action of “twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld . . . together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees.” RCW 49.52.070. 10 This court defines a willful withholding as “ ‘the result of knowing and intentional action and not the result of a bona fide disp

2008App. 272, 287-88 , 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (citing Wingert, 146 Wn.2d at 848 ). 9 Pursuant to the WRA, an employer’s violation of an agency rule must be willful and with the intent to deprive its employee of wages. ¶18 A willful withholding under RCW 49.52.050(2) is a basis for exemplary damages in a civil action of “twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld . . . together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees.” RCW 49.52.070. 10 This court defines a willful withholding as “ ‘the result of knowing and intentional action and not the result of a bona fide disp

2008White v. Salvation Army, 118 Wash.App. 272, 287-88 , 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (citing Wingert, 146 Wash.2d at 848 , 50 P.3d 256 ). [9] Pursuant to the WRA, an employer's violation of an agency rule must be willful and with the intent to deprive its employee of wages. ¶ 18 A willful withholding under RCW 49.52.050(2) is a basis for exemplary damages in a civil action of "twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld . . . together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney's fees." RCW 49.52.070. [10] This court defines a willful withholding as "`the result of knowing and int

2008App. 272, 287-88 , 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (citing Wingert, 146 Wn.2d at 848 ). 9 Pursuant to the WRA, an employer’s violation of an agency rule must be willful and with the intent to deprive its employee of wages. ¶18 A willful withholding under RCW 49.52.050(2) is a basis for exemplary damages in a civil action of “twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld . . . together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees.” RCW 49.52.070. 10 This court defines a willful withholding as “ ‘the result of knowing and intentional action and not the result of a bona fide disp

2008A bona fide dispute is a "`fairly debatable' dispute over whether an employment relationship exists, or whether all or a portion of the wages must be paid." Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 136 Wash.2d 152, 161-62 , 961 P.2d 371 (1998) (citing Cannon v. City of Moses Lake, 35 Wash.App. 120, 125 , 663 P.2d 865 (1983); Moran v. Stowell, 45 Wash.App. 70, 81 , 724 P.2d 396 (1986); Chelan County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n, 109 Wash.2d at 301 , 745 P.2d 1 ). ¶ 19 Determining willfulness is a question of fact reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.

2008Abona fide dispute is a “ ‘fairly debatable’ dispute over whether an employment relationship exists, or whether all or a portion of the wages must be paid.” Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 136 Wn.2d 152, 161-62 , 961 P.2d 371 (1998) (citing Cannon v. City of Moses Lake, 35 Wn.

2008App. 272, 287-88 , 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (citing Wingert, 146 Wn.2d at 848 ). 9 Pursuant to the WRA, an employer’s violation of an agency rule must be willful and with the intent to deprive its employee of wages. ¶18 A willful withholding under RCW 49.52.050(2) is a basis for exemplary damages in a civil action of “twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld . . . together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees.” RCW 49.52.070. 10 This court defines a willful withholding as “ ‘the result of knowing and intentional action and not the result of a bona fide disp

2008App. 272, 287-88 , 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (citing Wingert, 146 Wn.2d at 848 ). 9 Pursuant to the WRA, an employer’s violation of an agency rule must be willful and with the intent to deprive its employee of wages. ¶18 A willful withholding under RCW 49.52.050(2) is a basis for exemplary damages in a civil action of “twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld . . . together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees.” RCW 49.52.070. 10 This court defines a willful withholding as “ ‘the result of knowing and intentional action and not the result of a bona fide disp