27 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1847–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zweifel Manufacturing Corp. v. City of Peoriagreen2 sentences1996In Zweifel Manufacturing Corp. v. City of Peoria, 11 Ill.2d 489 , 144 N.E.2d 593 (1957), a case we cited in Mossburg , Zweifel sued the city of Peoria and sought a judgment that would declare invalid certain conditions imposed by the zoning board of appeals in granting a variance. 1996In Zweifel Manufacturing Corp. v. City of Peoria, 11 Ill.2d 489 , 144 N.E.2d 593 (1957), a case we cited in Mossburg , Zweifel sued the city of Peoria and sought a judgment that would declare invalid certain conditions imposed by the zoning board of appeals in granting a variance. | 2 | 3 |
Curtis v. Stategreen2 sentences2004“With regard to double jeopardy claims designed to prevent or invalidate trials, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), is applicable, and that an effective waiver requires knowing and intelligent action by the defendant himself. 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 33 , 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 144 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507 , 341 A.2d 388 (1975). 2004“With regard to double jeopardy claims designed to prevent or invalidate trials, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), is applicable, and that an effective waiver requires knowing and intelligent action by the defendant himself. 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 33 , 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 144 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507 , 341 A.2d 388 (1975). | 1 | 3 |
Green v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004This is the position taken by the Supreme Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-192 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). 4 “There has been no contention in this case that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his double jeopardy claim; moreover, the record would not support any such contention if it were made. 2004This is the position taken by the Supreme Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-192 , 78 S.Ct. 221 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). 4 “There has been no contention in this case that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his double jeopardy claim; moreover, the record would not support any such contention if it were made. | 1 | 2 |
Mummert v. Alizadehgreen1 sentence2025See id. at 221–22. 26 exceptions. | 1 | 1 |
Cure v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Cure, 195 Md.App. at 571 , 7 A.3d at 152 . 2011See Cure, 195 Md.App. at 571 , 7 A.3d at 152 . | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 220 , 734 A.2d 199 (1999) (appellate court may find a motion for mistrial unpreserved when untimely made after jury retires, especially if it finds that a curative instruction would have cured any prejudice and the motion is “made too late for the court conveniently to give such an instruction”). 2006See Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 220 , 734 A.2d 199 (1999) (appellate court may find a motion for mistrial unpreserved when untimely made after jury retires, especially if it finds that a curative instruction would have cured any prejudice and the motion is “made too late for the court conveniently to give such an instruction”). | 1 | 1 |
Md. Classified Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Moreover, in Maryland Classified Employees Association v. State of Maryland, supra, 346 Md. at 22, 694 A.2d at 947 , Judge Wilner for this Court took the position that the hearing must ordinarily be "pre-termination," saying: "[W]hen the attributes attendant to public employment under State law are such as to give the employee `a legitimate claim of entitlement' to the position, as under a tenure plan or where dismissal may only be for cause, a property interest in that employment is created, and the right to procedural due process ordinarily requires the opportunity of a pre-termination heari 2004Moreover, in Maryland Classified Employees Association v. State of Maryland, supra, 346 Md. at 22, 694 A.2d at 947 , Judge Wilner for this Court took the position that the hearing must ordinarily be "pre-termination," saying: "[W]hen the attributes attendant to public employment under State law are such as to give the employee `a legitimate claim of entitlement' to the position, as under a tenure plan or where dismissal may only be for cause, a property interest in that employment is created, and the right to procedural due process ordinarily requires the opportunity of a pre-termination heari | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Hampton State Bankgreen1 sentence1994Courts have stated that § 3-417’s warranty of title “is nothing more than an assurance that no one has better title to the check than the warrantor, and therefore, that no one is in a position to claim title as against the warrantee, as the payee or other owner of a genuine check could do if his endorsement were forged.” Perini 553 F.2d at 415 (quoting Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.Civ.App.1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureaugreen2 sentences1991Even under this language, we took the position that where a hearing was provided for in connection with a *667 permit or license, the proceeding was a “contested case.” See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 294-296 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1166-1167 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981) (water and sewer permits); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 479-480, 484 , 204 A.2d 521, 523, 525 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 , 86 S.Ct. 95 , 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965) (application for taxicab operator’s license). 1991Even under this language, we took the position that where a hearing was provided for in connection with a *667 permit or license, the proceeding was a “contested case.” See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 294-296 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1166-1167 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981) (water and sewer permits); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 479-480, 484 , 204 A.2d 521, 523, 525 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 , 86 S.Ct. 95 , 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965) (application for taxicab operator’s license). | 1 | 1 |
Prince George's County v. Blumberggreen2 sentences1991Even under this language, we took the position that where a hearing was provided for in connection with a *667 permit or license, the proceeding was a “contested case.” See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 294-296 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1166-1167 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981) (water and sewer permits); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 479-480, 484 , 204 A.2d 521, 523, 525 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 , 86 S.Ct. 95 , 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965) (application for taxicab operator’s license). 1991Even under this language, we took the position that where a hearing was provided for in connection with a *667 permit or license, the proceeding was a “contested case.” See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 294-296 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1166-1167 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981) (water and sewer permits); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 479-480, 484 , 204 A.2d 521, 523, 525 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 , 86 S.Ct. 95 , 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965) (application for taxicab operator’s license). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1990For reasoning that supports the position that a violation of rights which arise under Article IV(c) should survive a guilty plea, see the court’s dicta in People v. Harris, 148 Mich.App. 506 , 384 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 (App.1986). . 1990For reasoning that supports the position that a violation of rights which arise under Article IV(c) should survive a guilty plea, see the court’s dicta in People v. Harris, 148 Mich.App. 506 , 384 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 (App.1986). . | 1 | 1 |
Jennings v. Stategreen1 sentence1988See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104 (Ala.1980); Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 , 696 P.2d 700 (1985); State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); In Interest of Dow, 75 Ill.App.3d 1002 , 31 Ill.Dec. 39 , 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979); In the Matter of Skinner, 272 S.C. 135 , 249 S.E.2d 746 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Pottebaum v. Hindsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Panagoulisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Walters v. Sloangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2004“With regard to double jeopardy claims designed to prevent or invalidate trials, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), is applicable, and that an effective waiver requires knowing and intelligent action by the defendant himself. 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 33 , 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 144 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507 , 341 A.2d 388 (1975). 2004“With regard to double jeopardy claims designed to prevent or invalidate trials, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), is applicable, and that an effective waiver requires knowing and intelligent action by the defendant himself. 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 33 , 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 144 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507 , 341 A.2d 388 (1975). | 2 | 1982–2004 |
Jourdan v. State
green
2 sentences2004“With regard to double jeopardy claims designed to prevent or invalidate trials, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), is applicable, and that an effective waiver requires knowing and intelligent action by the defendant himself. 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 33 , 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 144 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507 , 341 A.2d 388 (1975). 2004“With regard to double jeopardy claims designed to prevent or invalidate trials, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), is applicable, and that an effective waiver requires knowing and intelligent action by the defendant himself. 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 33 , 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 144 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507 , 341 A.2d 388 (1975). | 2 | 1982–2004 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences2004“With regard to double jeopardy claims designed to prevent or invalidate trials, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), is applicable, and that an effective waiver requires knowing and intelligent action by the defendant himself. 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 33 , 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 144 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507 , 341 A.2d 388 (1975). 2004“With regard to double jeopardy claims designed to prevent or invalidate trials, this Court has repeatedly taken the position that the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 , 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938), is applicable, and that an effective waiver requires knowing and intelligent action by the defendant himself. 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 33 , 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 144 , 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507 , 341 A.2d 388 (1975). | 2 | 1982–2004 |
cluster 19566
green
2 sentences2007In Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir.1999), another federal appellate court utilized the job description of an employee’s position in its analysis of whether that position was ministerial. 198 F.3d at 176 . 2007In Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir.1999), another federal appellate court utilized the job description of an employee’s position in its analysis of whether that position was ministerial. 198 F.3d at 176 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Shirkey v. Eastwind Community Development Corp.
green
2 sentences2007In Shirkey v. Eastwind Community Development Corp., 941 F.Supp. 567 (1996), the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland concluded that, based solely on the job description approved by the defendant religious organization, the position sought by a job applicant was not ministerial. 941 F.Supp. at 577-78 . 2007In Shirkey v. Eastwind Community Development Corp., 941 F.Supp. 567 (1996), the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland concluded that, based solely on the job description approved by the defendant religious organization, the position sought by a job applicant was not ministerial. 941 F.Supp. at 577-78 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences1997Concomitant to this right, he continues, is the "constitutional right to adequately inquire of prospective jurors to determine if cause existed for disqualification." (citing Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27 , 633 A.2d 867 (1993)). 1997Concomitant to this right, he continues, is the "constitutional right to adequately inquire of prospective jurors to determine if cause existed for disqualification." (citing Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27 , 633 A.2d 867 (1993)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Montgomery County v. Mossburg
green
1 sentence1996We did say, however, that “[i]f he decides to accept a conditioned exception, it would appear that he would not thereafter be in a position to challenge the conditions, although we need not now decide the point.” Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
cluster 344807
green
1 sentence1994Courts have stated that § 3-417’s warranty of title “is nothing more than an assurance that no one has better title to the check than the warrantor, and therefore, that no one is in a position to claim title as against the warrantee, as the payee or other owner of a genuine check could do if his endorsement were forged.” Perini 553 F.2d at 415 (quoting Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.Civ.App.1973)). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Scalzo v. Hurney
green
1 sentence1991Even under this language, we took the position that where a hearing was provided for in connection with a *667 permit or license, the proceeding was a “contested case.” See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 294-296 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1166-1167 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981) (water and sewer permits); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 479-480, 484 , 204 A.2d 521, 523, 525 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 , 86 S.Ct. 95 , 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965) (application for taxicab operator’s license). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Tinari v. United States
green
1 sentence1991Even under this language, we took the position that where a hearing was provided for in connection with a *667 permit or license, the proceeding was a “contested case.” See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 294-296 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1166-1167 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981) (water and sewer permits); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 479-480, 484 , 204 A.2d 521, 523, 525 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 , 86 S.Ct. 95 , 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965) (application for taxicab operator’s license). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Ciaffoni v. Cowden
green
1 sentence1991Even under this language, we took the position that where a hearing was provided for in connection with a *667 permit or license, the proceeding was a “contested case.” See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 294-296 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1166-1167 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981) (water and sewer permits); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 479-480, 484 , 204 A.2d 521, 523, 525 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 , 86 S.Ct. 95 , 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965) (application for taxicab operator’s license). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Greenawalt v. Pawlak
green
1 sentence1991Even under this language, we took the position that where a hearing was provided for in connection with a *667 permit or license, the proceeding was a “contested case.” See, e.g., Prince George’s Co. v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 294-296 , 418 A.2d 1155, 1166-1167 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 , 101 S.Ct. 869 , 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981) (water and sewer permits); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 479-480, 484 , 204 A.2d 521, 523, 525 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 , 86 S.Ct. 95 , 15 L.Ed.2d 88 (1965) (application for taxicab operator’s license). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Gammons v. Berlat
green
2 sentences1988See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104 (Ala.1980); Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 , 696 P.2d 700 (1985); State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); In Interest of Dow, 75 Ill.App.3d 1002 , 31 Ill.Dec. 39 , 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979); In the Matter of Skinner, 272 S.C. 135 , 249 S.E.2d 746 (1978). 1988See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104 (Ala.1980); Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 , 696 P.2d 700 (1985); State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); In Interest of Dow, 75 Ill.App.3d 1002 , 31 Ill.Dec. 39 , 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979); In the Matter of Skinner, 272 S.C. 135 , 249 S.E.2d 746 (1978). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. DH
green
1 sentence1988See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104 (Ala.1980); Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 , 696 P.2d 700 (1985); State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); In Interest of Dow, 75 Ill.App.3d 1002 , 31 Ill.Dec. 39 , 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979); In the Matter of Skinner, 272 S.C. 135 , 249 S.E.2d 746 (1978). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Matter of Skinner
green
2 sentences1988See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104 (Ala.1980); Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 , 696 P.2d 700 (1985); State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); In Interest of Dow, 75 Ill.App.3d 1002 , 31 Ill.Dec. 39 , 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979); In the Matter of Skinner, 272 S.C. 135 , 249 S.E.2d 746 (1978). 1988See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104 (Ala.1980); Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 , 696 P.2d 700 (1985); State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); In Interest of Dow, 75 Ill.App.3d 1002 , 31 Ill.Dec. 39 , 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979); In the Matter of Skinner, 272 S.C. 135 , 249 S.E.2d 746 (1978). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Dow
green
2 sentences1988See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104 (Ala.1980); Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 , 696 P.2d 700 (1985); State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); In Interest of Dow, 75 Ill.App.3d 1002 , 31 Ill.Dec. 39 , 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979); In the Matter of Skinner, 272 S.C. 135 , 249 S.E.2d 746 (1978). 1988See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 384 So.2d 104 (Ala.1980); Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148 , 696 P.2d 700 (1985); State v. D.H., 340 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1976); In Interest of Dow, 75 Ill.App.3d 1002 , 31 Ill.Dec. 39 , 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979); In the Matter of Skinner, 272 S.C. 135 , 249 S.E.2d 746 (1978). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Steelman v. Lind green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Berko v. Freda green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hannah v. Jensen
green
1 sentence1987See Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 242 , 384 A.2d 76 (1978); Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal.3d 199, 202 , 142 Cal.Rptr. 152 , 571 P.2d 609 (1977) (“While denominated the fireman’s rule, the rule is applicable to policemen as well”); Steelman v. Lind, 97 Nev. 425 , 427 n. 2, 634 P.2d 666 (1981) (‘“Fireman’s Rule’ ... is applied to bar certain tort causes of action by firemen and policemen injured during the course of their hazardous occupations”); Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 643 (Iowa 1984); Hannah v. Jensen, 298 N.W.2d 52 (Minn.1980); Berko v. Freda, .93 NJ. 81, 87, 459 A.2d 663 | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Richardson v. State
green
2 sentences1987This Court has long taken the position that the privilege against self-incrimination contained in Art. 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights generally is "in pari materia with its federal counterpart.” Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 265 , 401 A.2d 1021 (1979). 1987This Court has long taken the position that the privilege against self-incrimination contained in Art. 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights generally is "in pari materia with its federal counterpart.” Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 265 , 401 A.2d 1021 (1979). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Jones v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Collins v. State green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Singleton v. Roman green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Sheets v. City of Hagerstown green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Turner v. Schwarz green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Woollen v. Hillen green | 1 | 1901–1901 |
| Norwood v. Norwood neutral | 1 | 1847–1847 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.