position challenge in Kansas

2022See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez-Castillo, 345 Or. 39, 50-51 , 188 P.3d 268 (2008) (noting [1] State did not argue language conduit theory before the trial court, [2] neither defendant nor State presented any evidence on factors, and [3] trial court had no chance to rule on factors, which meant appellate court was "not in a position to rule as a matter of law" on theory's applicability under that state's residual hearsay exception); Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 348 - 49 (discussing burden proponent of evidence bears in establishing reliability of interpretation before language conduit theory applies).

2003“An insurer assumes a duty to define any limitations on coverage in clear and explicit terms.” Americold, 261 Kan. 806 , Syl. ¶ 1.

2001In State v. Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 232 , 911 P.2d 792 (1995), the defendant raised an argument similar to the State's argument in the instant case, contending that "if an appellate court should review the sentencing court's reasons for departing to see if they are substantial and compelling as a matter of law, this would violate the policy that the finder of fact is in the best position to rule upon the credibility, sufficiency, and weight of the evidence." We disagreed, stating that the issue should be reviewed de novo with no deference given to the sentencing court. 259 Kan. at 233 .

2001In State v. Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 232 , 911 P.2d 792 (1995), the defendant raised an argument similar to the State's argument in the instant case, contending that "if an appellate court should review the sentencing court's reasons for departing to see if they are substantial and compelling as a matter of law, this would violate the policy that the finder of fact is in the best position to rule upon the credibility, sufficiency, and weight of the evidence." We disagreed, stating that the issue should be reviewed de novo with no deference given to the sentencing court. 259 Kan. at 233 .

1971Although a few courts have taken this position our rule, as well as in most jurisdictions, is the act does not relieve livestock commission agents licensed thereunder as marketing agencies from tort liability for wrongful conversion (Citizens State Bank v. Farmers Union Livestock Cooperative Co., 165 Kan. 96 , 193 P. 2d 636 ; anno. 2 A. L.

1971Although a few courts have taken this position our rule, as well as in most jurisdictions, is the act does not relieve livestock commission agents licensed thereunder as marketing agencies from tort liability for wrongful conversion (Citizens State Bank v. Farmers Union Livestock Cooperative Co., 165 Kan. 96 , 193 P. 2d 636 ; anno. 2 A. L.

1965We stated in Hardman v. Hand, 190 Kan. 148 , 373 P. 2d 178 , and reiterated in White v. Hand, 190 Kan. 472 , 375 P. 2d 616 , that the requirements of G.

1965We stated in Hardman v. Hand, 190 Kan. 148 , 373 P. 2d 178 , and reiterated in White v. Hand, 190 Kan. 472 , 375 P. 2d 616 , that the requirements of G.

1965We stated in Hardman v. Hand, 190 Kan. 148 , 373 P. 2d 178 , and reiterated in White v. Hand, 190 Kan. 472 , 375 P. 2d 616 , that the requirements of G.

1965We stated in Hardman v. Hand, 190 Kan. 148 , 373 P. 2d 178 , and reiterated in White v. Hand, 190 Kan. 472 , 375 P. 2d 616 , that the requirements of G.

1965Petitioner argues that the statute is unconstitutional on the grounds that the time provided for the appoinment of counsel is inadequate under the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 , 12 L.

1965Petitioner argues that the statute is unconstitutional on the grounds that the time provided for the appoinment of counsel is inadequate under the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 , 12 L.

1949(Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482 ; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .)” (p. 1307.) See, also 28 Am.

1949(Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482 ; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .)” (p. 1307.) See, also 28 Am.

1949(Chantland v. Sherman, 148 Iowa 352 , and cases cited; Newman v. French, 138 Iowa 482 ; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385 .)” (p. 1307.) See, also 28 Am.

1933Under the recent case of Verdón State Bank v. Smyth, 137 Kan. 1 , 18 P. 2d 897 , and the undisputed facts, we must hold that the plaintiff’s loan was not for purchase money, and hence the court was not warranted in so treating it and in reducing 'the redemption period from eighteen to six months. , The judgment, therefore, will be reversed with the direction to enter judgment in accordance with the opinion of this court.

1933Under the recent case of Verdón State Bank v. Smyth, 137 Kan. 1 , 18 P. 2d 897 , and the undisputed facts, we must hold that the plaintiff’s loan was not for purchase money, and hence the court was not warranted in so treating it and in reducing 'the redemption period from eighteen to six months. , The judgment, therefore, will be reversed with the direction to enter judgment in accordance with the opinion of this court.

1929In Kuhn v. Bank, 74 Kan. 456 , 87 Pac. 551 , it was said: “We have not been cited to any authority, nor have we found any, supporting the proposition that an independent purchaser of real property encumbered with liens who has no interest to protect therein, and no other equitable claim, can assume the payment and pay such lien or liens as he may choose and claim subrogation as against all inferior liens,” except certain cases which it is said are not in accord with the weight of authority.

1929In Kuhn v. Bank, 74 Kan. 456 , 87 Pac. 551 , it was said: “We have not been cited to any authority, nor have we found any, supporting the proposition that an independent purchaser of real property encumbered with liens who has no interest to protect therein, and no other equitable claim, can assume the payment and pay such lien or liens as he may choose and claim subrogation as against all inferior liens,” except certain cases which it is said are not in accord with the weight of authority.

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1927(Bank v. Grain Company, 63 Kan. 343 , 65 Pac. 676 ; Kueker v. Murphy, 86 Kan. 332 , 120 Pac. 362 ; Howard v. Tourbier, 98 Kan. 624, 160 Pac. 1144 ; Smith v. Shaver, 112 Kan. 790 , 212 Pac. 666 ; Jones v. Perkins, 115 Kan. 759 , 225 Pac. 97 ; In re Wood’s Estate, 118 Kan. 548 , 235 Pac. 864 ; Slabaugh v. State Bank, 123 Kan. 484 , 256 Pac. 139 .) It may be said that the defendants have not been ousted or their possession disturbed by the trustee or anyone else, and they are hardly in a position to challenge the title of their landlord, but however that may be, the right of redemption being exem

1907(Pine v. Bank, 63 Kan. 462, 465 , 65 Pac. 960 ; Woodmen Circle v. Stretton, 68 Kan. 403 , 75 Pac. 472 .) In answer to special questions the jury found that the engine was running at from four to five miles an hour; that no other signal was given except the signal for coal, which was sounded from 550 to 750 feet west of the place of the accident; that the employees in charge of the engine failed to keep a lookout, and never saw deceased; that he had not gone after the chisel but was at work on the track at a point about forty feet west of the coal-chute, and was prevented from hearing the appro

1907(Pine v. Bank, 63 Kan. 462, 465 , 65 Pac. 960 ; Woodmen Circle v. Stretton, 68 Kan. 403 , 75 Pac. 472 .) In answer to special questions the jury found that the engine was running at from four to five miles an hour; that no other signal was given except the signal for coal, which was sounded from 550 to 750 feet west of the place of the accident; that the employees in charge of the engine failed to keep a lookout, and never saw deceased; that he had not gone after the chisel but was at work on the track at a point about forty feet west of the coal-chute, and was prevented from hearing the appro

1907(Pine v. Bank, 63 Kan. 462, 465 , 65 Pac. 960 ; Woodmen Circle v. Stretton, 68 Kan. 403 , 75 Pac. 472 .) In answer to special questions the jury found that the engine was running at from four to five miles an hour; that no other signal was given except the signal for coal, which was sounded from 550 to 750 feet west of the place of the accident; that the employees in charge of the engine failed to keep a lookout, and never saw deceased; that he had not gone after the chisel but was at work on the track at a point about forty feet west of the coal-chute, and was prevented from hearing the appro

1882Co. v. Lea, 20 Kas. 353 , the land-owner in this case violated no statute in suffering his cattle to go at large.' Whatever risk of liability he might run to the owners of fields properly fenced, or to a railroad •company whose track was properly fenced, for any depredations or injury done by his cattle, the owner of an unfenced field and a railroad company with an unfenced track were not in a position to challenge his conduct.