position doctrine in West Virginia

2024If the court reverses or modifies a decision of the board pursuant to this subsection, it shall state with specificity the basis for the reversal or modification and the manner in which the decision of the board clearly violated constitutional or statutory provisions, resulted from erroneous conclusions of law, or was so clearly wrong based upon the evidentiary record that even when all inferences are resolved in favor of the board’s findings, reasoning, and conclusions, there is insufficient support to sustain the decision. 3 Because this Court and “not the parties, must determine the standar

2010Applying this standard, the circuit court concluded that it could not dismiss the appellees’ claims at this stage in the proceedings. *477 It is the appellants’ position that the test applicable to retaliatory prosecution cases like the instant one is found in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 , 126 S.Ct. 1695 , 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (hereinafter “Hartman ”), not in Mt.

2010Applying this standard, the circuit court concluded that it could not dismiss the appellees’ claims at this stage in the proceedings. *477 It is the appellants’ position that the test applicable to retaliatory prosecution cases like the instant one is found in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 , 126 S.Ct. 1695 , 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (hereinafter “Hartman ”), not in Mt.

1999Standard of Review “ ‘Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving the interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.’ Syllabus point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).” Syl.

1999Standard of Review “ ‘Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving the interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.’ Syllabus point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138 , 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).” Syl.

1998Recently, in State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3 , 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995), this Court addressed the effect of an attorney for a criminal defen dant specifically waiving objections 1 to a trial event which, as in this case, might be considered to be plain error.

1998Recently, in State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3 , 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995), this Court addressed the effect of an attorney for a criminal defen dant specifically waiving objections 1 to a trial event which, as in this case, might be considered to be plain error.

1979They did find in Jones that it “is impossible to apply the harmless error doctrine in the case before us....” [ 241 S.E.2d at 918 ] In an additional concurring opinion, two Justices took the position that the doctrine of harmless error could not apply to a Mullaney-Pendry instruction.

1979This was based on the reason that the doctrine of harmless constitutional error rests upon a finding that “ ‘the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Chapman v. Cali *797 fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967).” [ 241 S.E.2d at 919 ].

1946White v. City of Charles ton, 98 W.

1933Paxton v. Benedum Trees, 80 W.

1925The Attorney General in approving the bonds took the position that the requirement of the various items of information to the voter on the ballot as required by the Act of 1923, was directory rather than mandatory; and that full information having been given in the proclamation calling the election by publication in all of the newspapers of the municipality, once a week for four successive weeks, and posted at each voting precinct as required by law, no one could have been misled, and every voter knew what proposition he was called to vote upon; citing Lawson v. County Court, 80 W.

1906Having thus reached the conclusion that usury, as a de- ■ fense, is not distinguishable from others in respect to the time at which it must be made in a court of equity, it follows that the decisions in Lehman v. Hinton, 44 W.

1900The trustees base this position or claim on the well-established principle that, where one co-tenant has made improvements upon a part of the common land, such improvements -should be included in the land allotted to him in the partition, if the land is partible, and it can be done without injury to the rights of others, and the further principle, held in Dodson v. Hays, 29 W.

1900Va. 577 , ( 2 S. E. 415 ), that when the nature of the property is such as to admit of its use by several, and less than his just share is used and occupied by one tenant in common in a manner which in no way hinders or excludes other tenants in common from in like manner using and occupying their shares, such tenant does not receive more thati comes to his just share and proportion, within the meaning of section 14, chapter 100, of the Code, and is not accountable to his co-tenants for the profits of that portion of the property occupied by him.