position standard in Colorado

1897In Teirnan’s Executors v. Woodruff, 5 McLean, 350 , it was held that where the maker of a note was a discharged bankrupt, an agreement between him and the holder for two months’ delay, although on a valid consideration, did not discharge the indorser, because the latter could not, by making payment, have recourse against him.

1897In Teirnan’s Executors v. Woodruff, 5 McLean, 350 , it was held that where the maker of a note was a discharged bankrupt, an agreement between him and the holder for two months’ delay, although on a valid consideration, did not discharge the indorser, because the latter could not, by making payment, have recourse against him.

1991Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 , 58 S.Ct. 817, 822 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1937).

1991Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 , 58 S.Ct. 817, 822 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1937).

1991The seventh circuit "has not taken a position on the standard of proof required for punitive damages in a § 1983 case.” Coulter v. Vitale, 882 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir.1989); see also Fogarty v. Greenwood, 724 F.Supp. 545 , 546 (N.D.Ill.1989) (the appropriate burden of proof to apply to punitive damage claims in § 1983 actions "is a still-open question — moreover, a question on which there is certainly room for differences of view”). ."Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.” Erie R.R.

1991The seventh circuit "has not taken a position on the standard of proof required for punitive damages in a § 1983 case." Coulter v. Vitale, 882 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir.1989); see also Fogarty v. Greenwood, 724 F.Supp. 545 , 546 (N.D.Ill.1989) (the appropriate burden of proof to apply to punitive damage claims in § 1983 actions "is a still-open question—moreover, a question on which there is certainly room for differences of view"). [6] "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State." Erie R.R.

1961See Johnston v. Johnston, 123 Colo. 28 , 224 P. (2d) 949 ; and Parker v. Hilliard, 106 Colo. 187 , 102 P. (2d) 734 .

1961See Johnston v. Johnston, 123 Colo. 28 , 224 P. (2d) 949 ; and Parker v. Hilliard, 106 Colo. 187 , 102 P. (2d) 734 .

1955Hartman v. Reid, 17 C.A. 407, 68 Pac. 787 ; Bean v. Westwood, 101 Colo. 288 , 73 P. (2d) 386 . *387 Defendant acted upon actual knowledge which he had concerning the application for deed, by voluntarily appearing before the treasurer and requesting redemption, and was not thereafter in a position to claim the deed is void because his appearance was not made as the result of service of notice upon him.

1955Hartman v. Reid, 17 C.A. 407, 68 Pac. 787 ; Bean v. Westwood, 101 Colo. 288 , 73 P. (2d) 386 . *387 Defendant acted upon actual knowledge which he had concerning the application for deed, by voluntarily appearing before the treasurer and requesting redemption, and was not thereafter in a position to claim the deed is void because his appearance was not made as the result of service of notice upon him.

1906In support of this position the rule announced in Rittmaster v. Brisbane, 19 Colo. 371 -376, is invoked, where it is held that the general rule — that the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court upon an issue of fact where the court tries the issue upon evidence given orally by living witnesses in its presence, provided there is a substantial conflict in the evidence bearing upon such issue — does not prevail when the issue is determined upon testimony taken and reported to the trial court in writing.

1906The rule announced in Rittmaster v. Brisbane, supra, is not applicable to the case at .bar, for the reason that one of the defendants in this case testified orally before the court upon the whole subject-matter of this controversy, and upon every issue presented by the pleadings.