position principle in North Carolina

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1910We do not think it is necessary for us to decide, in order to pass upon this question, whether or not the plaintiff is a riparian owner, in the sense that it has the right to use the water of the river for manufacturing purposes, though there are authorities for the contention of the plaintiff that it has such right and all the rights of a riparian owner, and especially that it had "a (491) right to the undisturbed flow of the river which passed along the whole frontage of its property in the manner in which it had formerly been accustomed to pass." Land Co. v. Hotel Co. , 132 N.C. 517 ; Gould

1910Tbe next question presented in the case is whether tbe plaintiff is in a position to challenge tbe right of tbe defendant to obstruct tbe flow of water in tbe Roanoke River. ¥e do not think it is necessary for us to decide, in order to pass upon this question, whether or not tbe plaintiff is a riparian owner, in tbe sense that it has tbe right to use tbe water of tbe river for manufacturing purposes, though there are authorities for tbe contention of tbe plaintiff that it has sucb right and all tbe rights of a riparian owner, and especially that it bad “a right to the undisturbed flow of the r

1910We do not think it is necessary for us to decide, in order to pass upon this question, whether or not the plaintiff is a riparian owner, in the sense that it has the right to use the water of the river for manufacturing purposes, though there are authorities for the contention of the plaintiff that it has such right and all the rights of a riparian owner, and especially that it had "a (491) right to the undisturbed flow of the river which passed along the whole frontage of its property in the manner in which it had formerly been accustomed to pass." Land Co. v. Hotel Co. , 132 N.C. 517 ; Gould

1910Tbe next question presented in the case is whether tbe plaintiff is in a position to challenge tbe right of tbe defendant to obstruct tbe flow of water in tbe Roanoke River. ¥e do not think it is necessary for us to decide, in order to pass upon this question, whether or not tbe plaintiff is a riparian owner, in tbe sense that it has tbe right to use tbe water of tbe river for manufacturing purposes, though there are authorities for tbe contention of tbe plaintiff that it has sucb right and all tbe rights of a riparian owner, and especially that it bad “a right to the undisturbed flow of the r

2019Id. at 525, 724 S.E.2d at 116 .

2011As a trial court addresses conflicts and waivers, the position of defense counsel may be pertinent. “[D]efense counsel are often in the best position to recognize when dual representation presents a conflict of interest; thus, they shoulder an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to promptly inform the trial court when a conflict arises.” Walls, 342 N.C. at 40 , 463 S.E.2d at 758 (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346-47 , 64 L.

2011As a trial court addresses conflicts and waivers, the position of defense counsel may be pertinent. “[D]efense counsel are often in the best position to recognize when dual representation presents a conflict of interest; thus, they shoulder an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to promptly inform the trial court when a conflict arises.” Walls, 342 N.C. at 40 , 463 S.E.2d at 758 (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346-47 , 64 L.

2011As a trial court addresses conflicts and waivers, the position of defense counsel may be pertinent. “[D]efense counsel are often in the best position to recognize when dual representation presents a conflict of interest; thus, they shoulder an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to promptly inform the trial court when a conflict arises.” Walls, 342 N.C. at 40 , 463 S.E.2d at 758 (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346-47 , 64 L.

2011As a trial court addresses conflicts and waivers, the position of defense counsel may be pertinent. “[D]efense counsel are often in the best position to recognize when dual representation presents a conflict of interest; thus, they shoulder an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to promptly inform the trial court when a conflict arises.” Walls, 342 N.C. at 40 , 463 S.E.2d at 758 (citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346-47 , 64 L.

2011Ed. 2d at 345-46 ), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197 , 134 L.

2002App. at 353 , 542 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting Pruitt, 289 N.C. at 259 , 221 S.E.2d at 358 ) (quoting Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163 , 130 S.E.2d 39 (1963)).

2002App. at 353 , 542 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting Pruitt, 289 N.C. at 259 , 221 S.E.2d at 358 ) (quoting Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163 , 130 S.E.2d 39 (1963)).

2002App. at 353 , 542 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting Pruitt, 289 N.C. at 259 , 221 S.E.2d at 358 ) (quoting Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163 , 130 S.E.2d 39 (1963)).

2002In so holding, this Court said that once a Form 21 Agreement is approved, “neither party was in a position to challenge any provision of the agreement, ‘unless it [was] made to appear to the satisfaction of the Commission ‘that there [had] been error due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake.’ ’ ” Clark, 142 N.C.

1977Defendant assigns as error the court’s instruction that: “[I]f the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed Doris Jean Ferebee with a deadly weapon or intentionally inflicted a wound upon Mrs. Ferebee with a deadly weapon that proximately caused her death, the law implies first that the killing was unlawful and second that it was done with malice.” Relying upon Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , he takes the position that the instruction violated his rights to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Un

1977Defendant assigns as error the court’s instruction that: “[I]f the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed Doris Jean Ferebee with a deadly weapon or intentionally inflicted a wound upon Mrs. Ferebee with a deadly weapon that proximately caused her death, the law implies first that the killing was unlawful and second that it was done with malice.” Relying upon Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , he takes the position that the instruction violated his rights to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Un

1975In State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786 , 461 P. 2d 919 (1969), the Court took the position that the rule in New Mexico is that regardless of whether there is a stipulation, or regardless of the contents of the stipulation, evidence as to polygraph examinations and results is not admissible over objection.

1975In State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786 , 461 P. 2d 919 (1969), the Court took the position that the rule in New Mexico is that regardless of whether there is a stipulation, or regardless of the contents of the stipulation, evidence as to polygraph examinations and results is not admissible over objection.

1973His view is supported by Insurance Co. v. Sheek, 272 N.C. 484 , 158 S.E. 2d 635 .

1973His view is supported by Insurance Co. v. Sheek, 272 N.C. 484 , 158 S.E. 2d 635 .

1969G.S. 15-200; State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691 , 65 S.E. 2d 508 .

1969G.S. 15-200; State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691 , 65 S.E. 2d 508 .

1968This instruction did not require “that the defendant must have foreseen the injury in the exact form' in which it occurred.” On the contrary, this statement is in keeping with the view expressed by Parker, C.J., in Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62 , 149 S.E. 2d 590 , where he stated: “The only negligence of legal importance is negligence which proximately causes or contributes to the death or injury under judicial investigation. . . .

1968This instruction did not require “that the defendant must have foreseen the injury in the exact form' in which it occurred.” On the contrary, this statement is in keeping with the view expressed by Parker, C.J., in Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62 , 149 S.E. 2d 590 , where he stated: “The only negligence of legal importance is negligence which proximately causes or contributes to the death or injury under judicial investigation. . . .

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967Keel v. Bailey, 224 N.C. 447 , 31 S.E. 2d 362 ; Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196 , 154 S.E. 52 ; Willis v. Willis, 203 N.C. 517 , 166 S.E. 398 ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139 N.C. 215 , 51 S.E. 909 ; Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N.C. 15 , 138 S.E. 403 ; Williams v. R.

1967In North Carolina, whether a quitclaim deed or a deed of bargain and sale without technical covenants creates an estoppel depends upon its language, Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636 , 112 S.E. 2d 81 ; and there is substantial authority in this jurisdiction for the position that the principle of estoppel will apply when the deed shows that the grantor intended to convey and the grantee expected *179 to acquire a particular estate, although the deed contains no technical covenants.

1967In North Carolina, whether a quitclaim deed or a deed of bargain and sale without technical covenants creates an estoppel depends upon its language, Harrell v. Powell, 251 N.C. 636 , 112 S.E. 2d 81 ; and there is substantial authority in this jurisdiction for the position that the principle of estoppel will apply when the deed shows that the grantor intended to convey and the grantee expected *179 to acquire a particular estate, although the deed contains no technical covenants.

1966Convent v. Winston-Salem, 243 N.C. 316 , 90 S.E. 2d 879 .

1966Convent v. Winston-Salem, 243 N.C. 316 , 90 S.E. 2d 879 .

1938Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C., 648 , 161 S. E., 91 ; Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Byrd v. Hospital, 202 N. C., 337 , 162 S. E., 738 .

1938Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C., 648 , 161 S. E., 91 ; Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Byrd v. Hospital, 202 N. C., 337 , 162 S. E., 738 .

1938Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C., 648 , 161 S. E., 91 ; Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Byrd v. Hospital, 202 N. C., 337 , 162 S. E., 738 .

1938Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C., 648 , 161 S. E., 91 ; Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Byrd v. Hospital, 202 N. C., 337 , 162 S. E., 738 .

1938Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C., 648 , 161 S. E., 91 ; Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Byrd v. Hospital, 202 N. C., 337 , 162 S. E., 738 .

1938Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C., 648 , 161 S. E., 91 ; Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Byrd v. Hospital, 202 N. C., 337 , 162 S. E., 738 .