9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1953–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sherer v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2014See Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1983) (explaining that “a witness may be cross-examined on a prior bad act that has not resulted in a criminal conviction only *1265 where: (1) the examiner has a factual predicate for such question, and (2) the bad act bears directly upon the veracity of the witness in respect to the issues involved [in] the trial” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Akers, 374 A.2d 874, 878 (D.C.1977))). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Akersgreen1 sentence2014See Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1983) (explaining that “a witness may be cross-examined on a prior bad act that has not resulted in a criminal conviction only *1265 where: (1) the examiner has a factual predicate for such question, and (2) the bad act bears directly upon the veracity of the witness in respect to the issues involved [in] the trial” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Akers, 374 A.2d 874, 878 (D.C.1977))). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Barriteaugreen2 sentences1997District of Columbia v. Barriteau, 399 A.2d 563, 567 (D.C.1979). 1997District of Columbia v. Barriteau, 399 A.2d 563, 567 (D.C.1979). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Banksgreen2 sentences1993See In re Banks, 561 A.2d at 159 . [3] The provisions of D.C.Code § 28-3904 that DCRA charged Banks with violating are as follows: It shall be a violation . . . for any person to: (a) represent that goods or services have a source, sponsorship, approval, certification, accessories, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities that they do not have; (b) represent that the person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, certification or connection that the person does not have; * * * * * * (d) represent that goods or services are of particular standard, quality, grade, sty 1993See In re Banks, 561 A.2d at 159 . . | 1 | 1 |
Gordon v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992When the witness gave other testimony at variance with his grand jury testimony, the prosecutor was in a position to claim surprise. “[A] prosecutor [is] entitled to rely on the witness’ prior testimony given under oath, under the presumption that the witness understood the ramifications of committing perjury.” Price, supra, 545 A.2d at 1224 (citing Parker, supra, 363 A.2d at 977 ; Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1229-31 (D.C.1983)). 1992When the witness gave other testimony at variance with his grand jury testimony, the prosecutor was in a position to claim surprise. "[A] prosecutor [is] entitled to rely on the witness' prior testimony given under oath, under the presumption that the witness understood the ramifications of committing perjury." Price, supra, 545 A.2d at 1224 (citing Parker, supra, 363 A.2d at 977 ; Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1229-31 (D.C.1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991See Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862, 865 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). 2 Appellant received her right to an immediate appeal and the trial judge, upon being advised of the appeal, did not commence further material steps in the trial process. 3 Since a trial does not begin until the jury is impaneled, Arnold v. United States, 443 A.2d 1318 , 1327 n. 10 (D.C.1982); Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 499-500 (D.C.1972), appellant is not in a position to claim that she was burdened with a second trial. 1991See Campbell, supra, 295 A.2d at 499-500 . | 1 | 1 |
Kotteakos v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991See Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862, 865 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). 2 Appellant received her right to an immediate appeal and the trial judge, upon being advised of the appeal, did not commence further material steps in the trial process. 3 Since a trial does not begin until the jury is impaneled, Arnold v. United States, 443 A.2d 1318 , 1327 n. 10 (D.C.1982); Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 499-500 (D.C.1972), appellant is not in a position to claim that she was burdened with a second trial. 1991See Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862, 865 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). 2 Appellant received her right to an immediate appeal and the trial judge, upon being advised of the appeal, did not commence further material steps in the trial process. 3 Since a trial does not begin until the jury is impaneled, Arnold v. United States, 443 A.2d 1318 , 1327 n. 10 (D.C.1982); Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 499-500 (D.C.1972), appellant is not in a position to claim that she was burdened with a second trial. | 1 | 1 |
Beach v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1991See Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862, 865 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). 2 Appellant received her right to an immediate appeal and the trial judge, upon being advised of the appeal, did not commence further material steps in the trial process. 3 Since a trial does not begin until the jury is impaneled, Arnold v. United States, 443 A.2d 1318 , 1327 n. 10 (D.C.1982); Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 499-500 (D.C.1972), appellant is not in a position to claim that she was burdened with a second trial. | 1 | 1 |
Arnold v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1991See Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862, 865 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). 2 Appellant received her right to an immediate appeal and the trial judge, upon being advised of the appeal, did not commence further material steps in the trial process. 3 Since a trial does not begin until the jury is impaneled, Arnold v. United States, 443 A.2d 1318 , 1327 n. 10 (D.C.1982); Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 499-500 (D.C.1972), appellant is not in a position to claim that she was burdened with a second trial. | 1 | 1 |
Fitzgerald v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1991Because of a lingering uncertainty about whether a delayed report exception might or might not be permissible on the facts of this case, the trial court adopted the government’s recommendation. 19 See Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1304 (D.C.1982) (en banc) (Because “fresh complaint of rape” does not have guarantees of trustworthiness of spontaneous utterance, “the bare fact of the complaint may be introduced only for the purposes of corroboration [and] not for the truth of the matter asserted therein.”). | 1 | 1 |
Banton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1987See Banton v. United States, 411 A.2d 975, 979 (D.C.1980) (trial court has greater opportunity than appellate court “to assess the demeanor, reliability and credibility” of witness). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Price v. United States
green
2 sentences1992When the witness gave other testimony at variance with his grand jury testimony, the prosecutor was in a position to claim surprise. "[A] prosecutor [is] entitled to rely on the witness' prior testimony given under oath, under the presumption that the witness understood the ramifications of committing perjury." Price, supra, 545 A.2d at 1224 (citing Parker, supra, 363 A.2d at 977 ; Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1229-31 (D.C.1983)). 1992When the witness gave other testimony at variance with his grand jury testimony, the prosecutor was in a position to claim surprise. "[A] prosecutor [is] entitled to rely on the witness' prior testimony given under oath, under the presumption that the witness understood the ramifications of committing perjury." Price, supra, 545 A.2d at 1224 (citing Parker, supra, 363 A.2d at 977 ; Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1229-31 (D.C.1983)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Parker v. United States
green
2 sentences1992When the witness gave other testimony at variance with his grand jury testimony, the prosecutor was in a position to claim surprise. "[A] prosecutor [is] entitled to rely on the witness' prior testimony given under oath, under the presumption that the witness understood the ramifications of committing perjury." Price, supra, 545 A.2d at 1224 (citing Parker, supra, 363 A.2d at 977 ; Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1229-31 (D.C.1983)). 1992When the witness gave other testimony at variance with his grand jury testimony, the prosecutor was in a position to claim surprise. "[A] prosecutor [is] entitled to rely on the witness' prior testimony given under oath, under the presumption that the witness understood the ramifications of committing perjury." Price, supra, 545 A.2d at 1224 (citing Parker, supra, 363 A.2d at 977 ; Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1229-31 (D.C.1983)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Claude John Scallion, Raymond Lynn Buckelew, James Laney Jenkins and Judson Lee Drane
green
1 sentence1978In Cyphers , the court held that where there was no showing the defendant knew, prior to trial of the detainer lodged against him, he could invoke Article IV(e) for the first time on appeal. 91 In Edwards , however, the court held that an Article IV violation was not subject, under any circumstances, to collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because the defect, if any, involved neither constitutional error, lack of jurisdiction, nor “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice . . . ” Id. at 654 (citation omitted). 92 In United States v. Scallion, supra | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. James Seeley Cyphers and James W. Ferro
green
1 sentence1978Since Ford had specifically requested the transfer, however, the court expressly did not decide “whether the failure of a prisoner to express a preference as to the place of his incarceration pending trial, either through ignorance of his statutory right or otherwise, would nevertheless constitute a waiver of that right.” Id. n. 29. 90 Two other recent opinions of the Second Circuit, United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2937 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1978), and United States v. Edwards, 564 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1977), have failed to clarify the Sec | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Harold Edwards v. United States
green
1 sentence1978Since Ford had specifically requested the transfer, however, the court expressly did not decide “whether the failure of a prisoner to express a preference as to the place of his incarceration pending trial, either through ignorance of his statutory right or otherwise, would nevertheless constitute a waiver of that right.” Id. n. 29. 90 Two other recent opinions of the Second Circuit, United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2937 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1978), and United States v. Edwards, 564 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1977), have failed to clarify the Sec | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Monroe v. United States
green
1 sentence1978Since Ford had specifically requested the transfer, however, the court expressly did not decide “whether the failure of a prisoner to express a preference as to the place of his incarceration pending trial, either through ignorance of his statutory right or otherwise, would nevertheless constitute a waiver of that right.” Id. n. 29. 90 Two other recent opinions of the Second Circuit, United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2937 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1978), and United States v. Edwards, 564 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1977), have failed to clarify the Sec | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Johnson v. United States
green
1 sentence1978Since Ford had specifically requested the transfer, however, the court expressly did not decide “whether the failure of a prisoner to express a preference as to the place of his incarceration pending trial, either through ignorance of his statutory right or otherwise, would nevertheless constitute a waiver of that right.” Id. n. 29. 90 Two other recent opinions of the Second Circuit, United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2937 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1978), and United States v. Edwards, 564 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1977), have failed to clarify the Sec | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Kerr v. United States
green
1 sentence1978Since Ford had specifically requested the transfer, however, the court expressly did not decide “whether the failure of a prisoner to express a preference as to the place of his incarceration pending trial, either through ignorance of his statutory right or otherwise, would nevertheless constitute a waiver of that right.” Id. n. 29. 90 Two other recent opinions of the Second Circuit, United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 , 97 S.Ct. 2937 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1978), and United States v. Edwards, 564 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1977), have failed to clarify the Sec | 1 | 1978–1978 |
American Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
green
2 sentences1953American Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 85 U.S.App.D.C. 343 , 179 F.2d 437 . 1953American Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 85 U.S.App.D.C. 343 , 179 F.2d 437 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.