position claim in Florida

2018Lucarelli, 173 So. 3d at 1094 (“[T]he proposed class was overbroad because it included many members who did not suffer and would not be able to prove any injury or actual damage.”) (emphasis added); Ouellette, 888 So. 2d at 92 .

2018Lucarelli, 173 So. 3d at 1094 (“[T]he proposed class was overbroad because it included many members who did not suffer and would not be able to prove any injury or actual damage.”) (emphasis added); Ouellette, 888 So. 2d at 92 .

2015More recently, in Smith v. State, 143 So.3d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), the First District rejected the state’s position that defense counsel failed to preserve the peremptory strike issue by explicitly renewing the objection before accepting the jury.

2011A recent case, Mudafort v. Lee, 62 So.3d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), appears to take the position that these factors enumerated in pre-2009 case law are no longer useful in crafting time-sharing plans and can be ignored.

2011NOTES [1] A recent case, Mudafort v. Lee, 62 So.3d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), appears to take the position that these factors enumerated in pre-2009 case law are no longer useful in crafting time-sharing plans and can be ignored.

2008Dean, 662 So.2d at 373 .

2005E.g., Rinderer v. State, 857 So.2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (reversing the order denying a rule 3.800(a) motion claiming the trial court did not orally pronounce the mandatory minimum term appearing in the written sentence for further consideration as if filed pursuant to rule 3.850, where the motion was sworn and would have been timely if filed pursuant to rule 3.850); Campbell v. State, 718 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

2005E.g., Rinderer v. State, 857 So.2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (reversing the order denying a rule 3.800(a) motion claiming the trial court did not orally pronounce the mandatory minimum term appearing in the written sentence for further consideration as if filed pursuant to rule 3.850, where the motion was sworn and would have been timely if filed pursuant to rule 3.850); Campbell v. State, 718 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

1983Once the identity of the informant is revealed, the privilege disappears, Roviaro v. U.S. 353 U.S. 53, 60 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 627 , 1 *717 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); Garcia v. State, supra , and thus, the failure of the trial court to require disclosure of the informant's whereabouts requires our reversal.

1983Once the identity of the informant is revealed, the privilege disappears, Roviaro v. U.S. 353 U.S. 53, 60 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 627 , 1 *717 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); Garcia v. State, supra , and thus, the failure of the trial court to require disclosure of the informant's whereabouts requires our reversal.

1983We reject, as did this court in Garcia v. State, 379 So.2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), the state's position that the privilege not to reveal the identity of a confidential informant operated to justify the court's refusal to require the state to provide the address of the informant and to allow the police to testify as to the informant's whereabouts.

1983Once the identity of the informant is revealed, the privilege disappears, Roviaro v. U.S. 353 U.S. 53, 60 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 627 , 1 *717 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); Garcia v. State, supra , and thus, the failure of the trial court to require disclosure of the informant's whereabouts requires our reversal.

1982The Fourth District Court of Appeal originally affirmed the conviction, but on rehearing reversed itself, adopting the position and analysis of the Second District Court of Appeal in Hite v. State, 364 So.2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1979). *623 In Hite , the Second District Court of Appeal held that "for a person to be guilty of second degree felony-murder, he must have been personally present at the commission of one of the enumerated violent felonies and the killing must have been committed by someone other than him or one of his co-felons." 364 So.2d at 773

1982The Fourth District Court of Appeal originally affirmed the conviction, but on rehearing reversed itself, adopting the position and analysis of the Second District Court of Appeal in Hite v. State, 364 So.2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1979). *623 In Hite , the Second District Court of Appeal held that "for a person to be guilty of second degree felony-murder, he must have been personally present at the commission of one of the enumerated violent felonies and the killing must have been committed by someone other than him or one of his co-felons." 364 So.2d at 773

1979See, e.g., International Mobile Homes, supra; Vonnis, Inc. v. Raff, 243 A. 2d 836 ; In Re Webb, supra. See also Sussen Rubber Co., supra. This would appear to be true even though the amount owed to the minority of creditors who had the requisite knowledge constitutes more than half of the total indebtedness of the debtor.

1978In his reply brief appellant takes the position that an analysis of the dissenting opinion in Coffey v. State, 205 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), and the opinion of the Supreme Court in the same case on certiorari [2] demonstrate that the driver's understanding of the change from the accident report investigation to the criminal investigation is of little or no significance.

1975Pittman v. State, 1906, 51 Fla. 94 , 41 So. 385 .

1975In Gispert v. State, 118 So.2d 596 (Fla.App. 2nd, 1960), the court held that: “The fact that the appellants were on a joint nefarious venture, and that one non-owner was driving the car, does not give the two non-owners such occupancy or possession of the automobile or interest therein or the property seized as would place them in a position to claim wrongful search and seizure.” And, in 29 Fla.Jur., “Search and Seizure”, § 13, the following appears: “One must claim and prove himself to be the owner, lessee, or tenant, or the lawful occupant of the premises searched in order to be protected un

1973The identical contention of the state was considered and rejected in Watkins v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 197 So.2d 312 , wherein this court held that refusal to charge the jury, when properly requested, was prejudicial error. [1] Accordingly, the judgment and sentence imposed is reversed with directions to grant defendant a new trial.

1972Rogers v. Continental Casualty Company, Fla. App. 1963, 155 So.2d 641 , involved a crane loading barges from a lake onto trucks.

1968The court concluded that the Fifth Amendment privilege took precedence over the duty to explain so that the accused's "failure to explain possession of stolen goods could not thereafter create an inference of guilt at his trial." 203 So.2d at page 652 .

1966Steele v. Steele, Fla.App. 1965, 177 So.2d 873 ; Dings v. Dings, Fla. App. 1964, 161 So.2d 227 .

1966Steele v. Steele, Fla.App. 1965, 177 So.2d 873 ; Dings v. Dings, Fla. App. 1964, 161 So.2d 227 .

1939The case at bar is ruled by Adams v. Whittle, 101 Fla. 705 , 135 So. 152 .

1939The case at bar is ruled by Adams v. Whittle, 101 Fla. 705 , 135 So. 152 .

1930This would seem to follow from the principle announced that the contract must form a basis for a lien on the whole, but it is supported by authority as well. 2 Jones, Liens (2nd Ed.) No. 1314; Landers v. Dexter, 106 Mass. 531 ; North & South Lumber Co. v. Hegwer, (Kan.

1908Co., 31 Minn. 17 ; Aetna Live Stock Co. v. Olmstead, 21 Mich. 346 ; Dietz v. Insurance Co., 31 W.

1908But we think the great weight of authority certainly in the State courts, favors the position that a clause of this character is ineffective for 'the purpose designed and that an insurance company shall not appoint an' agent, use his services, accept the results of his work and repudiate this essential and inherent feature of the law of agency, that a knowledge of the agent is the knowledge of the company.” The court cites Sternnamen v. Insurance Co., 170 N. Y. 13 ; Kansal v. Ins.

1908Co., 31 Minn. 17 ; Aetna Live Stock Co. v. Olmstead, 21 Mich. 346 ; Dietz v. Insurance Co., 31 W.