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28 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1893–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Dawn Marie Sullivan, Appellantgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Sullivan, 196 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
| Crowell v. Gilmoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. 1,216.83 Acres of Land
green
2 sentences2025E.g., United States v. 1,216.83 Acres of Land, 89 Wn.2d 550 , 574 P.2d 375 (1978). 2025E.g., United States v. 1,216.83 Acres of Land, 89 Wn.2d 550 , 574 P.2d 375 (1978). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Spry v. Miller
green
2 sentences2009GA maintains that "`[o]nce the legislature has properly delegated rule-making authority to a state agency, that power is liberally construed.'" Br. of Appellant at 21 (quoting Spry v. Miller, 25 Wash.App. 741, 745 , 610 P.2d 931 (1980)). ¶ 21 But the weight of more recent authority supports the Federation's position that rule-making authority has limits: Agencies may exercise only those powers conferred on them expressly or by necessary implication. 2009App 741, 745, 610 P.2d 931 (1980)). ¶22 But the weight of more recent authority supports the Federation’s position that rule-making authority has limits: Agencies may exercise only those powers conferred on them expressly or by necessary implication. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Saunders v. Weissburg & Aronson
green
2 sentences2005Public confidence in the legal system may be eroded by the spectacle of lawyers squabbling over the could-have-beens of a concluded lawsuit, even when the client has indicated no dissatisfaction with the outcome.” Id. at 67 . id. 74 Cal. App. 4th 869 , 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 405 (1999). 2005Public confidence in the legal system may be eroded by the spectacle of lawyers squabbling over the could-have-beens of a concluded lawsuit, even when the client has indicated no dissatisfaction with the outcome.” Id. at 67 . id. 74 Cal. App. 4th 869 , 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 405 (1999). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Mason v. Levy & Van Bourg
green
2 sentences2005Public confidence in the legal system may be eroded by the spectacle of lawyers squabbling over the could-have-beens of a concluded lawsuit, even when the client has indicated no dissatisfaction with the outcome.” Id. at 67 . id. 74 Cal. App. 4th 869 , 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 405 (1999). 2005Public confidence in the legal system may be eroded by the spectacle of lawyers squabbling over the could-have-beens of a concluded lawsuit, even when the client has indicated no dissatisfaction with the outcome.” Id. at 67 . id. 74 Cal. App. 4th 869 , 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 405 (1999). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Shoberg v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2014App. 673, 677 , 463 P.2d 280 (1969) (medical expert was necessary and an affidavit of counsel “was not a substitute for expert medical testimony”). ¶19 However, we are not in a position to rule on the State’s argument. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Jones v. Halvorson-Berg
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 128-29 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Lyon v. Lyon
green
2 sentences2009He is not in a position to claim the agreement was unfair. [5] Professor Cross considered changing the character of property as "essentially a transfer or conveyance." He therefore recommended doing so with the formality necessary for the type of property involved. 49 Wash. L.Rev. at 806. [6] E.g., RCW 82.45.010; RCW 82.45.060 (real estate excise tax). [7] "A community property agreement as applied to after acquired property does not instantaneously convey initially separate property to the community but merely labels all after acquired property community immediately upon receipt." Lyon, 100 W 2009He is not in a position to claim the agreement was unfair. [5] Professor Cross considered changing the character of property as "essentially a transfer or conveyance." He therefore recommended doing so with the formality necessary for the type of property involved. 49 Wash. L.Rev. at 806. [6] E.g., RCW 82.45.010; RCW 82.45.060 (real estate excise tax). [7] "A community property agreement as applied to after acquired property does not instantaneously convey initially separate property to the community but merely labels all after acquired property community immediately upon receipt." Lyon, 100 W | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Millican of Washington, Inc. v. Wienker Carpet Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997App. 409 , 722 P.2d 861 (1986), for the position that a waiver of subrogation extends only to insured losses; however, that case is distinguishable. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Cumbie v. Cumbie
green
1 sentence1995Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wn.2d 836 , 376 P.2d 651 , 379 P.2d 918 (1962), cited by the trial court, does not limit the applicability of the general rule. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Gardner v. Malone
green
2 sentences1995Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wn.2d 836 , 376 P.2d 651 , 379 P.2d 918 (1962), cited by the trial court, does not limit the applicability of the general rule. 1995Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wn.2d 836 , 376 P.2d 651 , 379 P.2d 918 (1962), cited by the trial court, does not limit the applicability of the general rule. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hall v. Cole
green
2 sentences1992Memorandum opinion, at 6. 3 "The Union had been successful in processing numerous claims on this type of an informal basis and felt that this was the best course of action to pursue in connection with this particular claim." Memorandum opinion, at 2. 4 The Ninth Circuit has recognized two such exceptions based on Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 , 36 L. 1992Memorandum opinion, at 6. 3 "The Union had been successful in processing numerous claims on this type of an informal basis and felt that this was the best course of action to pursue in connection with this particular claim." Memorandum opinion, at 2. 4 The Ninth Circuit has recognized two such exceptions based on Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 , 36 L. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Emmanuel
green
2 sentences1978State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 799 , 259 P.2d 845 (1953). 1978State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 799 , 259 P.2d 845 (1953). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Duschaine v. City of Everett
green
2 sentences1975The plaintiffs state it was the responsibility of the defendant-lawyers to take the position that the claim included the claim of the parents and assert that position against the City of Spokane, stating that such claim statutes are to be liberally *99 construed and citing to us Cook v. Yakima, 21 Wn.2d 810 , 153 P.2d 279 (1944), and Duschaine v. Everett, 5 Wn.2d 181 , 105 P.2d 18 , 130 A.L.R. 134 (1940). 1975The plaintiffs state it was the responsibility of the defendant-lawyers to take the position that the claim included the claim of the parents and assert that position against the City of Spokane, stating that such claim statutes are to be liberally *99 construed and citing to us Cook v. Yakima, 21 Wn.2d 810 , 153 P.2d 279 (1944), and Duschaine v. Everett, 5 Wn.2d 181 , 105 P.2d 18 , 130 A.L.R. 134 (1940). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Cook v. City of Yakima
neutral
2 sentences1975The plaintiffs state it was the responsibility of the defendant-lawyers to take the position that the claim included the claim of the parents and assert that position against the City of Spokane, stating that such claim statutes are to be liberally *99 construed and citing to us Cook v. Yakima, 21 Wn.2d 810 , 153 P.2d 279 (1944), and Duschaine v. Everett, 5 Wn.2d 181 , 105 P.2d 18 , 130 A.L.R. 134 (1940). 1975The plaintiffs state it was the responsibility of the defendant-lawyers to take the position that the claim included the claim of the parents and assert that position against the City of Spokane, stating that such claim statutes are to be liberally *99 construed and citing to us Cook v. Yakima, 21 Wn.2d 810 , 153 P.2d 279 (1944), and Duschaine v. Everett, 5 Wn.2d 181 , 105 P.2d 18 , 130 A.L.R. 134 (1940). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Taitch v. Lavoy
green
2 sentences1973We are cited to Taitch v. Lavoy, 57 Wn.2d 857 , 360 P.2d 588 (1961). 1973We are cited to Taitch v. Lavoy, 57 Wn.2d 857 , 360 P.2d 588 (1961). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Collins v. Collins
neutral
2 sentences1972In response to the foregoing cases, plaintiff takes the position that the presumption of receipt disappears in the face of positive evidence of nonreceipt, relying upon Collins v. Collins, 151 Wash. 201, 210 , 275 P. 571 (1929); and Gibson v. Rouse, 81 Wash. 102, 109 , 142 P. 464 (1914). 1972In response to the foregoing cases, plaintiff takes the position that the presumption of receipt disappears in the face of positive evidence of nonreceipt, relying upon Collins v. Collins, 151 Wash. 201, 210 , 275 P. 571 (1929); and Gibson v. Rouse, 81 Wash. 102, 109 , 142 P. 464 (1914). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Gibson v. Rouse
green
2 sentences1972In response to the foregoing cases, plaintiff takes the position that the presumption of receipt disappears in the face of positive evidence of nonreceipt, relying upon Collins v. Collins, 151 Wash. 201, 210 , 275 P. 571 (1929); and Gibson v. Rouse, 81 Wash. 102, 109 , 142 P. 464 (1914). 1972In response to the foregoing cases, plaintiff takes the position that the presumption of receipt disappears in the face of positive evidence of nonreceipt, relying upon Collins v. Collins, 151 Wash. 201, 210 , 275 P. 571 (1929); and Gibson v. Rouse, 81 Wash. 102, 109 , 142 P. 464 (1914). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Boyle v. Lewis
green
2 sentences1966In Boyle v. Lewis, 30 Wn.2d 665, 681 , 193 P.2d 332 (1948), we said: It seems to us apparent that the jury made no award for any hospital, medical, dental, or nursing expenses to be incurred in the future, and thérefore that part of instruction No. 12, “or is reasonably certain to be compelled reasonably and necessarily to incur in the future as a proximate result of this accident,” was not prejudicial, even if it be conceded that the testimony did not warrant the giving of an instruction relative to future expense. 1966In Boyle v. Lewis, 30 Wn.2d 665, 681 , 193 P.2d 332 (1948), we said: It seems to us apparent that the jury made no award for any hospital, medical, dental, or nursing expenses to be incurred in the future, and thérefore that part of instruction No. 12, “or is reasonably certain to be compelled reasonably and necessarily to incur in the future as a proximate result of this accident,” was not prejudicial, even if it be conceded that the testimony did not warrant the giving of an instruction relative to future expense. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
green
1 sentence1953Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.C.A. 9th), 125 F. (2d) 812, 141 A.L.R. 548, 564 . [11, 12] As to appellant's second contention on this branch of the case, we think that respondent in this case was a third party who was not in a position to claim the privilege. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Martin v. Shaen
green
2 sentences1953This is in accord with our decision in Martin v. Shaen, 22 Wn. (2d) 505, 156 P. (2d) 681 , where we said: “The rule is well-nigh universal that the privilege against examination of a witness upon matters of confidential communication is personal to the client, patient, or other person to whom the privilege is extended. 70 C. 1953This is in accord with our decision in Martin v. Shaen, 22 Wn. (2d) 505, 156 P. (2d) 681 , where we said: "The rule is well-nigh universal that the privilege against examination of a witness upon matters of confidential communication is personal to the client, patient, or other person to whom the privilege is extended. 70 C.J. 456, Witnesses, § 619. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Dunn v. Carroll
neutral
2 sentences1947This being so, Hodgdon is in a position to claim these lots, if Sutter, Jr., could have done so, provided he had received his deed in good faith, and for a valuable consideration.” In Dunn v. Farrow, 101 Cal. App. 209 , 281 Pac. 506 , the common grantor, Emil R. d’Artois, was the record owner of numerous lots in the town of Rosecrans. 1947This being so, Hodgdon is in a position to claim these lots, if Sutter, Jr., could have done so, provided he had received his deed in good faith, and for a valuable consideration.” In Dunn v. Farrow, 101 Cal. App. 209 , 281 Pac. 506 , the common grantor, Emil R. d’Artois, was the record owner of numerous lots in the town of Rosecrans. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Vieser v. Bellows
neutral
2 sentences1946Vieser v. Bellows, 209 App. Div. 540 , 205 N. Y. 1946Vieser v. Bellows, 209 App. Div. 540 , 205 N. Y. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Adams v. Columbia Canal Co.
green
1 sentence1939The facts presented by the affidavits for a new trial do not bring them within the rule announced in State v. Powell, 51 Wash. 372 , 98 Pac. 741 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
State v. Powell
green
1 sentence1939The facts presented by the affidavits for a new trial do not bring them within the rule announced in State v. Powell, 51 Wash. 372 , 98 Pac. 741 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Independent Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hein
neutral
2 sentences1934In Independent Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hein, 73 Wash. 127 , 131 Pac. 471 , discussing such a situation, this court said: “It is next contended that two instructions were erroneous. 1934In Independent Asphalt Paving Co. v. Hein, 73 Wash. 127 , 131 Pac. 471 , discussing such a situation, this court said: “It is next contended that two instructions were erroneous. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Jensen v. Sheard
neutral
2 sentences1932Jensen v. Sheard, 49 Wash. 593, 96 Pac. 2 . 1932Jensen v. Sheard, 49 Wash. 593, 96 Pac. 2 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Robinson v. Brooks
neutral
2 sentences1916In Robinson v. Brooks, 31 Wash. 60 , 71 Pac. 721 , we held that wilful excess would vitiate the whole lien, and in Gilbert Hunt Co. v. Parry, 59 Wash. 646 , 110 Pac. 541 , Ann. 1916In Robinson v. Brooks, 31 Wash. 60 , 71 Pac. 721 , we held that wilful excess would vitiate the whole lien, and in Gilbert Hunt Co. v. Parry, 59 Wash. 646 , 110 Pac. 541 , Ann. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Gilbert Hunt Co v. Parry
neutral
2 sentences1916In Robinson v. Brooks, 31 Wash. 60 , 71 Pac. 721 , we held that wilful excess would vitiate the whole lien, and in Gilbert Hunt Co. v. Parry, 59 Wash. 646 , 110 Pac. 541 , Ann. 1916In Robinson v. Brooks, 31 Wash. 60 , 71 Pac. 721 , we held that wilful excess would vitiate the whole lien, and in Gilbert Hunt Co. v. Parry, 59 Wash. 646 , 110 Pac. 541 , Ann. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Ringel v. Newman
neutral
2 sentences1914Ringel v. Newman, 69 Wash. 583 , 125 Pac. 943 , and Architectural Decorating Co. v. Nicklason, supra, are not in disharmony with the rule laid down in this case. 1914Ringel v. Newman, 69 Wash. 583 , 125 Pac. 943 , and Architectural Decorating Co. v. Nicklason, supra, are not in disharmony with the rule laid down in this case. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Reddish v. Smith green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| County of Mason v. Dunbar green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.