collateral order doctrine in Maryland

2026The collateral order doctrine is not technically an exception to the final judgment rule; rather, it is “a judicially created fiction, under which certain interlocutory orders are considered to be final judgments, even though such orders clearly are not final judgments.” Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 376 Md. 53, 64 (2003). 9 The collateral order doctrine allows an immediate appeal to be taken from a “very limited” class of non-final, interlocutory orders that are “offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued” and that qualify, in effect, as “final judgments without

2019City Police Dep't , 376 Md. 53 , 58, 827 A.2d 115 (2003) (quoting Pittsburgh Corning v. James , 353 Md. 657 , 660-61, 728 A.2d 210 (1999) ). "[I]n Maryland the four requirements of the collateral order doctrine are very strictly applied." In re Foley , 373 Md. at 634 , 820 A.2d 587 .

2024The collateral order doctrine applies if the order: “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 502 (2011) (quoting In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 633 (2003)).

2021In the case of In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 633-34 (2003), Judge Eldridge, speaking for the Court, stressed that the collateral order doctrine should be applicable only in extraordinary circumstances.

2026However, the Court has clarified that: “the idea that an issue is not effectively reviewable after the termination of the trial because it involves a ‘right’ to avoid the trial itself, should be limited to double jeopardy claims and a very few other extraordinary situations.” Otherwise, “there would be a proliferation of appeals under the collateral order doctrine[,]” which “would be flatly inconsistent with the long- established and sound public policy against piecemeal appeals.” In re M.P., 487 Md. at 70 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bunting, 312 Md. at 482 ).

2026In Bunting v. State, a case challenging a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss charges based on an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, we expressed 13 hesitation at the idea that the collateral order doctrine should be invoked any time an appellant claims a “‘right’ to avoid the trial itself,” as it could effectively override the final judgment rule. 312 Md. 472, 479-82 (1988).

2025JUVENILE LAW > COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE An interlocutory order from a juvenile court declining to make SIJS factual findings is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine if it meets all of the following four requirements: “(1) [it] conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) [it] resolves an important issue, (3) [it] resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) [it] would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 251 (2020) (quoting Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v.

2025An interlocutory order is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine if it: “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” In re O.P., 470 Md. at 251 (quoting Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. James, 353 Md. 657, 661 (1999)).

2017Stevens, 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 ; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206-07 , 477 A.2d at 762-73 . 20 Additionally, despite the narrowing language contained in Dawkins, supra, this Court, relying on our decisions in Stevens and Patuxent Valley, continues to recognize that discovery orders may be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine when those orders seek to probe the individual thought processes of a high level government official acting in an administrative or investigatory decisional capacity.

2017Stevens, 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 ; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206-07 , 477 A.2d at 762-73 . 20 Additionally, despite the narrowing language contained in Dawkins, supra, this Court, relying on our decisions in Stevens and Patuxent Valley, continues to recognize that discovery orders may be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine when those orders seek to probe the individual thought processes of a high level government official acting in an administrative or investigatory decisional capacity.

2011"The collateral order doctrine was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).” St.

2011"The collateral order doctrine was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).” St.

2024We explained that, under the collateral order doctrine, a defendant may appeal immediately following the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy because implicit in the prohibition against double jeopardy is a right to be free from a second trial, and “[t]hat aspect of the right can never be restored by reversing a conviction after the second trial on the grounds that the second trial violated double jeopardy principles.” Id. at 425 , 483 A.2d at 75 .

2024We explained that, under the collateral order doctrine, a defendant may appeal immediately following the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy because implicit in the prohibition against double jeopardy is a right to be free from a second trial, and “[t]hat aspect of the right can never be restored by reversing a conviction after the second trial on the grounds that the second trial violated double jeopardy principles.” Id. at 425 , 483 A.2d at 75 .

2024According to the State, M.P.’s appeal is not permitted under the collateral order doctrine because it fails to meet the requirement that the denial of the motion to dismiss “would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” The State likens M.P.’s contention that the denial of his motion to dismiss is immediately appealable to that of the appellant in In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 313-14 , 783 A.2d 673, 677-78 (2001), a case in which a juvenile court issued an order purporting to rescind its waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal court and the juven

2024According to the State, M.P.’s appeal is not permitted under the collateral order doctrine because it fails to meet the requirement that the denial of the motion to dismiss “would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” The State likens M.P.’s contention that the denial of his motion to dismiss is immediately appealable to that of the appellant in In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 313-14 , 783 A.2d 673, 677-78 (2001), a case in which a juvenile court issued an order purporting to rescind its waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal court and the juven

2020For example, in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1 , 20–21 (1992), we held that “a discovery order directed to a governmental agency, a non-party to the underlying action, requiring the disclosure of files which contain information which, by statute, is confidential except when disclosed by the agency or by court order, is immediately appealable by the agency.” In Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 564 (2007), we held that the collateral order doctrine applied to a discovery order entered by a trial court for records where the Governor of the State of Maryland had ass

2020For example, in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1 , 20–21 (1992), we held that “a discovery order directed to a governmental agency, a non-party to the underlying action, requiring the disclosure of files which contain information which, by statute, is confidential except when disclosed by the agency or by court order, is immediately appealable by the agency.” In Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 564 (2007), we held that the collateral order doctrine applied to a discovery order entered by a trial court for records where the Governor of the State of Maryland had ass

2022The parties note that the Court of Appeals has held that a trial court’s denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine, citing Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213 (1979).

2022The parties note that the Court of Appeals has held that a trial court’s denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine, citing Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213 (1979).

2017Stevens, 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 ; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206-07 , 477 A.2d at 762-73 . 20 Additionally, despite the narrowing language contained in Dawkins, supra, this Court, relying on our decisions in Stevens and Patuxent Valley, continues to recognize that discovery orders may be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine when those orders seek to probe the individual thought processes of a high level government official acting in an administrative or investigatory decisional capacity.

2017Stevens, 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 ; Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206-07 , 477 A.2d at 762-73 . 20 Additionally, despite the narrowing language contained in Dawkins, supra, this Court, relying on our decisions in Stevens and Patuxent Valley, continues to recognize that discovery orders may be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine when those orders seek to probe the individual thought processes of a high level government official acting in an administrative or investigatory decisional capacity.

2015Those orders have been deemed appealable under the collateral order doctrine because they are “offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued[.]” Stevens, 337 Md. at 477 , 654 A.2d 877 (citation omitted). 10 To qualify as a collateral order, a ruling must satisfy four criteria: “(1) it must conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) it must resolve an important issue; (3) it must be completely separate from the merits of the action; and (4) it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” See, e.g., Addison v. Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC, 411 Md. 251,

2015Those orders have been deemed appealable under the collateral order doctrine because they are “offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued[.]” Stevens, 337 Md. at 477 , 654 A.2d 877 (citation omitted). 10 To qualify as a collateral order, a ruling must satisfy four criteria: “(1) it must conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) it must resolve an important issue; (3) it must be completely separate from the merits of the action; and (4) it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” See, e.g., Addison v. Lochearn Nursing Home, LLC, 411 Md. 251,

2017However, we have held that "the collateral order doctrine in Maryland is very limited" and that it "should be applied sparingly in only the most extraordinary circumstances." Schuele , 412 Md. at 572 , 989 A.2d 210 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017However, we have held that "the collateral order doctrine in Maryland is very limited" and that it "should be applied sparingly in only the most extraordinary circumstances." Schuele , 412 Md. at 572 , 989 A.2d 210 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2026ANALYSIS A. The Collateral Order Doctrine and Disqualification Orders in Other Contexts The collateral order doctrine generally does not authorize an immediate appeal of an order disqualifying defense counsel in a criminal case, see Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 260, 270 , or an order disqualifying a plaintiff’s or a defendant’s counsel in a civil case, see Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985); Harris, 310 Md. at 312, 316 .

2007The collateral order doctrine, recognized by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), permits the prosecution of an appeal from a “narrow class of orders, referred to as collateral orders, which are offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued and which are immediately appealable as ‘final judgments’ without regard to the posture of the case.” Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A, 310 *154 Md. 310, 315, 529 A.2d 356 (1987).

2026See In re M.P., 487 Md. at 69 (citing Stephens, 420 Md. at 505 n.4 (in turn citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977))) (explaining that review of a motion to dismiss for violation of double jeopardy rights was permitted under the collateral order doctrine because the issue invoked review of whether the defendant could be put to trial twice rather than the ultimate issue of guilt).

2024We observed that the Supreme Court of the United States had explained - 12 - that a ruling denying a claimed violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause comes within the collateral order doctrine because the ruling constitutes a final rejection of the claim, the issue is entirely collateral to and separable from the issue of guilt or innocence, and most significantly, delay in appellate review until after a final judgment would undermine the very right accorded by the double jeopardy prohibition, that is, the “guarantee against being twice put to trial for the same offense.” Id. at 505 n.4, 24 A.3

2017In Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Bowen , 410 Md. 287 , 296, 978 A.2d 678 , 684 (2009), this Court reiterated that the collateral order doctrine is a "very narrow exception" to the final judgment rule.

2017In Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Bowen , 410 Md. 287 , 296, 978 A.2d 678 , 684 (2009), this Court reiterated that the collateral order doctrine is a "very narrow exception" to the final judgment rule.

2010The collateral order doctrine was first applied in a civil case in Maryland in Peat v. Los Angeles Rams, 284 Md. 86 , 394 A.2d 801 (1978).

2010The collateral order doctrine was first applied in a civil case in Maryland in Peat v. Los Angeles Rams, 284 Md. 86 , 394 A.2d 801 (1978).

2014Generally, “the fourth prong ... ‘is not satisfied except in extraordinary situations,’ ” Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 329 , 884 A.2d 1215, 1223 (2005) (quotations omitted), because “ ‘[otherwise, ... there would be a proliferation of appeals under the collateral order doctrine.’ ” Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 505 , 24 A.3d 105, 110 (2011) (alterations in original), quoting Foley, 373 Md. at 636 , 820 A.2d at 593 .

2014Generally, “the fourth prong ... ‘is not satisfied except in extraordinary situations,’ ” Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 329 , 884 A.2d 1215, 1223 (2005) (quotations omitted), because “ ‘[otherwise, ... there would be a proliferation of appeals under the collateral order doctrine.’ ” Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 505 , 24 A.3d 105, 110 (2011) (alterations in original), quoting Foley, 373 Md. at 636 , 820 A.2d at 593 .

2020Joseph Medical Center, Inc. v. Cardiac Surgery Associates, P.A., 392 Md. 75, 91 (2006), we held that a hospital was entitled to appeal a circuit court’s order authorizing the disclosure of records which the hospital contended were protected by statutory privilege despite the fact that the discovery order was not a final judgment and was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

2015Ctr., Inc. v. Cardiac Surgery Assocs., P.A., 392 Md. 75, 85-87 (2006). -14- The Board, however, argues that the order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine, a “very narrow exception” to the final judgment rule (see, e.g., Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 376 Md. 53, 58 (2003)) that “treats as final and appealable a limited class of orders which do not terminate the litigation in the trial court.” Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206 .

2026However, an interlocutory order is treated as final under the collateral order doctrine if it “(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” In re M.P., 487 Md. 53, 68 (2024) (quoting Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 502 (2011)).

2026The collateral order doctrine is not technically an exception to the final judgment rule; rather, it is “a judicially created fiction, under which certain interlocutory orders are considered to be final judgments, even though such orders clearly are not final judgments.” Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 376 Md. 53, 64 (2003). 9 The collateral order doctrine allows an immediate appeal to be taken from a “very limited” class of non-final, interlocutory orders that are “offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued” and that qualify, in effect, as “final judgments without

2010The Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the collateral order doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), on this second occasion holding that resort to the doctrine was not available.

2010The Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the collateral order doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), on this second occasion holding that resort to the doctrine was not available.

2022Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 407 Md. 180, 191 (2009) (“‘[T]he idea that an issue is not effectively reviewable after the termination of trial because it involves a ‘right’ to avoid the trial itself should be limited to double jeopardy claims and a very few extraordinary situations.’” (quoting Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143 , 169–70 (1999))). 14 With respect to the criteria applied in assessing the collateral order doctrine, the parties argue that, similar to Clark, the first three requirements are satisfied.

2022Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 407 Md. 180, 191 (2009) (“‘[T]he idea that an issue is not effectively reviewable after the termination of trial because it involves a ‘right’ to avoid the trial itself should be limited to double jeopardy claims and a very few extraordinary situations.’” (quoting Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143 , 169–70 (1999))). 14 With respect to the criteria applied in assessing the collateral order doctrine, the parties argue that, similar to Clark, the first three requirements are satisfied.

2020For example, in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1 , 20–21 (1992), we held that “a discovery order directed to a governmental agency, a non-party to the underlying action, requiring the disclosure of files which contain information which, by statute, is confidential except when disclosed by the agency or by court order, is immediately appealable by the agency.” In Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 564 (2007), we held that the collateral order doctrine applied to a discovery order entered by a trial court for records where the Governor of the State of Maryland had ass

2017See Stevens, 337 Md. at 479-80 , 654 A.2d at 881 (holding that a discovery order requiring the Chief of Police for Montgomery County to be deposed was immediately appealable under the collateral 21 order doctrine because the Chief was a “high level government decision-maker.”); Patuxent Valley, 300 Md. at 206-07 , 477 A.2d at 762-63 (determining that a discovery order requiring individual commissioners at the Public Service Commission to be deposed satisfied the collateral order doctrine because the members were “high level government decision-makers.”); Stein, 328 Md. at 23 , 612 A.2d at 891

2024Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 571 (1978) (recognizing and applying the collateral order doctrine articulated in Cohen).

2010The standard of measurement employed was the collateral order doctrine. [W]e have recognized and applied the final judgment rule’s “collateral order” exception articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra. Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353 , 384 A.2d 91 (1978). 282 Md. at 571, 386 A.2d 1206 .

2012The Court of Appeals recently summarized this exception to the general rule that “the right to seek appellate review ... must await the entry of a final judgment, disposing of all claims against all parties[,]” Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 165 , 725 A.2d 549 (1999), as follows: Maryland’s collateral order doctrine has its roots in the important policy underlying the final judgment rule, which is to “prevent piecemeal appeals and ... the interruption of ongoing judicial proceedings.” The doctrine “is very limited,” and permits the immediate appeal of only a “narrow class of orders” that are

2011See, e.g., Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 376 Md. 53, 61 , 827 A.2d 115, 119 (2003) (discussing Bunting and holding that interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, public official immunity, statutory immunity, or any other type of immunity, generally do not come within the collateral order doctrine); Pittsburgh Corning, 353 Md. at 666 , 728 A.2d at 214 (“As we pointed out in Bunting and confirmed in Shoemaker [v. Smith, 353 Md. 143 , 725 A.2d 549 (1999) ], the proffered right to avoid trial, either at all or in a partic

2026The third element of the collateral order doctrine “requires that the contested order(s) be completely separable from and collateral to the merits of the action.” Harris v. State, 420 Md. 300, 318 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026The third element of the collateral order doctrine “requires that the contested order(s) be completely separable from and collateral to the merits of the action.” Harris, 420 Md. at 318 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017See id. at 376-82, 550 A.2d at 965-68 .15 In Newman, this Court held that “a sanctions order against a party to the underlying litigation is not immediately appealable, in advance of final judgment on the merits of the underlying action, under the collateral order doctrine.” Newman, 314 Md. at 385 , 550 A.2d at 969 (citing Yamaner v. Orkin, 310 Md. 321, 326 , 529 A.2d 361, 364 (1987)).

2017See id. at 376-82, 550 A.2d at 965-68 .15 In Newman, this Court held that “a sanctions order against a party to the underlying litigation is not immediately appealable, in advance of final judgment on the merits of the underlying action, under the collateral order doctrine.” Newman, 314 Md. at 385 , 550 A.2d at 969 (citing Yamaner v. Orkin, 310 Md. 321, 326 , 529 A.2d 361, 364 (1987)).

2025The Court found the stay order appealable under the collateral order doctrine but warned that their “‘holding concerning appealability goes no further than the circumstances presented in this case.’” Id. at 214 (quoting Public Serv.

2017The Court of Appeals concluded that the order was an appealable interlocutory order under the collateral order doctrine because the order “ha[d] the effect of blocking the County from prosecuting its condemnation action against the Schrodels unless and until it obtained] a state permit to construct the landfill on the property,” thereby satisfying “all four requirements of the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 212 , 577 A.2d 39 .

2011The Supreme Court has held that the latter ruling is not subject to an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine, because, inter alia, such rulings “necessitate! ] a. careful assessment of the particular facts of the case[ ]” and “are best considered only after the relevant facts have been developed at trial.” United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858 , 98 S.Ct. 1547 , 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978).

2011The Supreme Court has held that the latter ruling is not subject to an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine, because, inter alia, such rulings “necessitate! ] a. careful assessment of the particular facts of the case[ ]” and “are best considered only after the relevant facts have been developed at trial.” United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858 , 98 S.Ct. 1547 , 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978).