collateral order doctrine in Colorado

2019Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (There are some decisions that “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”). ¶ 22 The collateral order doctrine permits — in limited circumstances — appellate review of an interlocutory order despite its non-final nature.

2005Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) (articulating the collateral order doctrine).

2019Ct. App. 2005) (“We conclude that the trial court’s orders denying the requests to transfer jurisdiction affected a substantial right in a special proceeding and were, therefore, final, appealable orders.”); In re Adoption of A.B., 245 P.3d 711, 722 (Utah 2010) (stating the Navajo Nation could have appealed “the order denying the Nation’s motion for transfer of jurisdiction over the children”). 9 ¶ 24 “Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, to be immediately appealable a decision must ‘[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from

2013Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 , 349, 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006). ¶ 13 Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, to be immediately appealable a decision must "[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 , 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) ; see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.

2019This doctrine takes “a ‘practical construction’ of the finality require[ment] . . . and permits, under highly circumscribed situations, interlocutory review of a trial court ruling even if the ruling is not the last decision issued in the case.” Id. (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)); see also Paul v. People, 105 P.3d 628, 631-32 (Colo. 2005) (noting that the Colorado supreme court has not decided whether the collateral order doctrine applies to final judgments under C.A.R. 1(a)). ¶ 23 Several cases support our application of the collateral order doctrine to a denial of a trib

2019Regarding the third condition, “the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial public interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009) (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53 ). ¶ 25 We conclude that the juvenile court’s order denying the Navajo Nation’s motion to transfer jurisdiction satisfies all three requirements of the collateral order doctrine. ¶ 26 First, the order “conclusively determine[d]” the disputed issue of whether the Navajo Nation has jurisdiction ov

2019Regarding the third condition, “the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial public interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009) (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53 ). ¶ 25 We conclude that the juvenile court’s order denying the Navajo Nation’s motion to transfer jurisdiction satisfies all three requirements of the collateral order doctrine. ¶ 26 First, the order “conclusively determine[d]” the disputed issue of whether the Navajo Nation has jurisdiction ov

2019Regarding the third condition, “the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial public interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009) (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53 ). ¶ 25 We conclude that the juvenile court’s order denying the Navajo Nation’s motion to transfer jurisdiction satisfies all three requirements of the collateral order doctrine. ¶ 26 First, the order “conclusively determine[d]” the disputed issue of whether the Navajo Nation has jurisdiction ov

2019This court has “no authority to expand [our] appellate jurisdiction [as] specified by” the General Assembly, Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Colo. App. 1994), and we cannot “modify the jurisdiction granted [us] by statute.” People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 64 , 598 P.2d 526, 527 (1979). ¶ 16 Once the General Assembly establishes a statutory right of judicial review, “such review must be sought in strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute”; otherwise, the court 5 does not have jurisdiction “to act.” Mile High United Way, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

2019This court has “no authority to expand [our] appellate jurisdiction [as] specified by” the General Assembly, Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Colo. App. 1994), and we cannot “modify the jurisdiction granted [us] by statute.” People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 64 , 598 P.2d 526, 527 (1979). ¶ 16 Once the General Assembly establishes a statutory right of judicial review, “such review must be sought in strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute”; otherwise, the court 5 does not have jurisdiction “to act.” Mile High United Way, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

2019This court has “no authority to expand [our] appellate jurisdiction [as] specified by” the General Assembly, Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Colo. App. 1994), and we cannot “modify the jurisdiction granted [us] by statute.” People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 64 , 598 P.2d 526, 527 (1979). ¶ 16 Once the General Assembly establishes a statutory right of judicial review, “such review must be sought in strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute”; otherwise, the court 5 does not have jurisdiction “to act.” Mile High United Way, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

2019This court has “no authority to expand [our] appellate jurisdiction [as] specified by” the General Assembly, Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Colo. App. 1994), and we cannot “modify the jurisdiction granted [us] by statute.” People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 64 , 598 P.2d 526, 527 (1979). ¶ 16 Once the General Assembly establishes a statutory right of judicial review, “such review must be sought in strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute”; otherwise, the court 5 does not have jurisdiction “to act.” Mile High United Way, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

2019Ct. App. 2005) (“We conclude that the trial court’s orders denying the requests to transfer jurisdiction affected a substantial right in a special proceeding and were, therefore, final, appealable orders.”); In re Adoption of A.B., 245 P.3d 711, 722 (Utah 2010) (stating the Navajo Nation could have appealed “the order denying the Nation’s motion for transfer of jurisdiction over the children”). 9 ¶ 24 “Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, to be immediately appealable a decision must ‘[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from

2019Ct. App. 2005) (“We conclude that the trial court’s orders denying the requests to transfer jurisdiction affected a substantial right in a special proceeding and were, therefore, final, appealable orders.”); In re Adoption of A.B., 245 P.3d 711, 722 (Utah 2010) (stating the Navajo Nation could have appealed “the order denying the Nation’s motion for transfer of jurisdiction over the children”). 9 ¶ 24 “Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, to be immediately appealable a decision must ‘[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from

2019This doctrine takes “a ‘practical construction’ of the finality require[ment] . . . and permits, under highly circumscribed situations, interlocutory review of a trial court ruling even if the ruling is not the last decision issued in the case.” Id. (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)); see also Paul v. People, 105 P.3d 628, 631-32 (Colo. 2005) (noting that the Colorado supreme court has not decided whether the collateral order doctrine applies to final judgments under C.A.R. 1(a)). ¶ 23 Several cases support our application of the collateral order doctrine to a denial of a trib

2019This court has “no authority to expand [our] appellate jurisdiction [as] specified by” the General Assembly, Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Colo. App. 1994), and we cannot “modify the jurisdiction granted [us] by statute.” People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 64 , 598 P.2d 526, 527 (1979). ¶ 16 Once the General Assembly establishes a statutory right of judicial review, “such review must be sought in strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute”; otherwise, the court 5 does not have jurisdiction “to act.” Mile High United Way, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

2019This court has “no authority to expand [our] appellate jurisdiction [as] specified by” the General Assembly, Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Colo. App. 1994), and we cannot “modify the jurisdiction granted [us] by statute.” People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 64 , 598 P.2d 526, 527 (1979). ¶ 16 Once the General Assembly establishes a statutory right of judicial review, “such review must be sought in strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute”; otherwise, the court 5 does not have jurisdiction “to act.” Mile High United Way, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals

2019See, e.g., In re Children of Shirley T., 199 A.3d 221 , 224 n.6 (Me. 2019) (considering denial of a motion to transfer jurisdiction under ICWA “pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule”); see also In re Interest of Brittany C., 693 N.W.2d 592, 602 (Neb.

2019See, e.g., In re Children of Shirley T., 199 A.3d 221 , 224 n.6 (Me. 2019) (considering denial of a motion to transfer jurisdiction under ICWA “pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule”); see also In re Interest of Brittany C., 693 N.W.2d 592, 602 (Neb.

2019See, e.g., In re Children of Shirley T., 199 A.3d 221 , 224 n.6 (Me. 2019) (considering denial of a motion to transfer jurisdiction under ICWA “pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule”); see also In re Interest of Brittany C., 693 N.W.2d 592, 602 (Neb.

2019See, e.g., In re Children of Shirley T., 199 A.3d 221 , 224 n.6 (Me. 2019) (considering denial of a motion to transfer jurisdiction under ICWA “pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule”); see also In re Interest of Brittany C., 693 N.W.2d 592, 602 (Neb.

2013See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 , 423, 84 S.Ct. 923 , 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (act of state doctrine "arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers"); see also W.S.

2013See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 , 423, 84 S.Ct. 923 , 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) (act of state doctrine "arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers"); see also W.S.

2013See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc., 200 F.3d at 855 ("We do not reach Venezuela's act of state defense because it is not properly subject to interlocutory appeal." (citing Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1387 )); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1387 ("As the invocation of an act of state defense does not call into question federal jurisdiction, the district court's ruling on the issue is not a part of the immediately appealable order denying sovereign immunity."). 2.

2013See Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1027 ("Considerations of fairness or efficiency may also justify the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction...."); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1387 (federal appellate courts "may consider claims under [ ] pendent appellate jurisdiction that are closely related to the order properly before [the court]"). ¶ 41 Some federal jurisdictions, when allowing interlocutory appeal of a FSIA immunity ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine, have asserted pendent appellate jurisdiction over a related act of state doctrine ruling.

2013Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210 , 1214 (10th Cir.1999) ("The denial of a claim to sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine."); Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020 , 1025 (D.C.Cir.1997) (under federal law, it is "well-established that an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint on the ground of sovereign immunity under the FSIA satisfies the three requirements of the collateral order doctrine and may thus be brought on an interlocutory basis").

2013See Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1027 ("Considerations of fairness or efficiency may also justify the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction...."); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1387 (federal appellate courts "may consider claims under [ ] pendent appellate jurisdiction that are closely related to the order properly before [the court]"). ¶ 41 Some federal jurisdictions, when allowing interlocutory appeal of a FSIA immunity ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the collateral order doctrine, have asserted pendent appellate jurisdiction over a related act of state doctrine ruling.

2013See, e.g., Transamerica Leasing, Inc., 200 F.3d at 855 ("We do not reach Venezuela's act of state defense because it is not properly subject to interlocutory appeal." (citing Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1387 )); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc., 965 F.2d at 1387 ("As the invocation of an act of state defense does not call into question federal jurisdiction, the district court's ruling on the issue is not a part of the immediately appealable order denying sovereign immunity."). 2.

1998See id. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1804 .

1998See id. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1804 .