collateral order doctrine in Hawaii

2026NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 463 P.3d 985, 994 (2020), and the August 11, 2025 Order is not independently appealable, see Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai#i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (reciting the requirements for appeals under the collateral-order doctrine and the Forgay doctrine); HRS § 641-1(b) (2016) (setting forth the requirements for leave to file an interlocutory appeal).

2026Hawai#i Rules of Evidence Rule 201. 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (reciting the requirements for appeals under the collateral-order doctrine and the Forgay doctrine); HRS § 641-1(b) (2016) (setting forth the requirements for leave to file an interlocutory appeal).

2022See Abrams v. Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, 88 Hawai‘i 319, 322, 966 P.2d 631, 634 (1998) (stating requirements for appealability under the collateral order doctrine).

2022An order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine if it: "(1) conclusively determines a disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai#i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (citing Abrams v. Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, 88 Hawai#i 319, 322, 966 P.2d 631, 634 (1998)). 5.

2026NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we resolve this appeal as follows: As a preliminary matter, we note that under the collateral order doctrine, a party may immediately appeal from a sanctions order if the party is "in immediate jeopardy of being found in contempt of court if [it] did not comply with the order directing payment of the assessed sum." Siangco v. Kasadate, 77 Hawai i 157, 161-62, 883 P.2d 78, 82-83 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2026We previously denied the OPGI Plaintiffs' counterstatement, which we construed as a motion to dismiss the appeal for untimeliness, in an August 29, 2024 order. 22 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order may be appealable if the order "[(1)] conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, [(2)] resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [(3)] [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment." Siangco v. Kasadate, 77 Hawai‘i 157, 161, 883 P.2d 78, 82 (1994)

2021See Ciesla v. Reddish, 78 Hawai#i 18, 20, 889 P.2d 702, 704 (1995) (requirements for appealability under the Forgay doctrine); Abrams v. Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, 88 Hawai#i 319, 322, 966 P.2d 631, 634 (1998) (requirements for 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER appealability under the collateral-order doctrine); HRS § 641- 1(b) (2016) (requirements for an appeal from an interlocutory order).

2020See Ciesla v. Reddish, 78 Hawai#i 18, 20, 889 P.2d 702, 704 (1995) (requirements for appealability under the Forgay doctrine); Abrams v. Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, 88 Hawai#i 319, 322, 966 P.2d 631, 634 (1998) (requirements for appealability under the collateral order doctrine); HRS § 641-1(b) (2016) (requirements for an appeal from an interlocutory order).

2024See Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai#i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (setting forth the requirements for appealability under the collateral-order doctrine and the Forgay doctrine). 1 Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848). 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is granted, and the appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

2022See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Adams, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2013 WL 3863100 , at *1 (App. July 25, 2013) (Order) (finding that an order denying a motion for sanctions does not satisfy the requirements for appealability under the collateral order exception). 1 Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848). 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER As to Edwards's June 8, 2022 "Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant's Hearing Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff's Counsel, Filed May 3, 2022," though labeled as a motion for reconsideration of the 7/13/22 Order, it is, in substanc

2016In Kukui Plaza, we held that an order denying arbitration fell under the collateral order doctrine because “it will be too late effectively to review the present order when final judgment is entered; for the rights conferred by HRS Chapter 658, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably.” 68 Haw. at 105-06 , 705 P.2d at 34 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2016In Kukui Plaza, we held that an order denying arbitration fell under the collateral order doctrine because “it will be too late effectively to review the present order when final judgment is entered; for the rights conferred by HRS Chapter 658, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably.” 68 Haw. at 105-06 , 705 P.2d at 34 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

2026But, under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude we have jurisdiction under the collateral order exception. "[U]nder the collateral order exception, an interlocutory order is appealable if it: (1) fully disposes of the question at issue; (2) resolves an issue completely collateral to the merits of the case; and (3) involves important rights which would be irreparably lost if review had to await a final judgment." State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai#i 351, 353–54, 884 P.2d 729 , 731–32 (1994).

2026But, under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude we have jurisdiction under the collateral order exception. "[U]nder the collateral order exception, an interlocutory order is appealable if it: (1) fully disposes of the question at issue; (2) resolves an issue completely collateral to the merits of the case; and (3) involves important rights which would be irreparably lost if review had to await a final judgment." State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai#i 351, 353–54, 884 P.2d 729, 731–32 (1994).

2026Siangco, 77 Hawaiʻi at 161, 883 P.2d at 82 (citations omitted) (holding that "the collateral order doctrine [did] not apply" because the "circuit court's order did not fully and finally dispose of the sanctions issue" where "it did not specify the amount" of attorney's fees the appellant would have to pay); see Harada v. Ellis, 60 Haw. 467, 480, 591 P.2d 1060, 1070 (1979).

2026Siangco, 77 Hawaiʻi at 161, 883 P.2d at 82 (citations omitted) (holding that "the collateral order doctrine [did] not apply" because the "circuit court's order did not fully and finally dispose of the sanctions issue" where "it did not specify the amount" of attorney's fees the appellant would have to pay); see Harada v. Ellis, 60 Haw. 467, 480, 591 P.2d 1060, 1070 (1979).

2003The collateral order doctrine is narrowly construed; thus, to fall within its confines an order "must [1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Siangco v. Kasadate, 77 Hawai`i 157, 161, 883 P.2d 78, 82 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 , [] (1978) (footnote omitted)); see also Association of Owners v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 68 Haw. 98, 105 , 705 P.

2003The collateral order doctrine is narrowly construed; thus, to fall within its confines an order "must [1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Siangco v. Kasadate, 77 Hawai`i 157, 161, 883 P.2d 78, 82 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 , [] (1978) (footnote omitted)); see also Association of Owners v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 68 Haw. 98, 105 , 705 P.

2025See Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, 76 Hawai i 115, 119, 869 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1994) (holding that a civil appeal under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-1(a) will be dismissed if the circuit court has not entered an appealable judgment pursuant to Hawai i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 58 or Rule 54(b)); Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (reciting the requirements for appeals under the collateral-order doctrine and the Forgay 1 The court takes judicial notice of the record in 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX.

2022See Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, 76 Hawai#i 115, 119, 869 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1994) (holding that an aggrieved party cannot obtain appellate review of a circuit court's interlocutory orders in a civil case, under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-1(a) (2016), until the NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER circuit court has reduced its dispositive rulings to an appealable, final judgment under Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 58 or Rule 54(b)); Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai#i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (reciting the requirements for appeals un

2020See Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai#i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (reciting the requirements for appeals under the collateral order doctrine and the Forgay doctrine); Hofmann v. De Marchena Kaluche & Asociados, 642 F.3d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the collateral order doctrine does not provide appellate jurisdiction for a severance order issued under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); cf. In re Lieb, 915 F.2d 180 , 182–185 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a district court's order severing claims and directing that they continue as separate actions in bankruptcy court w

2020See Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai#i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (reciting the requirements for appeals under the collateral order doctrine and the Forgay doctrine); Hofmann v. De Marchena Kaluche & Asociados, 642 F.3d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the collateral order doctrine does not provide appellate jurisdiction for a severance order issued under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); cf. In re Lieb, 915 F.2d 180 , 182–185 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a district court's order severing claims and directing that they continue as separate actions in bankruptcy court w

2003Knauer asserts that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine as set forth in International Savings and Loan Association v. Woods, 69 Haw. 11, 15 , 731 P.2d 151, 154 (1987), and the irreparable injury doctrine as adopted by Penn, 2 Haw.App. at 274, 630 P.2d at 649 (quoting Forgay , 47 U.S. (6 How) at 206).

2003Knauer asserts that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine as set forth in International Savings and Loan Association v. Woods, 69 Haw. 11, 15 , 731 P.2d 151, 154 (1987), and the irreparable injury doctrine as adopted by Penn, 2 Haw.App. at 274, 630 P.2d at 649 (quoting Forgay , 47 U.S. (6 How) at 206).

2026Cf. Lathrop v. Sakatani, 111 Hawai‘i 307, 311 n.8, 141 P.3d 480, 484 n.8 (2006) (noting that "[a]n order expunging a lis pendens is immediately appealable . . . under the collateral order doctrine" because "if the movant had to wait until final judgment on the underlying claim, the realty could be sold before the issue was resolved, thereby rendering the order unreviewable" (citing Knauer v. Foote, 101 Hawai‘i 81, 85, 63 P.3d 389, 393 (2003)).

2026Cf. Lathrop v. Sakatani, 111 Hawai‘i 307, 311 n.8, 141 P.3d 480 , 484 n.8 (2006) (noting that "[a]n order expunging a lis pendens is immediately appealable . . . under the collateral order doctrine" because "if the movant had to wait until final judgment on the underlying claim, the realty could be sold before the issue was resolved, thereby rendering the order unreviewable" (citing Knauer v. Foote, 101 Hawai‘i 81, 85, 63 P.3d 389, 393 (2003)).

2025See State v. Johnson, 96 Hawaiʻi 462, 470 n.12, 32 P.3d 106, 114 n.12 (App. 2001) ("Generally, the collateral order exception is applicable in criminal cases only upon a denial of pretrial motions to reduce bail, motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, and motions to dismiss under the Speech and Debate Clause.").

2025See State v. Johnson, 96 Hawaiʻi 462, 470 n.12, 32 P.3d 106 , 114 n.12 (App. 2001) ("Generally, the collateral order exception is applicable in criminal cases only upon a denial of pretrial motions to reduce bail, motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, and motions to dismiss under the Speech and Debate Clause.").

2017Kealaiki, 95 Hawai'i at 316-17 , 22 P.3d at 595-96 , Pursuant to this doctrine, an order or decision of the court may be appealable if it: "(1) fully disposes of the question at issue; (2) resolves an issue completely collateral to the merits of the case; and (3) involves important rights which would be irreparably lost if review had to await a final judgment." Id. (quoting State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai'i 351, 353-54 , 884 P.2d 729, 731-32 (1994) (applying the collateral order exception to hold that a defendant may take an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss base

2017Kealaiki, 95 Hawai'i at 316-17 , 22 P.3d at 595-96 , Pursuant to this doctrine, an order or decision of the court may be appealable if it: "(1) fully disposes of the question at issue; (2) resolves an issue completely collateral to the merits of the case; and (3) involves important rights which would be irreparably lost if review had to await a final judgment." Id. (quoting State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai'i 351, 353-54 , 884 P.2d 729, 731-32 (1994) (applying the collateral order exception to hold that a defendant may take an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss base

2026See Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai#i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (setting forth the requirements for appealability under the collateral-order doctrine and the Forgay doctrine); HRS § 641-1(b) (specifying requirements for leave to file interlocutory appeal); see also Labayog v. Labayog, 83 Hawai#i 412, 420, 927 P.2d 420, 428 (App. 1996) ("An order allowing substitution . . . is interlocutory and not appealable of right. . . .

1998See Labayog v. Labayog, 83 Hawai'i 412 , 927 P.2d 420 , reconsideration denied 83 Hawai'i 440 , 927 P.2d 448 (App.1996) (order denying petition to remove personal representatives not a collateral order); State v. Ontiveros, 82 Hawai'i 446 , 923 P.2d 388 (1996) (denial of motion to dismiss on a particular double jeopardy ground not a collateral order); Siangco v. Kasadate, 77 Hawai'i 157 , 883 P.2d 78 (1994) (sanction order not appealable collateral order); Brown v. Wong, 71 Haw. 519 , 795 P.2d 283 (1990) (order denying State’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity not an appealable col

2026State v. Minn, 79 Hawai#i 461, 464, 903 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1995).

2001See State v. Minn, 79 Hawai'i 461, 464 , 903 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1995); State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai'i 351, 354-55 , 884 P.2d 729, 732-33 (1994). .

1996Absent the entry of final judgment as to all claims, an appeal may generally be taken from a nonfinal order or decree if (1) leave to take an interlocutory appeal has been granted by the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 641-l(b), 2 Arthur at 162-63 , 907 P.2d at 748-49 ; (2) the order or decree has been certified as final for appeal purposes pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b) 3 ; (3) the order or decree being appealed is an “appeal-able order” under the collateral order doctrine, 4 International Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. *99 Woods, 69 Haw. 11, 15, 731 P.2d 151, 154 (1987)

1996Absent the entry of final judgment as to all claims, an appeal may generally be taken from a nonfinal order or decree if (1) leave to take an interlocutory appeal has been granted by the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 641-l(b), 2 Arthur at 162-63 , 907 P.2d at 748-49 ; (2) the order or decree has been certified as final for appeal purposes pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b) 3 ; (3) the order or decree being appealed is an “appeal-able order” under the collateral order doctrine, 4 International Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. *99 Woods, 69 Haw. 11, 15, 731 P.2d 151, 154 (1987)

2016Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), the case that served as the basis for the collateral order doctrine.

2016Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), the case that served as the basis for the collateral order doctrine.

2020Co., 61 Haw. 552 , 606 P.2d 1320 (1980) (declining to extend the collateral order doctrine to allow immediate appeal from an order granting disqualification of counsel); Gomes v. Heirs of Kauwe, 52 Haw. 126 , 472 P.2d 119 (1970) (holding that 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER orders denying disqualification of counsel are interlocutory and not appealable under the collateral order rule).

2020Co., 61 Haw. 552 , 606 P.2d 1320 (1980) (declining to extend the collateral order doctrine to allow immediate appeal from an order granting disqualification of counsel); Gomes v. Heirs of Kauwe, 52 Haw. 126 , 472 P.2d 119 (1970) (holding that 2 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER orders denying disqualification of counsel are interlocutory and not appealable under the collateral order rule).

1996We need not, however, determine whether the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule has any application to appeals from collateral orders of the district courts because, in this case, the order appealed from does not satisfy the prerequisites of a collateral order enumerated in Baranco and the case upon which it relied, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 , 97 S.Ct. 2034 , 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). 2.

1996We need not, however, determine whether the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule has any application to appeals from collateral orders of the district courts because, in this case, the order appealed from does not satisfy the prerequisites of a collateral order enumerated in Baranco and the case upon which it relied, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 , 97 S.Ct. 2034 , 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). 2.

2022See Greer v. Baker, 137 Hawai#i 249, 253, 369 P.3d 832, 836 (2016) (reciting the requirements for appeals under the collateral-order doctrine); HRS § 641-1(b) (2016) (reciting the requirements for leave to file an interlocutory appeal); see also Lambert v. Teisina, 131 Hawai#i 457, 462 n.11, 319 P.3d 376 , 381 n.11 (2014) ("[A]n order appointing a commissioner and directing a partition sale (e.g., a partition decree) is an interlocutory order that is not appealable unless allowed by the trial judge.").

2016See Jenkins, 76 Hawai'i at 117 n. 1, 869 P.2d at 1336 n. 1 (“This opinion is not intended to apply to .., appealable collateral orders.”); Lambert v. Teisina, 131 Hawai'i 457 , 461 n. 8, 319 P.3d 376 , 380 n. 8 (2014) (noting that the Forgay doctrine, the collateral order doctrine, and HRS § 641-l(b) are “[exceptions to the separate, final judgment requirement”). 1.

2016The Collateral Order Doctrine The ICA majority, citing to Abrams and Brown v. Wong, 71 Haw. 519, 523 , 795 P.2d 283, 285 (1990), concluded that the circuit court’s order did not satisfy the requirements for appealability under the collateral order doctrine.

2016The Collateral Order Doctrine The ICA majority, citing to Abrams and Brown v. Wong, 71 Haw. 519, 523 , 795 P.2d 283, 285 (1990), concluded that the circuit court’s order did not satisfy the requirements for appealability under the collateral order doctrine.

2001“Under this exception, certain orders fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai'i 351, 353 , 884 P.2d 729, 731 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[Ujnder the collateral order exception, an interlocutory order is appealable if it: (1) fully disposes of the question at issue; (2) resolves an issue c

2001“Under this exception, certain orders fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai'i 351, 353 , 884 P.2d 729, 731 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[Ujnder the collateral order exception, an interlocutory order is appealable if it: (1) fully disposes of the question at issue; (2) resolves an issue c

1999In our view, such a conclusion was consistent with the rationale of the collateral order doctrine, which “makes appealable orders which do not dispose of the entire litigation, but ‘finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’ ” Id. at 523 , 559 P.2d at 747 (citation omitted).

1999In our view, such a conclusion was consistent with the rationale of the collateral order doctrine, which “makes appealable orders which do not dispose of the entire litigation, but ‘finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’ ” Id. at 523 , 559 P.2d at 747 (citation omitted).

1994See In re Estate of Henry, 2 Haw.App. 529, 532 , 634 P.2d 615, 618 (1981) (order awarding attorney’s fees is not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine where attorney’s services were not yet complete); Gates v. Central States Teamsters Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 1341, 1343 (8th Cir.1986) (an order “finding appellant liable for attorneys’ fees and costs but without determining the specific amount of that award is not a final and appealable order”).

1994See In re Estate of Henry, 2 Haw.App. 529, 532 , 634 P.2d 615, 618 (1981) (order awarding attorney’s fees is not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine where attorney’s services were not yet complete); Gates v. Central States Teamsters Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 1341, 1343 (8th Cir.1986) (an order “finding appellant liable for attorneys’ fees and costs but without determining the specific amount of that award is not a final and appealable order”).

2026The Malagodis argue the Order Denying Stay is not appealable under Forgay because it "does not command the immediate transfer of property, but only denies the Appellant Nice's [sic] request to stay the court's previous [Order Granting Motion to Compel]." 3 See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848). 4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that this court reviews de novo under the right/wrong standard." Uyeda v. Schermer, 144 Hawaiʻi 163, 170, 439 P.3d 115, 122 (2019) (citation omitted).

2026The Malagodis argue the Order Denying Stay is not appealable under Forgay because it "does not command the immediate transfer of property, but only denies the Appellant Nice's [sic] request to stay the court's previous [Order Granting Motion to Compel]." 3 See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848). 4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER "The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that this court reviews de novo under the right/wrong standard." Uyeda v. Schermer, 144 Hawaiʻi 163, 170, 439 P.3d 115, 122 (2019) (citation omitted).