collateral order doctrine in Virgin Islands

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.1. 728, 731 (VI 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.1. 409, 416 (V1. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (VI. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Govt of the VI. v. Crooke, 54 VA. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); ¢e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.L. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a fina! judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.1. 682, 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.1. 728, 731 (VI 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.1. 409, 416 (V1. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (VI. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Govt of the VI. v. Crooke, 54 VA. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); ¢e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.L. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a fina! judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.1. 682, 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of

2026Others have been recognized by case law, such as the collateral order doctrine, see Enrietto v. Rogers Townsend & Thomas P.C., 49 V.I. 311 , 319–20 (V.I. 2007) (per curiam), and the stand-on-the-pleadings doctrine, see In re Estate of Gibbs, 2025 VI 24 , ¶¶ 14–15 (citing Mills-Williams v. Mapp, 67 V.I. 574, 582 (V.I. 2017)).

2015Cf. Enrietto v. Rogers Townsend & Thomas PC, 49 V.I. 311, 316-17 (V.I. 2008) (adopting the collateral order doctrine for the Virgin Islands).

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2025See Beach TV Cable Co., Inc. v. Comcast of Florida/Georgia, LLC, 808 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2015) (“{I]n Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1981), the Supreme Court held that an order denying an attorney disqualification motion satisfied the first {collateral order doctrine] requirement ‘because the only issue is whether challenged counsel will be permitted to continue his representation.””) (citations omitted) 35 However, the issue of whether the Magistrate Division’s order disqualifying Milligan satisfies the two remaining elements of the collateral order test i

2025As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, the collateral order doctrine is a “narrow exception.” Richardson-Merrell 472 U.S. at 430 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)) 414 For the collateral order doctrine to apply, an order must: “(1) conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action Henneman-Todman v. O'Bryan-Johnson 2025 VI 10 S. Ct. Civ.

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2026W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Matter of Estate

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2026The rule would be limited to the circumstances presented 6 It rules out the collateral order doctrine as well, which is available in the Virgin Islands only if the order at issue is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Beachside Assocs. v. Fishman, 53 V.I. 700, 709 (V.I. 2010); accord Stubblefield v. Windsor Cap.

2015This judicially-created exception to the final judgment rule applies to “a small class of prejudgment orders which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, and are too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration, be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Beachside Assocs. v. Fishman, 53 V.I. 700, 709 (V.I. 2010) (quoting Enrietto, 49 V.I. at 319 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016In our appealability determination for collateral orders, the challenged ruling(s) “must conclusively determine the disputed question; resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. at 815 (quoting Hard Rock Café v. Lee, 54 V.I. 622, 628 (V.I. 2011)).

2012In other contexts, this Court has explicitly adopted the collateral order doctrine, which provides that an order may be considered “final” for the purposes of review when it (1) “conclusively determine^] the disputed question,” (2) “resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,” and (3) is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Hard Rock Café v. Lee, 54 V.I. 622, 628-30 (V.I. 2011).

2011Cir. 1989) (collecting cases), “most circuits have also made an exception to this blanket rule when it is the... agency itself that brings an appeal____because the agency is bound on remand by the standard articulated by the [trial] court and so would not have a chance to appeal from any further judgment, making the [trial] court’s determination effectively unreviewable by the agency on remand.” Shipbuilders Council of America v. U.S. Coast Guard, 578 F.3d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Occidental Petroleum Corp., 873 F.2d at 330 ).

2010Cir. 1989) (collecting cases), “most circuits have also made an exception to this blanket rule when it is the . .. agency itself that brings an appeal.... because the agency is bound on remand by the standard articulated by the [trial] court and so would not have a chance to appeal from any further judgment, making the [trial] court’s determination effectively unreviewable by the agency on remand.” Shipbuilders Council of America v. U.S. Coast Guard, 578 F.3d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Occidental Petroleum Corp., 873 F.2d at 330 ).

2011Ed. 2d 340 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted).... [Ajlthough courts have held that litigants may generally not appeal agency remands pursuant to the collateral order doctrine because in most circumstances the trial court’s decision will, at some point, become reviewable on appeal, Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 329-30 (D.C.

2010Likewise, the August 22, 2007 Opinion and Order satisfies the second element by determining the important issue of under what circumstances individuals initially hired as “exempt” employees who later attempted to elect into the “classified” service pursuant to the now-repealed 3 V.I.C. § 498 may appeal adverse employment actions to PERB. 10 Finally, although courts have held that litigants may generally not appeal agency remands pursuant to the collateral order doctrine because in most circumstances the trial court’s decision will, at some point, become reviewable on appeal, Occidental Petrole

2026Grp., 74 F.3d 990, 997 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that since the appellant is “free to seek review of the district court’s decision [to grant a Rule 60(b) motion] after a final judgment is entered,” the grant is not “effec- tively unreviewable” and hence not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine).

2026Grp., 74 F.3d 990, 997 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that since the appellant is “free to seek review of the district court’s decision [to grant a Rule 60(b) motion] after a final judgment is entered,” the grant is not “effec- tively unreviewable” and hence not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine).

2026Others have been recognized by case law, such as the collateral order doctrine, see Enrietto v. Rogers Townsend & Thomas P.C., 49 V.I. 311 , 319–20 (V.I. 2007) (per curiam), and the stand-on-the-pleadings doctrine, see In re Estate of Gibbs, 2025 VI 24 , ¶¶ 14–15 (citing Mills-Williams v. Mapp, 67 V.I. 574, 582 (V.I. 2017)).

2025W., 62 V.I. 728, 731 (V.I. 2015); Ramirez v. People, 56 V.I. 409, 416 (V.I. 2012) and citations in footnote)); see generally Penn v. Mosley, 67 V.I. 879 , 891 n.4 (V.I. 2017) (discussing the distinctions between a judgment, order, and decree); Miller v. Sorenson, 67 V.I. 861, 871-72 (V.I. 2017) (same); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237, 249-52 (V.I. 2010) (adopting Collateral Order rule for establishing a Final Judgment); e.g., Demming v. Demming, 66 V.I. 502, 506 (V.I. 2017) (holding that a divorce decree is a final judgment); Cianci v. Chaput, 68 V.I. 682 , 688 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Ma

2025No. 2022-0038 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 13 and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 430 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). “{A] failure to meet even one of the three factors renders the doctrine inapplicable as a basis for appeal, no matter how compelling the other factors may be.” Enrietto, 49 V.I. at 319-20 (citing Govt of the VI. v Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 320 (3d Cir. 2004)) 415 In this case, the Superior Court’s June 14, 2022 order® disqualifying Attorney Caines conclusively decided that Attorne

2025No. 2022-0038 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 13 and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 430 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). “{A] failure to meet even one of the three factors renders the doctrine inapplicable as a basis for appeal, no matter how compelling the other factors may be.” Enrietto, 49 V.I. at 319-20 (citing Govt of the VI. v Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 320 (3d Cir. 2004)) 415 In this case, the Superior Court’s June 14, 2022 order® disqualifying Attorney Caines conclusively decided that Attorne

2025Thus, there is no appellate jurisdiction in this case under the collateral order doctrine.”); Vaccone v. Syken, 899 A.2d. 1103, 1107 (Pa. 2006) (“[I]n many cases, orders disqualifying counsel will not be separable from the merits of the litigation, and that is particularly the case here where the order is based on the likelihood that the attorney would be called to testify at trial.).

2025No. 2022-0038 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 13 and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 430 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). “{A] failure to meet even one of the three factors renders the doctrine inapplicable as a basis for appeal, no matter how compelling the other factors may be.” Enrietto, 49 V.I. at 319-20 (citing Govt of the VI. v Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 320 (3d Cir. 2004)) 415 In this case, the Superior Court’s June 14, 2022 order® disqualifying Attorney Caines conclusively decided that Attorne

2025No. 2022-0038 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 13 and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 430 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). “{A] failure to meet even one of the three factors renders the doctrine inapplicable as a basis for appeal, no matter how compelling the other factors may be.” Enrietto, 49 V.I. at 319-20 (citing Govt of the VI. v Hodge, 359 F.3d 312 , 320 (3d Cir. 2004)) 415 In this case, the Superior Court’s June 14, 2022 order® disqualifying Attorney Caines conclusively decided that Attorne

2025Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983))). 5 Although not raised by the parties, we acknowledge that the March 10, 2020 opinion and order could potentially qualify for an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.

2025See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988) (“If the order at issue fails to satisfy any one of these requirements, it is not appealable under the collateral-order (doctrine].”) (citations omitted).

2025The elements are that the challenged ruling ‘(1) conclusively determined the disputed question; (2) resolved an important issue separate from the merits of the case; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Jn re Deepwater Horizon, 793 F.3d 479, 484 (Sth Cir. 2015).

2025See Beach TV Cable Co., Inc. v. Comcast of Florida/Georgia, LLC, 808 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2015) (“{I]n Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1981), the Supreme Court held that an order denying an attorney disqualification motion satisfied the first {collateral order doctrine] requirement ‘because the only issue is whether challenged counsel will be permitted to continue his representation.””) (citations omitted) 35 However, the issue of whether the Magistrate Division’s order disqualifying Milligan satisfies the two remaining elements of the collateral order test i