12 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 2011–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryorgreen2 sentences2018Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a party may not take an immediate appeal of a trial court’s decision regarding standing because appealing such issue fails the collateral order doctrine); compare SCI Texas Funeral Servs, Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tx. 2018Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a party may not take an immediate appeal of a trial court’s decision regarding standing because appealing such issue fails the collateral order doctrine); compare SCI Texas Funeral Servs, Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tx. | 3 | 3 |
SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc. v. Hijargreen2 sentences2018Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a party may not take an immediate appeal of a trial court’s decision regarding standing because appealing such issue fails the collateral order doctrine); compare SCI Texas Funeral Servs, Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tx. 2018Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a party may not take an immediate appeal of a trial court’s decision regarding standing because appealing such issue fails the collateral order doctrine); compare SCI Texas Funeral Servs, Inc. v. Hijar, 214 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Tx. | 3 | 3 |
Maggard v. Kinneygreen2 sentences2025See Maggard v. Kinney, 576 S.W.3d 559, 568-69 (Ky. 2019) (discussing the judicial statements privilege and the “confusion with one parallel, and sometimes intersecting legal rule, . . . so-called ‘witness immunity.’” The Court ultimately decided that neither the judicial statements privilege nor witness immunity met “the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule[.]”); see also Curd v. Kentucky State Bd. of Licensure for Prof’l Eng’rs. & Land Surveyors, 433 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (stating that “absolute immunity is a judicially cre 2021First, in Maggard v. Kinney, 576 S.W.3d 559 (Ky. 2019), we were tasked with determining whether the denial of a judicial statements privilege in litigation between two physicians fell within the collateral order doctrine. | 1 | 3 |
Ervin Cable Construction, LLC v. Laygreen2 sentences2021The year after Farmer was decided, the Court of Appeals, in Ervin Cable, 461 S.W.3d 422 , was tasked with answering the exact question before us today – whether, under the collateral order doctrine, an appellate court has jurisdiction to review a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment which relies on the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. 2021When the case was first before the Court, we exercised appellate jurisdiction in reliance on Breathitt County Board of Education v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2009), as interpreted in Ervin Cable Construction, LLC v. Lay, 461 S.W.3d 422, 423 (Ky. App. 2015), overruled by Sheets, supra. Sheets noted that since Prater, the Supreme Court has refined interlocutory jurisdiction based on the collateral order doctrine exception to the finality rule. | 1 | 3 |
Nixon v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences2021In its analysis, the Farmer Court, drawing upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), adopted a three-element test to determine when the collateral order doctrine applies. 2014In Nixon , the Court addressed the “small class” of immediately appealable interlocutory orders falling within the collateral order doctrine. 457 U.S. at 742 , 102 S.Ct. 2690 . | 1 | 2 |
Curd v. Kentucky State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers & Land Surveyorsgreen1 sentence2025See Maggard v. Kinney, 576 S.W.3d 559, 568-69 (Ky. 2019) (discussing the judicial statements privilege and the “confusion with one parallel, and sometimes intersecting legal rule, . . . so-called ‘witness immunity.’” The Court ultimately decided that neither the judicial statements privilege nor witness immunity met “the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule[.]”); see also Curd v. Kentucky State Bd. of Licensure for Prof’l Eng’rs. & Land Surveyors, 433 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (stating that “absolute immunity is a judicially cre | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Fieldsgreen1 sentence2023What Romines is really attempting is not a writ petition, but an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss which would be appropriate in only the most “rare cases[,]” Baker v. Fields, 543 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2018,) where we would consider application of the collateral order doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Ashcroft v. Iqbalgreen1 sentence2021In Maggard in 2019, the Court emphasized that interlocutory appeals are “rare” and that “Kentucky courts have in some instances allowed the collateral order doctrine to expand beyond ‘its logic and . . . the [Cohen] criteria.’” 576 S.W.3d at 566 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chassergreen2 sentences2014See Lauro Lines s.r.l v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 , 109 S.Ct. 1976 , 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 , 113 S.Ct. 684 , 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 , 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). 2014See Lauro Lines s.r.l v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 , 109 S.Ct. 1976 , 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 , 113 S.Ct. 684 , 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 , 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ervin Cable Construction, LLC v. Laygreen2 sentences2021The year after Farmer was decided, the Court of Appeals, in Ervin Cable, 461 S.W.3d 422 , was tasked with answering the exact question before us today – whether, under the collateral order doctrine, an appellate court has jurisdiction to review a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment which relies on the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. 2021When the case was first before the Court, we exercised appellate jurisdiction in reliance on Breathitt County Board of Education v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2009), as interpreted in Ervin Cable Construction, LLC v. Lay, 461 S.W.3d 422, 423 (Ky. App. 2015), overruled by Sheets, supra. Sheets noted that since Prater, the Supreme Court has refined interlocutory jurisdiction based on the collateral order doctrine exception to the finality rule. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Breathitt County Board of Education v. Prater
green
2 sentences2021In 2009, in Prater, this Court recognized for the first time, though not explicitly by name, a new exception to the general rule that appeals may be taken only from final orders known as the collateral order doctrine. 292 S.W.3d at 886-87 . 2021When the case was first before the Court, we exercised appellate jurisdiction in reliance on Breathitt County Board of Education v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2009), as interpreted in Ervin Cable Construction, LLC v. Lay, 461 S.W.3d 422, 423 (Ky. App. 2015), overruled by Sheets, supra. Sheets noted that since Prater, the Supreme Court has refined interlocutory jurisdiction based on the collateral order doctrine exception to the finality rule. | 5 | 2011–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Farmer
green
2 sentences2021This Court has honed its application of the collateral order doctrine since its decision in Prater, beginning with Commonwealth v. Farmer, 423 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2014). 2021The Court explained that “the collateral order doctrine requires an order that (1) conclusively decides an important issue separate from the merits of the case; (2) is effectively unreviewable following final judgment; and (3) involves a substantial public interest that would be imperiled absent an immediate appeal.” Id. | 4 | 2021–2023 |
Will v. Hallock
green
2 sentences2021We cited to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kelly v. Great Seneca Financial Corp., 447 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2006), which relied heavily on Will, 546 U.S. 345 , for its emphasis “on limiting the collateral order exception to cases involving a substantial public interest that would be threatened by a trial or other proceedings on the merits of the full case.” Id. at 568. 2014In 2006, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 , 126 S.Ct. 952 , 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006), a case which closely scrutinized the limitations of the collateral order doctrine. | 3 | 2014–2021 |
Mitchell v. Forsyth
green
2 sentences2021In its analysis, the Farmer Court, drawing upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), adopted a three-element test to determine when the collateral order doctrine applies. 2011Mitchell and Nixon applied the collateral order doctrine [1] articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), to interlocutory appeals of government officials claiming immunity, and held that "the denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment." Prater, 292 S.W.3d at 887 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 ). | 2 | 2011–2021 |
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
green
2 sentences2011Mitchell and Nixon applied the collateral order doctrine [1] articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), to interlocutory appeals of government officials claiming immunity, and held that "the denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment." Prater, 292 S.W.3d at 887 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 ). 2011Mitchell and Nixon applied the collateral order doctrine [1] articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), to interlocutory appeals of government officials claiming immunity, and held that "the denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment." Prater, 292 S.W.3d at 887 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 , 105 S.Ct. at 2815 ). | 2 | 2011–2021 |
Alice G. Kelly Norman P. Kelly v. Great Seneca Financial Corp. Javitch, Block & Rathbone
green
1 sentence2021We cited to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kelly v. Great Seneca Financial Corp., 447 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2006), which relied heavily on Will, 546 U.S. 345 , for its emphasis “on limiting the collateral order exception to cases involving a substantial public interest that would be threatened by a trial or other proceedings on the merits of the full case.” Id. at 568. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014See Lauro Lines s.r.l v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 , 109 S.Ct. 1976 , 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 , 113 S.Ct. 684 , 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 , 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). 2014See Lauro Lines s.r.l v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 , 109 S.Ct. 1976 , 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 , 113 S.Ct. 684 , 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 , 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014See Lauro Lines s.r.l v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 , 109 S.Ct. 1976 , 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 , 113 S.Ct. 684 , 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 , 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). 2014See Lauro Lines s.r.l v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 , 109 S.Ct. 1976 , 104 L.Ed.2d 548 (1989); Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 , 113 S.Ct. 684 , 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 , 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter
green
2 sentences2011NOTES [1] The collateral order doctrine permits appellate courts to hear interlocutory appeals from "a small set of prejudgment orders that are `collateral to' the merits of an action and `too important' to be denied immediate review." Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 599, 603 , 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 2011NOTES [1] The collateral order doctrine permits appellate courts to hear interlocutory appeals from "a small set of prejudgment orders that are `collateral to' the merits of an action and `too important' to be denied immediate review." Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 599, 603 , 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Yanero v. Davis
green
2 sentences2011Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-1226 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). [2] Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky.2001), described "governmental immunity" as "the public policy, derived from the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, that limits imposition of tort liability on a government agency." Id. at 519 (quoting 57 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability, § 10 (2001)). 2011Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-1226 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). [2] Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky.2001), described "governmental immunity" as "the public policy, derived from the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, that limits imposition of tort liability on a government agency." Id. at 519 (quoting 57 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal, County, School and State Tort Liability, § 10 (2001)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.