66 West Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2026 23 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Robert J. and Billye S. Front, etc.green2 sentences2024However, this Court has often said that “[a]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory ruling 3 Respondent also filed suit against Inter-State Hardwoods, Inc., the company that timbered the land; and against Larry S. Barger, the forester who arranged the timber sale. 2 which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 231 W. 2022“An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.” Syllabus Point 1, Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 231 W. | 5 | 46 |
Robinson v. Packgreen2 sentences2024Va. 828, 833 , 679 S.E.2d 660, 665 (2009) (explaining that the collateral order doctrine applies because, inter alia, a ruling on whether a party is immune from suit is “‘effectively unreviewable’ at the appeal stage. . . . 2023The collateral order doctrine applies where an interlocutory order “(1) conclusively 5 determines the disputed controversy, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action[], and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Robinson v. Pack, 223 W. | 5 | 6 |
Mitchell v. Forsythgreen2 sentences2009Although we observed in Hutchison that the high court views pretrial immunity rulings as “immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,” we did not decide whether the denial of a dispositive motion 6 based on qual *832 ified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal in this state. 7 198 W.Va. at 147 , 479 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); accord Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that “a district court’s order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order unde 2009Although we observed in Hutchison that the high court views pretrial immunity rulings as “immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,” we did not decide whether the denial of a dispositive motion 6 based on qual *832 ified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal in this state. 7 198 W.Va. at 147 , 479 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); accord Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that “a district court’s order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order unde | 2 | 7 |
Hutchison v. City of Huntingtongreen2 sentences2009Although we observed in Hutchison that the high court views pretrial immunity rulings as “immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,” we did not decide whether the denial of a dispositive motion 6 based on qual *832 ified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal in this state. 7 198 W.Va. at 147 , 479 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); accord Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that “a district court’s order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order unde 2009Although we observed in Hutchison that the high court views pretrial immunity rulings as “immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,” we did not decide whether the denial of a dispositive motion 6 based on qual *832 ified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal in this state. 7 198 W.Va. at 147 , 479 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); accord Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that “a district court’s order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order unde | 1 | 6 |
James M.B. v. Carolyn M.green2 sentences2013Our cases have pointed out that we may address specific issues decided by an interlocutory order under the collateral order doctrine or ‘by writs of prohibition, certified questions, or by judgments rendered under Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.’” (quoting James M.B., 193 W.Va. at 292 n. 3, 456 S.E.2d at 19 n. 3)). 2013Our cases have pointed out that we may address specific issues decided by an interlocutory order under the collateral order doctrine or ‘by writs of prohibition, certified questions, or by judgments rendered under Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.’” (quoting James M.B., 193 W.Va. at 292 n. 3, 456 S.E.2d at 19 n. 3)). | 1 | 4 |
Durm v. Heck's, Inc.green2 sentences2023The final consideration in the collateral order test is whether the order “is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Durm, 184 W. 2013Following the rationale expressed by the Robinson Court, we will analyze an order compelling arbitration under the collateral order doctrine to ascertain if such an order is among that limited class of interlocutory orders that is immediately appealable. 7 As to the first factor in the collateral order test, that the ruling at issue “conclusively determines the disputed controversy,” Durm, 184 W.Va. at 566 n. 2, 401 S.E.2d at 912 n. 2, we find that a circuit court’s ruling that refuses to compel arbitration is conclusive as to the disputed controversy of whether the parties are required to arb | 1 | 4 |
Ewing v. Board of Educationgreen2 sentences2021“When a party . . . assigns as error a circuit court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, the circuit court’s disposition of the motion to dismiss will be reviewed de i novo.” Syllabus point 4, in part, Ewing v. Board of Education of County of Summers, 202 W. 2021“When a party . . . assigns as error a circuit court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, the circuit court’s disposition of the motion to dismiss will be reviewed de i novo.” Syllabus point 4, in part, Ewing v. Board of Education of County of Summers, 202 W. | 1 | 4 |
Coleman v. Sophergreen2 sentences2026“An interlocutory order would be subject to appeal under this doctrine if it ‘(1) conclusively determines the disputed 8 459 S.E.2d 367, 371 (1995) (“The usual prerequisite for our appellate jurisdiction is a final judgment, final in respect that it ends this case.”). 2021Va. 90 , 96 n.7, 459 S.E.2d 367 , 373 n.7 (1995) (“Although the issue of statutory immunity could conceivably qualify [for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine], we are reluctant to invoke this doctrine in a case where there has been no request to do so and in light of our ironclad rule against piecemeal appeals.”). | 1 | 2 |
Jarvis v. WEST VIRGINIA STATE POLICEgreen2 sentences2019Petitioners contend that the whistleblower issue falls within the collateral order rule because, in their view, it is “predicated in part on qualified immunity” and thus falls within the reasoning of Jarvis v. West Virginia State Police, 227 W. 2013Va. 472 , 711 S.E.2d 542 (2010). 9 In concluding that the order denying the motion to dismiss was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, the Jarvis Court adopted the rationale expressed in Robinson. | 1 | 2 |
Dishman v. Jarrellgreen2 sentences2026To the extent Lawrence sanctions the use of the collateral order doctrine to permit interlocutory review of denials of motions to dismiss for deficient screening certificates of merit under the auspices of presenting a subject matter jurisdiction question, we clarify in this opinion that it presents no such issue. 17 Dishman v. Jarrell, 165 W. 2026Va. 709, 712 , 271 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1980)). | 1 | 1 |
Hubbard v. State Farm Indemnity Co.green1 sentence2024Va. 542, 550-51 , 584 S.E.2d 176, 184-85 (2003) (explaining that a party can immediately appeal an order that approximates a final order in nature and effect but is not required to do so).3 Here, Mr. Johnson does not appeal the December 13, 2022, order under the collateral order doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Diane Singleton v. Kenneth Apfelgreen1 sentence2024Federal courts have rejected such a rule, finding that “[t]he collateral order doctrine is permissive, not mandatory.” Singleton v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 853, 856 (11th Cir. 2000); 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. | 1 | 1 |
Adkins v. Capehartgreen1 sentence2023Va. 460, 463 , 504 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1998). 7 doctrine if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed controversy, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” 13 The collateral order doctrine has most frequently been applied in granting review of denials of governmental immunity but has also been applied in the context of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. 14 In refusing to review this order under the collateral order doctrine, we are mindful both that the doctrine’s princi | 1 | 1 |
Carson v. Giant Food, Inc.green1 sentence2020In Credit Acceptance Corporation v. Front, 9 we held that “[a]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.” And, “[w]hen an appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration is properly before this Court, our review is 8 Carson, 175 F.3d at 331-32. 9 231 W. | 1 | 1 |
Woman's Club of St. Albans v. Jamesgreen2 sentences2019Albans v. James, 158 W.Va. 698, 703 , 213 S.E.2d 469, 472-73 (1975). 2 compel arbitration. 3 We reasoned that, while the decedent wanted petitioner to be afforded substantial deference in how she interpreted the decedent’s will, “the language on which petitioner relies evidences no intention by the decedent that disputes arising under the will be arbitrated.” Id. at *3. 2019Albans v. James, 158 W.Va. 698, 703 , 213 S.E.2d 469, 472-73 (1975). 2 compel arbitration. 3 We reasoned that, while the decedent wanted petitioner to be afforded substantial deference in how she interpreted the decedent’s will, “the language on which petitioner relies evidences no intention by the decedent that disputes arising under the will be arbitrated.” Id. at *3. | 1 | 1 |
Nationstar Mortgage v. Adam and Bethany Westgreen2 sentences2017Standard of Review As this Court held in syllabus point one of Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 231 W.Va. 518 , 745 S.E.2d 556 (2013), “[a]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.” Moreover, “[i]n cases, such as this, where the challenge to the arbitration clause is based on unconscionability, the issue presented is a question of law controlled by contract principles.” Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. West, 237 W.Va. 84, 87-88 , 785 S.E.2d 634, 637-38 (2016). 2017Standard of Review As this Court held in syllabus point one of Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Front, 231 W.Va. 518 , 745 S.E.2d 556 (2013), “[a]n order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.” Moreover, “[i]n cases, such as this, where the challenge to the arbitration clause is based on unconscionability, the issue presented is a question of law controlled by contract principles.” Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. West, 237 W.Va. 84, 87-88 , 785 S.E.2d 634, 637-38 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Behrens v. Pelletiergreen2 sentences2009Although we observed in Hutchison that the high court views pretrial immunity rulings as “immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,” we did not decide whether the denial of a dispositive motion 6 based on qual *832 ified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal in this state. 7 198 W.Va. at 147 , 479 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); accord Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that “a district court’s order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order unde 2009Although we observed in Hutchison that the high court views pretrial immunity rulings as “immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,” we did not decide whether the denial of a dispositive motion 6 based on qual *832 ified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal in this state. 7 198 W.Va. at 147 , 479 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); accord Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that “a district court’s order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order unde | 1 | 1 |
Parrish v. Clevelandgreen1 sentence2009Although we observed in Hutchison that the high court views pretrial immunity rulings as “immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,” we did not decide whether the denial of a dispositive motion 6 based on qual *832 ified immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal in this state. 7 198 W.Va. at 147 , 479 S.E.2d at 657 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)); accord Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that “a district court’s order denying a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity is a qualifying order unde | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
John J. Helton v. William P. Clements, Jr., Governor of Texas
green
2 sentences2021Specifically, in Helton, the court found that “a refusal to rule on a claim of immunity, like the explicit denial of a claim of immunity, is also immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 1017 . 2021Specifically, in Helton, the court found that “a refusal to rule on a claim of immunity, like the explicit denial of a claim of immunity, is also immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. at 1017 . | 2 | 2021–2021 |
West Virginia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. McDowell Pharmacy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019“When an appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration is properly before this Court, our review is de novo.” Syllabus Point 1, West Virginia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. McDowell Pharmacy, Inc., 238 W.Va. 465 , 796 S.E.2d 574 (2017). 3. 2019“When an appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration is properly before this Court, our review is de novo.” Syllabus Point 1, West Virginia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. McDowell Pharmacy, Inc., 238 W.Va. 465 , 796 S.E.2d 574 (2017). 3. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
State v. Edward Charles L.
green
1 sentence2023Va. 641 , 645 n.1, 398 S.E.2d 123 , 127 n.1 (1990). 1 presented in this appeal are interlocutory, do not fall within the collateral order doctrine, and do not otherwise present an appealable ruling, as discussed more fully infra. Accordingly, we dismiss the instant appeal. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2017In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stephens, 188 W.Va. 622 , 425 S.E.2d 577 (1992), we held that “[a] writ of prohibition is available to correct a clear legal error resulting from a trial court’s substantial abuse of its discretion in regard to discovery orders.” Id., at 624 , 425 S.E.2d at 679 , syl. pt. 1; see also accord State ex rel. 2017In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stephens, 188 W.Va. 622 , 425 S.E.2d 577 (1992), we held that “[a] writ of prohibition is available to correct a clear legal error resulting from a trial court’s substantial abuse of its discretion in regard to discovery orders.” Id., at 624 , 425 S.E.2d at 679 , syl. pt. 1; see also accord State ex rel. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State Ex Rel. Arrow Concrete Co. v. Hill
green
2 sentences2015Arrow Concrete Co. v. Hill, 194 W.Va. 239 , 245 n.5, 460 S.E.2d 54 , 60 n.5 (1994), we noted that “[an] appeal [of denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim] is available in a few special circumstances to protect rights that are defined as rights intended to protect against the burden of trial rather than simply to protect against the entry of judgment . . . .” (citing Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.1 at 493 (2d ed. 1992)). 3 Having resolved the threshold question regarding jurisdiction, we now turn to petitioners’ assignment of error. 2015Arrow Concrete Co. v. Hill, 194 W.Va. 239 , 245 n.5, 460 S.E.2d 54 , 60 n.5 (1994), we noted that “[an] appeal [of denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim] is available in a few special circumstances to protect rights that are defined as rights intended to protect against the burden of trial rather than simply to protect against the entry of judgment . . . .” (citing Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.1 at 493 (2d ed. 1992)). 3 Having resolved the threshold question regarding jurisdiction, we now turn to petitioners’ assignment of error. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown
green
1 sentence2015“Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 , a written provision to settle by arbitration a controversy arising out of a contract that evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, unless the provision is found to be invalid, revocable or unenforceable upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Syllabus Point 6, Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W.Va. 646 , 724 S.E.2d 250 (2011), reversed on other grounds by Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012). 3. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown Ex Rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare
green
2 sentences2015“Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 , a written provision to settle by arbitration a controversy arising out of a contract that evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, unless the provision is found to be invalid, revocable or unenforceable upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Syllabus Point 6, Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W.Va. 646 , 724 S.E.2d 250 (2011), reversed on other grounds by Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012). 3. 2015“Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 , a written provision to settle by arbitration a controversy arising out of a contract that evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, unless the provision is found to be invalid, revocable or unenforceable upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Syllabus Point 6, Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 228 W.Va. 646 , 724 S.E.2d 250 (2011), reversed on other grounds by Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012). 3. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
green
2 sentences2013The exception referred to as the “collateral order” doctrine, which was established by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), may be applied to allow appeal of an interlocutory order when three factors are met: “An interlocutory order would be subject to appeal under [the collateral order] doctrine if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed controversy, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgme 2013The exception referred to as the “collateral order” doctrine, which was established by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), may be applied to allow appeal of an interlocutory order when three factors are met: “An interlocutory order would be subject to appeal under [the collateral order] doctrine if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed controversy, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgme | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.