collateral order doctrine in Georgia

2016System of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505 ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009), for the proposition that an interlocutory refusal of sovereign immunity is an appealable judgment under the collateral order doctrine.

2016System of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505 ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009), for the proposition that an interlocutory refusal of sovereign immunity is an appealable judgment under the collateral order doctrine.

2024The Supreme Court has limited the collateral order doctrine to a very small class of interlocutory rulings [that] are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral records . . . [if] [a]fter an in camera inspection of such records, the court finds that access to such records appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence[.]” 2 Defendants requested a certificate of immediate review, which the trial court did not issue. 3 Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) ( 653 SE2d 713 ) (2007). 4 (Citation and punctuation omitt

2024The Supreme Court has limited the collateral order doctrine to a very small class of interlocutory rulings [that] are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral records . . . [if] [a]fter an in camera inspection of such records, the court finds that access to such records appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence[.]” 2 Defendants requested a certificate of immediate review, which the trial court did not issue. 3 Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) ( 653 SE2d 713 ) (2007). 4 (Citation and punctuation omitt

2022Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order may be appealed directly if it: “(1) resolves an issue that is substantially separate from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2) would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, and (3) completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal[.]” Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) ( 653 SE2d 713 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 432 (1) (c) ( 297 SE2d 469 ) (1982).

2022Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order may be appealed directly if it: “(1) resolves an issue that is substantially separate from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2) would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, and (3) completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal[.]” Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) ( 653 SE2d 713 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 432 (1) (c) ( 297 SE2d 469 ) (1982).

2024In his notice of appeal, Taylor suggests that he may appeal directly under the collateral order doctrine, which “permits appeals from a small category of decisions that are (i) conclusive, (ii) that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and (iii) that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.”Expedia v. City of Columbus, 305 Ga. App. 450, 452 (1) ( 699 SE2d 1 In fact, Taylor did file an application for interlocutory appeal, which we denied.

2023“The collateral order doctrine permits appeals from a small category of decisions that are (i) conclusive, (ii) that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and (iii) that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 305 Ga. App. 450, 452 (1) ( 699 SE2d 600 ) (2010) (punctuation omitted).

2026See id. at 413 (1); see also Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 774 ( 784 SE2d 775 ) (2016) (“[A]n order that satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine is considered to be effectively final and would be appealable because it comes within the terms of a relevant statutory right to appeal final judgments.”) (punctuation omitted).

2026See id. at 413 (1); see also Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 774 ( 784 SE2d 775 ) (2016) (“[A]n order that satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine is considered to be effectively final and would be appealable because it comes within the terms of a relevant statutory right to appeal final judgments.”) (punctuation omitted).

2022See, e.g., Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431- 432 (1) (c) (297 SE2d 469) (1982); Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829, 832 (747 SE2d 21) (2013); Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-435 (II) (A), (105 SCt 2757, 86 LEd2d 340) (1985); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 11 See Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 203 (657 SE2d 842) (2008) (holding that a criminal defendant is “entitled to representation on appeal by effective, i.e., conflict-free, counsel as a matter of constitutional law”). 12 The dissent, however, did consider this issue and concluded that counsel’s interest justified applicatio

2022See, e.g., Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431- 432 (1) (c) (297 SE2d 469) (1982); Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829, 832 (747 SE2d 21) (2013); Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-435 (II) (A), (105 SCt 2757, 86 LEd2d 340) (1985); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 11 See Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 203 (657 SE2d 842) (2008) (holding that a criminal defendant is “entitled to representation on appeal by effective, i.e., conflict-free, counsel as a matter of constitutional law”). 12 The dissent, however, did consider this issue and concluded that counsel’s interest justified applicatio

2026As Justice Pinson explained in his concurrence in Buckner-Webb v. State, 314 Ga. 823 (2022), “our Court imported the collateral-order doctrine from federal law,” id. at 833 , where it serves as a “‘practical rather than a technical construction’” of the language in the federal 3 appellate-jurisdiction statute, 28 USC § 1291 .

2026As Justice Pinson explained in his concurrence in Buckner-Webb v. State, 314 Ga. 823 (2022), “our Court imported the collateral-order doctrine from federal law,” id. at 833 , where it serves as a “‘practical rather than a technical construction’” of the language in the federal 3 appellate-jurisdiction statute, 28 USC § 1291 .

2021See Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 875-877 ( 287 SE2d 7 ) (1982) (looking to federal collateral order case law in developing the doctrine under Georgia law); Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 432 ( 297 SE2d 469 ) (1982) (same).” Warren v. State, 297 Ga. 810 , 811 n. 2 ( 778 SE2d 749 ) (2015). “[N]early all of the courts which have decided this issue, federal and state, have held that orders denying an attorney’s request to withdraw fall within the collateral order doctrine.” In re Franke, 55 A3d 713, 717 (I) (Md.

2021See Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 875-877 ( 287 SE2d 7 ) (1982) (looking to federal collateral order case law in developing the doctrine under Georgia law); Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 432 ( 297 SE2d 469 ) (1982) (same).” Warren v. State, 297 Ga. 810 , 811 n. 2 ( 778 SE2d 749 ) (2015). “[N]early all of the courts which have decided this issue, federal and state, have held that orders denying an attorney’s request to withdraw fall within the collateral order doctrine.” In re Franke, 55 A3d 713, 717 (I) (Md.

2023Alternatively, the appellants contend that, even if deemed interlocutory, the Set-Off Order is subject to direct appeal under the collateral-order exception to the finality rule under Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570 ( 651 SE2d 679 ) (2007). 3 See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d) (“Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all . . . orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the . . . order standing al

2023Alternatively, the appellants contend that, even if deemed interlocutory, the Set-Off Order is subject to direct appeal under the collateral-order exception to the finality rule under Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570 ( 651 SE2d 679 ) (2007). 3 See OCGA § 5-6-34 (d) (“Where an appeal is taken under any provision of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this Code section, all . . . orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal and which may affect the proceedings below shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of the . . . order standing al

2022See, e.g., Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430 , 431- 432 (1) (c) ( 297 SE2d 469 ) (1982); Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829, 832 ( 747 SE2d 21 ) (2013); Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-435 (III) (A), ( 105 SCt 2757 , 86 LE2d 340) (1985); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 . 11 See Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 203 ( 657 SE2d 842 ) (2008) (holding that a criminal defendant is “entitled to representation on appeal by effective, i.e., conflict-free, counsel as a matter of constitutional law”). 12 The dissent, however, did consider this issue and concluded that counsel’s interest justified

2022See, e.g., Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431- 432 (1) (c) (297 SE2d 469) (1982); Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829, 832 (747 SE2d 21) (2013); Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-435 (II) (A), (105 SCt 2757, 86 LEd2d 340) (1985); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 11 See Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 203 (657 SE2d 842) (2008) (holding that a criminal defendant is “entitled to representation on appeal by effective, i.e., conflict-free, counsel as a matter of constitutional law”). 12 The dissent, however, did consider this issue and concluded that counsel’s interest justified applicatio

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders — including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the ————————————————————— 8 See, e.g., Warren v. State, 297 Ga. 810 , 811 n.2 ( 778

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2025Because the automobile accident at issue in this case occurred in January 2022, OCGA § 51-12-1.1 (d) does not apply to this case. 7 The collateral order doctrine is “to be applied if the order being appealed (1) resolves an issue that is ‘substantially separate’ from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2) would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final 8 this Court has held that”a discovery order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceed

2025Because the automobile accident at issue in this case occurred in January 2022, OCGA § 51-12-1.1 (d) does not apply to this case. 7 The collateral order doctrine is “to be applied if the order being appealed (1) resolves an issue that is ‘substantially separate’ from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2) would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final 8 this Court has held that”a discovery order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceed

2024The Supreme Court has limited the collateral order doctrine to a very small class of interlocutory rulings [that] are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral records . . . [if] [a]fter an in camera inspection of such records, the court finds that access to such records appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence[.]” 2 Defendants requested a certificate of immediate review, which the trial court did not issue. 3 Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) ( 653 SE2d 713 ) (2007). 4 (Citation and punctuation omitt

2024The Supreme Court has limited the collateral order doctrine to a very small class of interlocutory rulings [that] are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral records . . . [if] [a]fter an in camera inspection of such records, the court finds that access to such records appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence[.]” 2 Defendants requested a certificate of immediate review, which the trial court did not issue. 3 Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 748 (1) ( 653 SE2d 713 ) (2007). 4 (Citation and punctuation omitt

2018Despite the lack of a certificate of immediate review, Luedee asks this Court to grant his application, either under the collateral-order doctrine or pursuant to Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572 ( 532 SE2d 380 ) (2000).

2018Pretermitting whether the “inherent power” to hear such appeals extends to this Court, the Applicants have cited no authority supporting their conclusory suggestion that this discovery dispute “involve[s] an issue of great concern, gravity, and importance to the public.”1 See id. at 575-576 (1); compare Johnson & Johnson 1 We do not consider the Applicants’ alternative argument – belatedly raised for the first time in their reply brief – that the trial court’s order potentially may be directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

2022See, e.g., Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431- 432 (1) (c) (297 SE2d 469) (1982); Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829, 832 (747 SE2d 21) (2013); Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-435 (II) (A), (105 SCt 2757, 86 LEd2d 340) (1985); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 11 See Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 203 (657 SE2d 842) (2008) (holding that a criminal defendant is “entitled to representation on appeal by effective, i.e., conflict-free, counsel as a matter of constitutional law”). 12 The dissent, however, did consider this issue and concluded that counsel’s interest justified applicatio

2022See, e.g., Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431- 432 (1) (c) (297 SE2d 469) (1982); Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga. App. 829, 832 (747 SE2d 21) (2013); Richardson-Merrell v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 434-435 (II) (A), (105 SCt 2757, 86 LEd2d 340) (1985); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 11 See Garland v. State, 283 Ga. 201, 203 (657 SE2d 842) (2008) (holding that a criminal defendant is “entitled to representation on appeal by effective, i.e., conflict-free, counsel as a matter of constitutional law”). 12 The dissent, however, did consider this issue and concluded that counsel’s interest justified applicatio

2020The collateral order exception permits review of non-final orders that “conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468-469 (I) ( 98 SCt 2451 , 57 LE2d 351) (1977); Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 774 ( 784 SE2d 775 ) (2016) (describing collateral orders as “effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important

2009For the collateral order doctrine to apply, “the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” (Citations and footnote omitted.) Id. 6 Under Georgia law, sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, rather than a mere defense to liability, and is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.

2026In doing so, we implicitly applied the collateral-order doctrine, under which we have permitted direct appeals from “a very small class of interlocutory rulings” that “are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole 2 case is adjudicated.” Duke, 306 Ga. at 172–73 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

2026In doing so, we implicitly applied the collateral-order doctrine, under which we have permitted direct appeals from “a very small class of interlocutory rulings” that “are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole 2 case is adjudicated.” Duke, 306 Ga. at 172–73 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2021Thus, an order that satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine would be appealable because it comes within the terms of the relevant statutory right to appeal final judgments. 10 Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. 639, 639-640 (1) ( 847 SE2d 541 ) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2021Thus, an order that satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine would be appealable because it comes within the terms of the relevant statutory right to appeal final judgments. 10 Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. 639, 639-640 (1) ( 847 SE2d 541 ) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2022We have also allowed review of appeals under the collateral order doctrine when, for example, the order at issue permitted the State to involuntarily medicate a defendant to render him competent for trial or compelled a non-party newspaper reporter to disclose information regarding his confidential sources in a murder case.8 But we have also concluded that certain interlocutory orders—including an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a defense of sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity and an order denying the State’s motion to recuse a trial judge, among others— ————————————————————— 8 See

2022See also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (II) (A) (130 SCt 599, 175 LEd2d 458) (2009) (holding that, to determine the applicability of the collateral order doctrine, the inquiry should focus on “the entire category to which a claim belongs”).

2022See also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (II) (A) (130 SCt 599, 175 LEd2d 458) (2009) (holding that, to determine the applicability of the collateral order doctrine, the inquiry should focus on “the entire category to which a claim belongs”).

2022The trial court acts as the factfinder in determining whether a prosecutor intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial, and the court’s “resolution of factual issues will be upheld by the appellate court unless it is clearly erroneous.” Roscoe v. State, 286 Ga. 325, 327 ( 687 SE2d 455 ) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[W]e will not reverse the factual findings of the court below if there is any evidence to support them, and this holds true even if the findings are 1 “[T]he appeal of a denied plea of double jeopardy is subject to the collateral order doctrine.” Carman

2020Where . . .a mistrial is granted at the request of a criminal defendant, retrial is not prohibited on the basis of double jeopardy unless it is established that the State intended to “goad” the defendant into moving for a mistrial in order for the State to avoid a reversal due to prosecutorial or judicial error, or otherwise to obtain a more favorable chance of a guilty verdict on retrial. 3 See generally Carman v. State, 304 Ga. 21, 25 (1) ( 815 SE2d 860 ) (2018) (determining that the case was “properly before [appellate court] as a direct appeal, because the appeal of a denied plea of double

2026In Hubbard, we explained that though the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him was not a final judgment, the collateral-order doctrine applied because the right to a speedy trial includes not only the right to be tried within a certain timeframe, but also the right to be free from the “uncertainty, emotional stress and the economic strain” of pending prosecution once that time has passed. 254 Ga. at 695 .

2026In Hubbard, we explained that though the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him was not a final judgment, the collateral-order doctrine applied because the right to a speedy trial includes not only the right to be tried within a certain timeframe, but also the right to be free from the “uncertainty, emotional stress and the economic strain” of pending prosecution once that time has passed. 254 Ga. at 695 .

2020In reaching that conclusion, we look to our precedent in Patterson, 248 Ga. 875 , where we relied on the reasoning of Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 ( 97 SCt 2034 , 52 LE2d 651) (1977), to denial of a constitutional speedy trial claim is directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

2020In reaching that conclusion, we look to our precedent in Patterson, 248 Ga. 875 , where we relied on the reasoning of Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 ( 97 SCt 2034 , 52 LE2d 651) (1977), to denial of a constitutional speedy trial claim is directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine.