collateral order exception in Maine

1995See Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me.1993) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-26 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-15 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

1995See Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me.1993) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-26 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-15 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

2023Ass’n, 2022 ME 26, ¶ 16 , 273 A.3d 6 358 (quotation marks omitted) (“The exceptions include (1) the death knell exception, (2) the collateral order exception, and (3) the judicial economy exception.”).

2023See Maples, 2022 ME 26, ¶ 16 , 273 A.3d 358 . [¶17] We have stated that “[a] party urging that we reach the merits of an otherwise interlocutory appeal has the burden of demonstrating” that one of the exceptions to the final judgment rule “justifies our reaching the merits of the appeal.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (“The exceptions include (1) the death knell exception, (2) the collateral order exception, and (3) the judicial economy exception.”).

1995Creamer v. Sceviour, 652 A.2d 110 , 112 n. 4 (Me.1995); Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me.1993); Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 412-13 (Me.1990); Lord v. Murphy, 561 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Me.1989). 3 . 14 M.R.S.A. § 859 (Supp.1994) provides that [i]f a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause thereof from the person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is committed which entitles any person to an action, the action may be commenced at any time within 6 years after the person entitled thereto discovers that he has just cause of action, except as provided in sect

1995Although we have previously stated that a denial of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to a claim of immunity falls within the collateral order exception, see Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 412-13 (Me.1990) and its progeny, we believe it is more appropriately described as falling within the "death knell” exception.

2026The collateral order exception applies “‘when the appellant can establish that (1) the decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation; (2) it presents a major unsettled question of law; and (3) it would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review.’” Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 11 , 30 A.3d 816 (quoting Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 25 , 974 A.2d 918 ).

2026The collateral order exception applies “‘when the appellant can establish that (1) the decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation; (2) it presents a major unsettled question of law; and (3) it would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review.’” Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 11 , 30 A.3d 816 (quoting Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 25 , 974 A.2d 918 ).

2015Although appeals from prejudgment orders of attachment are considered interlocutory, we have held that orders granting or denying attachment and trustee process "are immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule.” Centrix Bank & Trust v. Kehl, 2012 ME 52, ¶ 13 , 40 A.3d 942 .

2015Although appeals from prejudgment orders of attachment are considered interlocutory, we have held that orders granting or denying attachment and trustee process "are immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule.” Centrix Bank & Trust v. Kehl, 2012 ME 52, ¶ 13 , 40 A.3d 942 .

2026See Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 17, 202 A.3d 1189 (holding that a “statute of limitation defense can be reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment, [so] no irreparable loss of right exists if the case proceeds to trial”); see also United States v. Weiss, 7 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that appeal of a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds does not involve a right that will be “irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal”) (quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he statute of limitations is an ordinary defense an

2026We address the parties’ arguments in turn. [¶15] “For either the death knell or the collateral order exception to be applicable, a party must suffer an irreparable loss of rights absent immediate review.” 4 Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 17, 202 A.3d 1189 .

1995See Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me.1993) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-26 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-15 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

1995See Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me.1993) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-26 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-15 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)).

1991Bates Fabrics, Inc. v. LeVeen, 590 A.2d 528 (Me.1991); Northeast Investment Co. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 351 A.2d 845 (Me.1976).

1980Having jurisdiction under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule, see Northeast Investment Co. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., Me., 351 A.2d 845, 849 (1976); Foisy v. Bishop, Me., 232 A.2d 797, 798 (1967), we affirm the order of the Superior Court. *367 In order to be entitled to prejudgment attachment and/or trustee process, the plaintiff must demonstrate by affidavit or otherwise a reasonable likelihood of success.

2026See Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 17, 202 A.3d 1189 (holding that a “statute of limitation defense can be reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment, [so] no irreparable loss of right exists if the case proceeds to trial”); see also United States v. Weiss, 7 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that appeal of a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds does not involve a right that will be “irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal”) (quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he statute of limitations is an ordinary defense an

2026We address the parties’ arguments in turn. [¶15] “For either the death knell or the collateral order exception to be applicable, a party must suffer an irreparable loss of rights absent immediate review.” 4 Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 17, 202 A.3d 1189 .

2019See Tornesello v. Tisdale , 2008 ME 84 , ¶ 12, 948 A.2d 1244 .

2019See Tornesello v. Tisdale , 2008 ME 84 , ¶ 12, 948 A.2d 1244 .

2018See Taylor, 2017 ME 218 , ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539 ; In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 14 , 169 A.3d 914 (stating that the death knell exception “allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if substantial rights of that party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment” (quotation marks omitted)); Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 11 , 30 A.3d 816 (stating that the collateral order exception applies when a court’s decision “would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review” (quotation marks omitted)).

2018See Taylor , 2017 ME 218 , ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539 ; In re Evelyn A. , 2017 ME 182 , ¶ 14, 169 A.3d 914 (stating that the death knell exception "allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if substantial rights of that party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment" (quotation marks omitted) ); Bond v. Bond , 2011 ME 105 , ¶ 11, 30 A.3d 816 (stating that the collateral order exception applies when a court's decision "would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review" (quotation marks omitted) ).

2018See Taylor, 2017 ME 218 , ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539 ; In re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, ¶ 14 , 169 A.3d 914 (stating that the death knell exception “allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if substantial rights of that party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment” (quotation marks omitted)); Bond v. Bond, 2011 ME 105, ¶ 11 , 30 A.3d 816 (stating that the collateral order exception applies when a court’s decision “would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review” (quotation marks omitted)).

2018See Taylor , 2017 ME 218 , ¶ 8, 173 A.3d 539 ; In re Evelyn A. , 2017 ME 182 , ¶ 14, 169 A.3d 914 (stating that the death knell exception "allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order immediately if substantial rights of that party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment" (quotation marks omitted) ); Bond v. Bond , 2011 ME 105 , ¶ 11, 30 A.3d 816 (stating that the collateral order exception applies when a court's decision "would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review" (quotation marks omitted) ).

2002See State v. Maine State, Employees Ass’n, 482 A.2d 461, 463-65 (Me.1984).

2002Maine State Employees Ass’n, 482 A.2d at 464 .

1995Creamer v. Sceviour, 652 A.2d 110 , 112 n. 4 (Me.1995); Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me.1993); Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 412-13 (Me.1990); Lord v. Murphy, 561 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Me.1989). 3 . 14 M.R.S.A. § 859 (Supp.1994) provides that [i]f a person, liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause thereof from the person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is committed which entitles any person to an action, the action may be commenced at any time within 6 years after the person entitled thereto discovers that he has just cause of action, except as provided in sect

1990An interlocutory decision is ap-pealable under the collateral order exception: *200 Lord v. Murphy, 561 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Me.1989).

1989See Barrett v. Stewart, 456 A.2d 10 , 11 n. 1 (Me.1983); 2 Field, McKusick & Wroth § 73.2 (Supp.1981).

1983See Barrett v. Stewart, 456 A.2d 10 , 11 n. 1 (Me.1983); Terry v. T.J.C.

2026And although we have applied this exception where there are “particularly unique circumstances in the history of a case such as exceedingly long litigation, multiple pending proceedings involving the same 8 party, or litigation subject to inordinate delay,” Quirion v. Veilleux, 2013 ME 50, ¶ 9 , 65 A.3d 1287 (quotation marks and alterations omitted), we have done so sparingly and even then only when application of the defense was clear, because otherwise “it would ensure that every future trial court decision rejecting an affirmative defense would be appealed on an interlocutory basis.” Porraz

2026And although we have applied this exception where there are “particularly unique circumstances in the history of a case such as exceedingly long litigation, multiple pending proceedings involving the same 8 party, or litigation subject to inordinate delay,” Quirion v. Veilleux, 2013 ME 50, ¶ 9 , 65 A.3d 1287 (quotation marks and alterations omitted), we have done so sparingly and even then only when application of the defense was clear, because otherwise “it would ensure that every future trial court decision rejecting an affirmative defense would be appealed on an interlocutory basis.” Porraz

2012See Official Post Confirmation Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims v. *945 Markheim, 2005 ME 81, ¶¶7-9 , 877 A.2d 155 (allowing, under the unusual facts of that case, an immediate appeal from the grant of a renewed attachment order and from the denial of a motion to modify attachment that raised the same issues as the appeal from the renewal order); Lindner v. Barry, 2003 ME 91, ¶¶ 1, 3 , 828 A.2d 788 (allowing an immediate appeal from the grant of a motion to increase, the amount of an attachment order); Calvert v. Corthell, 599 A.2d 69, 71 (Me.1991) (“We entertain appeals from an ord

2012See Official Post Confirmation Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims v. *945 Markheim, 2005 ME 81, ¶¶7-9 , 877 A.2d 155 (allowing, under the unusual facts of that case, an immediate appeal from the grant of a renewed attachment order and from the denial of a motion to modify attachment that raised the same issues as the appeal from the renewal order); Lindner v. Barry, 2003 ME 91, ¶¶ 1, 3 , 828 A.2d 788 (allowing an immediate appeal from the grant of a motion to increase, the amount of an attachment order); Calvert v. Corthell, 599 A.2d 69, 71 (Me.1991) (“We entertain appeals from an ord

2011Id.

2010The collateral order exception does not apply because “the order at issue is not separable from and collateral to the underlying lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 7, 896 A.2d at 959 (quotation marks omitted).

2011See Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME 13, ¶ 7 , 912 A.2d 1255 . .

2011See Bruesewitz v. Grant, 2007 ME 13, ¶ 7 , 912 A.2d 1255 . .

2002Thus, the collateral order exception is inapplicable. [¶ 7] The judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule is available if two requirements are met: “first, that ‘review of a non-final order can establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the entire litigation,’ ... and second, that the interests of justice require that immediate review be undertaken.” Town of Otis v. Derr, 2001 ME 151, ¶3 , 782 A.2d 788, 789 (quoting State v. Me.

2002Thus, the collateral order exception is inapplicable. [¶ 7] The judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule is available if two requirements are met: “first, that ‘review of a non-final order can establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the entire litigation,’ ... and second, that the interests of justice require that immediate review be undertaken.” Town of Otis v. Derr, 2001 ME 151, ¶3 , 782 A.2d 788, 789 (quoting State v. Me.

1986See Hanley v. Evans, 443 A.2d 65, 66 (Me.1982).

1982Recently, in Hanley v. Evans, Me., 443 A.2d 65 (1982), we set forth the generally accepted criteria by which the appealability of interlocutory orders are evaluated.

1984The Dartmouth Co. v. Day's, Inc., 419 A.2d 366, 367 (Me.1980).

1981Dartmouth Co. v. Day’s, Inc., Me., 419 A.2d 366 (1980). 1 We recently spelled out in Bowman v. Dussault, Me., 425 A.2d 1325 (1981), the pertinent requirements for the Superior Court’s approval of the prejudgment attachment process.

1984The only exception to the final judgment rule advanced by plaintiff is the collateral order exception as defined in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 , 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

1984The only exception to the final judgment rule advanced by plaintiff is the collateral order exception as defined in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 , 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

2026See Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 17, 202 A.3d 1189 (holding that a “statute of limitation defense can be reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment, [so] no irreparable loss of right exists if the case proceeds to trial”); see also United States v. Weiss, 7 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that appeal of a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds does not involve a right that will be “irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal”) (quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he statute of limitations is an ordinary defense an

2026See Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 17, 202 A.3d 1189 (holding that a “statute of limitation defense can be reviewed on an appeal from a final judgment, [so] no irreparable loss of right exists if the case proceeds to trial”); see also United States v. Weiss, 7 F.3d 1088, 1090-91 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that appeal of a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds does not involve a right that will be “irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal”) (quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he statute of limitations is an ordinary defense an