collateral order doctrine in Minnesota

2016For an order to be immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine, it must “(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. at 240 .

2011Id.; see Kastner v. Star Trails Ass’n, 646 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn.2002) (adopting the collateral order doctrine in civil cases).

2002P. 103.03, but added the caveat “without regard to whether it must be followed.” 393 N.W.2d at 364 ; see also Harvey, 561 N.W.2d at 194 (observing that while this court adopted the Mitchell rationale, it did not formally adopt the federal collateral order doctrine); Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 742 (noting that the collateral order doctrine was cited favorably in Anderson where this court held that the doctrine is useful to consider when presented with a general question of whether an interlocutory order or judgment is ap-pealable).

2000Our conclusion in McGowan reflected a concern that forcing an appellant to wait to appeal would deny the appellant the benefit of the legal rule by which it sought dismissal. ■ Our decision in McGowan is consistent with the collateral order doctrine which we cited favorably in Anderson, 393 N.W.2d at 364 .

2012See, e.g., Kastner v. Star Trails Ass’n, 646 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn.2002); McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 832 .

2011See McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Minn. 1995); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1986).

2011In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 786 N.W.2d 890, 893 (Minn.App.2010); see Kastner v. Star Trails Ass'n, 646 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn.2002) (adopting the collateral order doctrine). .

2011In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 786 N.W.2d 890, 893 (Minn.App.2010); see Kastner v. Star Trails Ass'n, 646 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn.2002) (adopting the collateral order doctrine). .

2002In reaching its conclusion, the Mitchell court applied the rationale of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), where the Supreme Court first articulated what is now known as the collateral order doctrine.

2002In reaching its conclusion, the Mitchell court applied the rationale of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), where the Supreme Court first articulated what is now known as the collateral order doctrine.

2016Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 , 113 S.Ct. 684, 688 , 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993).

2016Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 , 113 S.Ct. 684, 688 , 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993).

2016An order satisfies the second requirement when it “raises a question that is significantly different from the questions underlying [the] plaintiffs claims on the merits.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 LlEd.2d 238 (1995).

2016An order satisfies the second requirement when it “raises a question that is significantly different from the questions underlying [the] plaintiffs claims on the merits.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 LlEd.2d 238 (1995).

2002Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-25 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 .

2002Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-25 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 .

2011See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 206 , 119 S.Ct. 1915 , 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999) (“[W]e have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.”); Digital Equip.

2011See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 206 , 119 S.Ct. 1915 , 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999) (“[W]e have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.”); Digital Equip.

2011See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 , 659 n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 2034 , 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).

2011See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 , 659 n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 2034 , 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).

2005In In re Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co., the panel sua sponte asked the parties to argue whether an order involving an administrative subpoena was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , as an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000), or under the collateral order doctrine. 214 F.3d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 2000).

2005The panel concluded that appeal of right was most appropriate because "[a]n order enforcing an administrative subpoena is considered a final order.” Id.

2002P. 103.03, but added the caveat “without regard to whether it must be followed.” 393 N.W.2d at 364 ; see also Harvey, 561 N.W.2d at 194 (observing that while this court adopted the Mitchell rationale, it did not formally adopt the federal collateral order doctrine); Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 742 (noting that the collateral order doctrine was cited favorably in Anderson where this court held that the doctrine is useful to consider when presented with a general question of whether an interlocutory order or judgment is ap-pealable).

2002We disagree with the court of appeals’ interpretation in Harvey that nongovernmental entities are per se not so entitled, 561 N.W.2d at 195 , and to the extent that the Harvey decision is based upon a governmental-nongovernmental distinction, it is overruled.

2002P. 103.03, but added the caveat “without regard to whether it must be followed.” 393 N.W.2d at 364 ; see also Harvey, 561 N.W.2d at 194 (observing that while this court adopted the Mitchell rationale, it did not formally adopt the federal collateral order doctrine); Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 742 (noting that the collateral order doctrine was cited favorably in Anderson where this court held that the doctrine is useful to consider when presented with a general question of whether an interlocutory order or judgment is ap-pealable).

2002See Engvall, 605 N.W.2d at 744-45 (holding that failure to take an interlocutory appeal permissible under the principles of the collateral order doctrine does not forfeit the right of appellate review of the interlocutory order or judgment on appeal from the final judgment).

2000See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 , 756 n. 3 (8th Cir.1994); Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222 , 231 n. 11 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Michelle’s Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 692 (7th Cir.1994).

2000See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 , 756 n. 3 (8th Cir.1994); Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222 , 231 n. 11 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Michelle’s Lounge, 39 F.3d 684, 692 (7th Cir.1994).