collateral order doctrine in Connecticut

2023Similarly, the majority of the United States courts of appeals have deemed denials of special motions to dismiss under state anti-SLAPP statutes to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine identified by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S. Ct. 1221 , 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949), which permits—pursuant to the federal appellate statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292— the appeal of a ‘‘small class’’ of nonfinal orders that implicate a ‘‘substantial public interest’’ and are ‘‘too important to be denied review and too independent

2023Similarly, the majority of the United States courts of appeals have deemed denials of special motions to dismiss under state anti-SLAPP statutes to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine identified by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S. Ct. 1221 , 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949), which permits—pursuant to the federal appellate statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292— the appeal of a ‘‘small class’’ of nonfinal orders that implicate a ‘‘substantial public interest’’ and are ‘‘too important to be denied review and too independent

2023But see Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116 , 119-22 (2d Cir. 2016) (order passing on merits of special motion to strike filed pursuant to Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute was not appealable under collateral order doc- trine because it did not ‘‘resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action’’ given that analysis of motion was ‘‘entangled in the facts’’ and elements of claims, and rejecting analogy to qualified immunity as not requiring fact based analysis (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted); Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795 , 801-802

2023But see Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116 , 119-22 (2d Cir. 2016) (order passing on merits of special motion to strike filed pursuant to Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute was not appealable under collateral order doctrine because it did not ‘‘resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action’’ given that analysis of motion was ‘‘entangled in the facts’’ and elements of claims, and rejecting analogy to qualified immunity as not requiring fact based analysis (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)); Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795 , 801-802

2026As it stated: “Because qualified immunity, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, is an affirmative defense that can be waived, we decline to extend the collateral order doctrine to allow immediate appeal from an order denying as untimely a motion asserting that defense. . . . [S]uch an expansion is unwarranted, since it would essentially grant defendants the right to assert a qualified immunity defense at any time . . . as though the affirmative defense were the equivalent of a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.” (Citations omitted.) Maye v. New Haven, 89 F.4th 403 , 407-408 (2d Cir. 2023

2008Accordingly, we do not find the trial court’s order in Roberson to be analogous to the denial of class certification status, which results from a prejudgment order before the commencement of trial. 9 The plaintiffs in Coopers & Lybrand claimed that the “death knell" theory, first articulated by the California Supreme Court in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695 , 433 P.2d 732 , 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967), satisfied the test for immediate appealability under the collateral order exception to the federal final judgment rule.

2008Accordingly, we do not find the trial court’s order in Roberson to be analogous to the denial of class certification status, which results from a prejudgment order before the commencement of trial. 9 The plaintiffs in Coopers & Lybrand claimed that the “death knell" theory, first articulated by the California Supreme Court in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695 , 433 P.2d 732 , 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967), satisfied the test for immediate appealability under the collateral order exception to the federal final judgment rule.