motor vehicle violation in New Jersey

2026"To justify a stop, an 'officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver . . . is committing a motor-vehicle violation' or some other offense." State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488 , 524 (2021) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)).

2025"To justify a stop, an 'officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver . . . is committing a motor-vehicle violation' or some other offense." State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488 , 524 (2021) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)).

2022"Under both the Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution] and Article I, Paragraph 7 [of the New Jersey Constitution], ordinarily, a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor- vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense to justify a stop." State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016); see also State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999).

2021To lawfully stop a motor vehicle, "a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons 10 A-4082-18 offense[.] " State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016) (citing Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470 ).

2024It is well settled that law enforcement officers "may stop motor vehicles where they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred." State v. Murphy, 238 N.J.

2020It is well-established that "law enforcement officials may stop motor vehicles where they have a reasonable or articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred." State v. Murphy, 238 N.J.

2020In the context of an arrest for DUI, "the yardstick of making [an] arrest . . . is whether the arresting officer 'had reasonable grounds A-5581-18T1 12 to believe that the driver was operating a motor vehicle in violation [of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50].'" State v. Moskal, 246 N.J.

2018To make an arrest for DWI, the arresting officer need only have "'reasonable grounds to believe' that the driver was operating a motor vehicle in violation [of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50]." State v. Moskal, 246 N.J.

2022In those cases, we considered N.J.S.A. 39:4-126 in the context of an investigatory vehicle stop. "[N.J.S.A. 39:4-126] . . . defines the motor-vehicle violation that justifies the stop in terms of whether the failure to signal may have affected any other traffic." Williamson, 138 N.J. at 305 .

2021The State "need not establish that the move actually affected traffic," nor does the State need to "prove that a motor-vehicle violation occurred as a matter of law." Ibid.

2025See State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 446 (2018).

2021A-0754-20 10 Judge Rogers held the motor vehicle stop "was lawful and appropriate" based on Waller's "reasonable [and] articulable suspicion that the driver ha[d] committed a motor vehicle violation." See State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 444 (2018) ("An officer may stop a motor vehicle only upon 'articulable and reasonable suspicion' that a criminal or motor vehicle violation has occurred.").

2021Super. 12, 21 (App. Div. 1991) ("[T]he yardstick for making [an] arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . is whether the arresting officer 'had reasonable grounds to believe' that the driver was operating a motor vehicle in violation [of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50]." (alteration in original) (quoting Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J.

2018In the context of an arrest for DWI, "the yardstick . . . is whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver was operating a motor vehicle in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50." Strelecki v. Coan, 97 N.J.

2024It is well established, "[l]aw enforcement officers 'may stop motor vehicles where they have a reasonable or articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred.'" State v. Barrow, 408 N.J.

2024"Law enforcement officers 'may stop motor A-2904-22 9 vehicles where they have a reasonable [and] articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred.'" State v. Barrow, 408 N.J.

2021Accordingly, an investigatory stop is permissible "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545-46 (2019) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)).

2021Accordingly, an investigatory stop is permissible "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545-46 (2019) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)). 11 A-5470-18 "[I]n determining the lawfulness of an investigatory stop, a reviewing court must 'evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be prote

2021Accordingly, an investigatory stop is permissible "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545-46 (2019) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)).

2021Accordingly, an investigatory stop is permissible "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545-46 (2019) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)). 11 A-5470-18 "[I]n determining the lawfulness of an investigatory stop, a reviewing court must 'evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be prote

2024"To justify a stop, an 'officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver . . . is committing a motor-vehicle violation' or some other offense." State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488 , 524 (2021) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (recognizing the constitutional propriety of warrantless traffic stops if based upon articulable police suspicions of illegality).

2022Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 2011) ("A motor vehicle violation, no matter how minor, justifies a stop without any reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a crime or other unlawful act." (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 )).

2021See State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 208 (1994) (declining to follow New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and recognizing a warrantless arrest for a motor vehicle offense does not authorize the search of a vehicle's passenger compartment); see also State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 635 , modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002) (declining to follow Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218 , and finding that 21 A-0580-20 there must be a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing as a prerequisite to requesting consent to search a vehicle after a routine stop for a motor vehicle violation)

2008The Court has also recognized a broader concept of what constitutes a seizure, State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158 , 642 A. 2d 401 (1994), than has been found in the Fourth Amendment, California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1991); has recognized that a warrantless arrest for a motor vehicle offense does not authorize the search of a vehicle's passenger compartment, State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184 , 642 A. 2d 947 (1994), whereas the Fourth Amendment does permit such a search, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed. 2d 768 *909 (1981); and has foun

2026In assessing the totality of the circumstances for a stop based on a motor vehicle violation, a reviewing court must determine "[whether] the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant [an individual] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate[.]" State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 21- A-0309-23 9 22 (1968)).

2024In assessing the totality of the circumstances for a stop based on a motor vehicle violation, a reviewing court must determine "[whether] the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant [an individual] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

2009Id. at 466, 724 A. 2d 234 (finding the stop justified based upon the officer's observations that the defendant was driving "at `a high rate of speed'" in a zone where "[t]he posted speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour[]"); see also State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375, 380-81 , 790 A. 2d 202 (App.Div.2002) (holding that an officer who subjectively believed a vehicle's tinted windows were darkened beyond the acceptable limit had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation had occurred, thereby justifying the stop); State v. Smith, 306 N.J.Super. 370, 380 , 703 A. 2

2009Id. at 466, 724 A. 2d 234 (finding the stop justified based upon the officer's observations that the defendant was driving "at `a high rate of speed'" in a zone where "[t]he posted speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour[]"); see also State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375, 380-81 , 790 A. 2d 202 (App.Div.2002) (holding that an officer who subjectively believed a vehicle's tinted windows were darkened beyond the acceptable limit had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation had occurred, thereby justifying the stop); State v. Smith, 306 N.J.Super. 370, 380 , 703 A. 2

2017Super. at 413 , where the officer made observations that proved legally insufficient to convict the defendant of a motor vehicle violation, or Pitcher, supra, 379 N.J.

2017Super. at 413 , where the officer made observations that proved legally insufficient to convict the defendant of a motor vehicle violation, or Pitcher, supra, 379 N.J.

2026Even though the initial stop was for a motor vehicle violation, a police officer is not precluded from broadening the inquiry of his stop "[i]f, during the inquiries initiated by the officer, the circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense." State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J.

2025It is well- established, "[t]o justify a stop, an 'officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver . . . is committing a motor-vehicle violation' or some other offense." State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488 , 524 (2021) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)); see also State v. Bernokeits, 423 N.J.

2026In assessing the totality of the circumstances for a stop based on a motor vehicle violation, a reviewing court must determine "[whether] the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant [an individual] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate[.]" State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 21- A-0309-23 9 22 (1968)).

2024In assessing the totality of the circumstances for a stop based on a motor vehicle violation, a reviewing court must determine "[whether] the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant [an individual] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

2021Accordingly, an investigatory stop is permissible "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545-46 (2019) (quoting State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)). 11 A-5470-18 "[I]n determining the lawfulness of an investigatory stop, a reviewing court must 'evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be prote

2020Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2020) (slip op. at 10) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)). "[I]n determining A-1902-18T3 14 the lawfulness of an investigatory stop, a reviewing court must 'evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" Chisum, 236 N.J. at 546 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)).

2019State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 48-49 (2012).

2019State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 48-49 (2012).

2019See State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 85 (2003) (in which the Court noted that "excessive speed, weather and lighting conditions, and known substantial safety defects in the motor vehicle or vessel" may also be considered to determine whether the defendant was driving recklessly at the time of the incident.) A-2852-17T3 2 In State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218 (2013), the Court reviewed the history of "recklessness" as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3), to determine the adequacy of the factual basis the defendant provided when he pleaded guilty to second degree reckless manslaughter. 1 Writing for th

2018See State v. Stanton, 176 N.J. 75, 85 (2003) (in which the Court noted that "excessive speed, weather and lighting conditions, and known substantial safety defects in the motor vehicle or vessel" may also be considered to determine whether the defendant was driving recklessly at the time of the incident.) A-2852-17T3 2 In State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218 (2013), the Court reviewed the history of "recklessness" as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3), to determine the adequacy of the factual basis the defendant provided when he pleaded guilty to second degree reckless manslaughter.1 Writing for the

2011Even though the initial stop was for a motor vehicle violation, a police officer is not precluded from broadening the inquiry of his stop “[i]f, during the course of the stop or as a result of the reasonable inquiries initiated by the officer, the circumstances ‘give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense.’ ” State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 479-80 , 706 A.2d 180 (1998) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356, 357 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 936 , 116 S.Ct. 348 , 133 L.Ed.2d 245 (1995)); see also State v. Baum, 199 N.J. 407, 424 , 972 A.2d 1127 (2009).

2011Even though the initial stop was for a motor vehicle violation, a police officer is not precluded from broadening the inquiry of his stop “[i]f, during the course of the stop or as a result of the reasonable inquiries initiated by the officer, the circumstances ‘give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense.’ ” State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 479-80 , 706 A.2d 180 (1998) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356, 357 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 936 , 116 S.Ct. 348 , 133 L.Ed.2d 245 (1995)); see also State v. Baum, 199 N.J. 407, 424 , 972 A.2d 1127 (2009).

2019A. "[A] police officer may stop a motor vehicle where there is a reasonable or articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred." State v. A-1959-17T3 6 Cohen, 347 N.J.

2009Id. at 466, 724 A. 2d 234 (finding the stop justified based upon the officer's observations that the defendant was driving "at `a high rate of speed'" in a zone where "[t]he posted speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour[]"); see also State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375, 380-81 , 790 A. 2d 202 (App.Div.2002) (holding that an officer who subjectively believed a vehicle's tinted windows were darkened beyond the acceptable limit had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation had occurred, thereby justifying the stop); State v. Smith, 306 N.J.Super. 370, 380 , 703 A. 2

2024Therefore, "[i]n order to justify such a seizure, 'a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly A-3184-22 11 persons offense.'" Id. at 533 (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016)).

2020See N.J.S.A. 39:3-29; State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 533 (2017) (holding a police officer may demand a driver's identification incident to a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation).

2020To stop a vehicle, the officer must have "'a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense.'" Id. at 533 (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016)).

2019To stop a vehicle, the officer must have "'a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense.'" Id. at 533 (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34-34 (2016)).