216 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1947–2026 64 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. City of Detroitgreen2 sentences2026Defendants rely on Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 457 ; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), which held that “[g]iven the fact that the motor vehicle exception must be narrowly construed, we conclude that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the ‘resulting from’ language of the statute where the pursuing police vehicle did not hit the fleeing car or otherwise physically force it off the road or into another vehicle or object.” Plaintiff argues the facts of this case are distinguishable from Robinson3 because the police vehicles involved in the chases in Robinson activated their lights and sirens or otherwise identifi 2026Defendants rely on Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 457 ; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), which held that “[g]iven the fact that the motor vehicle exception must be narrowly construed, we conclude that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the ‘resulting from’ language of the statute where the pursuing police vehicle did not hit the fleeing car or otherwise physically force it off the road or into another vehicle or object.” Plaintiff argues the facts of this case are distinguishable from Robinson3 because the police vehicles involved in the chases in Robinson activated their lights and sirens or otherwise identifi | 4 | 24 |
Robinson v. City of Lansinggreen2 sentences2014“BODILY INJURY” We interpreted the phrase “bodily injury” in Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, specifically within the context of the motor vehicle exception.41 The central issue in Wesche was “whether the motor vehicle exception . . . authorizes a claim for loss of consortium against a governmental agency.”42 In analyzing the language of the motor vehicle exception, we stated: “This language is clear: it imposes liability for ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ resulting from a governmental employee’s negligent operation of a government-owned motor vehicle.”43 Because the GTLA does not define “b 2011There are, however, six exceptions to governmental immunity, including the motor-vehicle exception, which allows a private party to maintain an action against a governmental agency for “bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner . . . .” MCL 691.1405; see also Robinson v City of Lansing, 486 Mich 1, 5-6 ; 782 NW2d 171 (2010). | 4 | 4 |
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Farm Bureau General Insurancegreen2 sentences2020“MCL 500.3114(5)[] establishes the priority in which a motorcycle rider accidentally injured by a motor vehicle must claim no-fault benefits.” Farmers Ins Exch v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co, 272 Mich App 106, 111 ; 724 NW2d 485 (2006). 2020“MCL 500.3114(5)[] establishes the priority in which a motorcycle rider accidentally injured by a motor vehicle must claim no-fault benefits.” Farmers Ins Exch v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co, 272 Mich App 106, 111 ; 724 NW2d 485 (2006). | 3 | 7 |
MacK v. City of Detroitgreen2 sentences2024An activity that is expressly or impliedly authorized or mandated by constitution, statute, local charter, ordinance, or other law constitutes a government function. [Id. at 391-392 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] Among the six exceptions to governmental immunity enumerated in the GTLA is the motor vehicle exception, or negligent-operation exception, MCL 691.1405, which states: “Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by an officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the 2024An activity that is expressly or impliedly authorized or mandated by constitution, statute, local charter, ordinance, or other law constitutes a government function. [Id. at 391-392 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] Among the six exceptions to governmental immunity enumerated in the GTLA is the motor vehicle exception, or negligent-operation exception, MCL 691.1405, which states: “Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by an officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the | 3 | 5 |
Maiden v. Rozwoodgreen2 sentences2023STANDARD OF REVIEW “This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 2023STANDARD OF REVIEW “This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). | 3 | 4 |
| Hobrla v. Glassgreen | 3 | 3 |
Wesche v. Mecosta County Road Commissiongreen2 sentences2022See MCL 691.1401(a), (d), and (e). 3 “The six statutory exceptions are: the highway exception, MCL 619.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public-building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary- function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage-disposal-system-event exception, MCL 691.1417(2) and (3).” Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75 , 84 n 10; 746 NW2d 847 (2008). -3- processing of applications for a license. 2021While we concur with plaintiffs’ broad statement, the individual 4 “The six statutory exceptions are: the highway exception, MCL 619.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public-building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary- function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage-disposal-system-event exception, MCL 691.1417(2) and (3).” Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75 , 84 n 10; 746 NW2d 847 (2008). -5- council members are not parties to this lawsuit. | 2 | 25 |
Heather Lynn Hannay v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2025One exception to governmental immunity, known as the motor vehicle exception, Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 50 ; 860 NW2d 67 (2014), states that “[g]overnmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner[.]” MCL 691.1405. “[T]he restrictions on damages recoverable in third-party tort actions involving motor vehicle accidents set forth in MCL 500.3135 of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., apply to cas 2025One exception to governmental immunity, known as the motor vehicle exception, Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 497 Mich 45, 50 ; 860 NW2d 67 (2014), states that “[g]overnmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner[.]” MCL 691.1405. “[T]he restrictions on damages recoverable in third-party tort actions involving motor vehicle accidents set forth in MCL 500.3135 of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., apply to cas | 2 | 16 |
Chandler v. Muskegon Countygreen2 sentences2026In Chandler v Co of Muskegon, 467 Mich 315, 319-322 ; 652 NW2d 224 (2002), our Supreme Court interpreted the word “operation” in the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405. 2026Thus, to fall within the scope of the motor- vehicle exception, the plaintiff’s claim must involve “activities that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.” Id. at 321 . | 2 | 14 |
Stanton v. City of Battle Creekgreen2 sentences2023In Stanton v City of Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 616-617 ; 647 NW2d 508 (2002), our Supreme Court observed that the motor-vehicle exception in MCL 691.1405 does not provide a definition of “motor vehicle,” and rejected this Court’s analysis applying the definition of “motor vehicle” found in the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq. 2023In Stanton v City of Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 616-617 ; 647 NW2d 508 (2002), our Supreme Court observed that the motor-vehicle exception in MCL 691.1405 does not provide a definition of “motor vehicle,” and rejected this Court’s analysis applying the definition of “motor vehicle” found in the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq. | 2 | 9 |
in Re Bradley Estategreen2 sentences2022“The statutory exceptions contained in the [Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA)] are: (1) the highway exception, MCL 691.1402, (2) the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, (3) the public building exception, MCL 691.1406, (4) the governmental hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4), (5) the proprietary function exception, MCL 691.1413, and (6) the sewage system event exception, MCL 691.1417.” In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 , 378 n 21; 835 NW2d 545 (2013). 2022“The statutory exceptions contained in the [Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA)] are: (1) the highway exception, MCL 691.1402, (2) the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, (3) the public building exception, MCL 691.1406, (4) the governmental hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4), (5) the proprietary function exception, MCL 691.1413, and (6) the sewage system event exception, MCL 691.1417.” In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367 , 378 n 21; 835 NW2d 545 (2013). | 2 | 5 |
Pioneer State Mutual Insurance v. Titan Insurancegreen2 sentences2022See Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Titan Ins Co, 252 Mich App 330, 335-336 ; 652 NW2d 469 (2002) (holding “the statute does not mandate that the vehicle involved in the accident must have been insured by the insurer of the owner before an injured person can seek benefits.”); see also Farmers Ins Exch v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 272 Mich App 106, 113-114 ; 724 NW2d 485 (2006) (stating that “the insurer need not insure the vehicle in the accident, but must insure the owner or registrant). 2022See Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Titan Ins Co, 252 Mich App 330, 335-336 ; 652 NW2d 469 (2002) (holding “the statute does not mandate that the vehicle involved in the accident must have been insured by the insurer of the owner before an injured person can seek benefits.”); see also Farmers Ins Exch v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 272 Mich App 106, 113-114 ; 724 NW2d 485 (2006) (stating that “the insurer need not insure the vehicle in the accident, but must insure the owner or registrant). | 2 | 5 |
Ross v. Consumers Power Co.red2 sentences2014See also MCL 691.1407(1) and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 593-608 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984) (providing a detailed histoiy of sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, and the GTLA). 34 The six statutory exceptions to governmental immunity contained within the GTLA precede and follow the general grant of immunity in MCL 691.1407(1): “the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the puhlic-building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary-function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewa 2014See also MCL 691.1407(1) and Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 593-608 ; 363 NW2d 641 (1984) (providing a detailed histoiy of sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, and the GTLA). 34 The six statutory exceptions to governmental immunity contained within the GTLA precede and follow the general grant of immunity in MCL 691.1407(1): “the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the puhlic-building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary-function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewa | 2 | 4 |
| People v. Browngreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Championgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Maryland Casualty Co. v. Transamerica Insurance Corp. of Americagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Jones v. Bitnergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Auto Club Insurance v. New York Life Insurancegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Federal Insurance Company v. The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection And Insurance Companygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Corwin v. DaimlerChrysler Insurancegreen | 2 | 2 |
Seldon v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportationgreen2 sentences2024See Seldon v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 297 Mich App 427, 432 ; 824 NW2d 318 (2012) (holding that the motor-vehicle exception did not apply to a passenger injured when she was ejected from her wheelchair when a bus driver applied the brakes because the passenger was not injured during the loading or unloading process). 2024See Seldon v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 297 Mich App 427, 432 ; 824 NW2d 318 (2012) (holding that the motor-vehicle exception did not apply to a passenger injured when she was ejected from her wheelchair when a bus driver applied the brakes because the passenger was not injured during the loading or unloading process). | 1 | 13 |
Odom v. Wayne Countygreen2 sentences2025The established “statutory exceptions to the governmental immunity provided to the state and its agencies are the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public-building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary-function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage- disposal-system-event exception, MCL 691.1417(2) and (3).” Odom v Wayne County, 482 Mich 459 , 478 n 62; 760 NW2d 217 (2008) (citation omitted). 2025The established “statutory exceptions to the governmental immunity provided to the state and its agencies are the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public-building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary-function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage- disposal-system-event exception, MCL 691.1417(2) and (3).” Odom v Wayne County, 482 Mich 459 , 478 n 62; 760 NW2d 217 (2008) (citation omitted). | 1 | 13 |
Martin v. Rapid Inter-Urban Transit P'shipgreen2 sentences2026In a somewhat similar case, the plaintiff slipped and fell down the steps of a shuttle bus as she was attempting to exit the bus, and our Supreme Court held that the motor-vehicle exception applied because “[t]he loading and unloading of passengers is an action within the ‘operation’ of a shuttle bus.” Martin v Rapid Inter-Urban Transit Partnership, 480 Mich 936, 936 (2007). 2023In Martin v Rapid Inter-Urban Transit Partnership, 480 Mich 936 ; 740 NW2d 657 (2007), the plaintiff alleged “that she slipped and fell down the steps of a shuttle bus owned and operated by the defendants as she was attempting to exit the bus.” The Court concluded that the motor- vehicle exception applied because “[t]he loading and unloading of passengers is an action within the ‘operation’ of a shuttle bus.” Id. | 1 | 5 |
People v. Schaefergreen2 sentences2019MCL 257.625(4) provides that “[a] person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (1), (3), or (8) and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a crime as follows[.]” “In criminal jurisprudence, the causation element of an offense is generally comprised of two components: factual cause and proximate cause.” People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 435 ; 703 NW2d 774 (2005). 2019MCL 257.625(4) provides that “[a] person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (1), (3), or (8) and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the death of another person is guilty of a crime as follows[.]” “In criminal jurisprudence, the causation element of an offense is generally comprised of two components: factual cause and proximate cause.” People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 435 ; 703 NW2d 774 (2005). | 1 | 5 |
Strozier v. Flint Community Schoolsgreen2 sentences2024In Strozier v Flint Community Sch, 295 Mich App 82 ; 811 NW2d 59 (2011), this Court again considered the meaning of the term “operation” with regard to the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity. 2024In Strozier v Flint Community Sch, 295 Mich App 82 ; 811 NW2d 59 (2011), this Court again considered the meaning of the term “operation” with regard to the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity. | 1 | 4 |
Poppen v. Toveygreen2 sentences2024Id. at 353 . 2019Poppen, 256 Mich App at 355 . | 1 | 3 |
| Roberts v. City of Detroitgreen | 1 | 3 |
| Atkins v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportationgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Alex v. Wildfonggreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Conleygreen | 1 | 2 |
| Cooper v. Wadegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Perry
green
2 sentences2022See MCL 691.1401(a), (d), and (e). 3 “The six statutory exceptions are: the highway exception, MCL 619.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public-building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary- function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage-disposal-system-event exception, MCL 691.1417(2) and (3).” Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75 , 84 n 10; 746 NW2d 847 (2008). -3- processing of applications for a license. 2021While we concur with plaintiffs’ broad statement, the individual 4 “The six statutory exceptions are: the highway exception, MCL 619.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public-building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary- function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage-disposal-system-event exception, MCL 691.1417(2) and (3).” Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 480 Mich 75 , 84 n 10; 746 NW2d 847 (2008). -5- council members are not parties to this lawsuit. | 16 | 2008–2022 |
People v. Kazmierczak
green
2 sentences2025In this case we consider whether the people’s enactment of the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA), MCL 333.27951 et seq., in 2018 superseded this Court’s holding in People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 413 ; 605 NW2d 667 (2000), that “the smell of marijuana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.” We agree with the Court of Appeals that Kazmierczak’s holding is no longer good law in light of the passage of the MRTMA. 2025In this case we consider whether the people’s enactment of the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA), MCL 333.27951 et seq., in 2018 superseded this Court’s holding in People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 413 ; 605 NW2d 667 (2000), that “the smell of marijuana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.” We agree with the Court of Appeals that Kazmierczak’s holding is no longer good law in light of the passage of the MRTMA. | 10 | 2017–2025 |
Nawrocki v. MacOmb County Road Commission
green
2 sentences2006Defendant, as a department of the state, is protected by the provisions of this act. [15] MCL 691.1407(1). [16] The Legislature codified the following exceptions: the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage disposal system exception, MCL 691.1417. [17] MCL 691.1402(1) (emphasis added). [18] MCL 691.1401(e). [19] Id. [20] 463 Mich. 143 , 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000). [21] In Nawrocki, this Court decided t 2006Defendant, as a department of the state, is protected by the provisions of this act. [15] MCL 691.1407(1). [16] The Legislature codified the following exceptions: the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the public building exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage disposal system exception, MCL 691.1417. [17] MCL 691.1402(1) (emphasis added). [18] MCL 691.1401(e). [19] Id. [20] 463 Mich. 143 , 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000). [21] In Nawrocki, this Court decided t | 7 | 2002–2024 |
Hardy v. Oakland County
green
2 sentences2025Because “the restrictions set forth in the no-fault act control the broad statement of liability found in the immunity statute,” Hardy v Oakland Co, 461 Mich 561, 565 ; 607 NW2d 718 (2000), plaintiff must also satisfy the requirements of the no-fault act. 2025Because “the restrictions set forth in the no-fault act control the broad statement of liability found in the immunity statute,” Hardy v Oakland Co, 461 Mich 561, 565 ; 607 NW2d 718 (2000), plaintiff must also satisfy the requirements of the no-fault act. | 5 | 2008–2025 |
Allen v. Bloomfield Hills School District
green
2 sentences2024Specifically, summary disposition is properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) “when the undisputed facts establish that the moving party is entitled to immunity granted by law,” Allen, 281 Mich App at 52 , and a factual dispute exists here as to whether the motor vehicle exception to the GTLA applies. 2023“The plain language of MCL 691.1405 and MCL 500.3135 may be read harmoniously to provide that a plaintiff may avoid governmental immunity if he suffers “bodily injury” under the motor vehicle exception of MCL 691.1405, but he must also satisfy the no-fault act threshold for bringing a third-party tort claim, i.e., a plaintiff must establish a serious impairment of a body function as stated in MCL 500.3135.” Allen v Bloomfield Hills Sch Dist, 281 Mich App 49, 55-56 ; 760 NW2d 811 (2008). -12- (5) As used in this section, “serious impairment of body function” means an impairment that satisfies a | 5 | 2019–2024 |
Regan v. WASHTENAW CTY. BD. OF RD. COM'RS
green
2 sentences2017Thus, the motor vehicle exception should not be construed to remove the broad veil of governmental immunity for the negligent operation of a forklift. [Stanton, 466 Mich at 617-618 (emphasis in original).] -7- Then, in Regan v Washtenaw County Rd Comm’rs (On Remand), 257 Mich App 39 , 42- 43; 667 NW2d 57 (2003), this Court reconsidered its decision in Regan v Washtenaw County Bd of Comm’rs, 249 Mich App 153, 155-156 ; 641 NW2d 285 (2002), on order from the Supreme Court, Regan v Washtenaw County Rd Comm’rs, 468 Mich 851 ; 658 NW2d 490 (2003), in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stanton 2017Thus, the motor vehicle exception should not be construed to remove the broad veil of governmental immunity for the negligent operation of a forklift. [Stanton, 466 Mich at 617-618 (emphasis in original).] -7- Then, in Regan v Washtenaw County Rd Comm’rs (On Remand), 257 Mich App 39 , 42- 43; 667 NW2d 57 (2003), this Court reconsidered its decision in Regan v Washtenaw County Bd of Comm’rs, 249 Mich App 153, 155-156 ; 641 NW2d 285 (2002), on order from the Supreme Court, Regan v Washtenaw County Rd Comm’rs, 468 Mich 851 ; 658 NW2d 490 (2003), in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stanton | 5 | 2003–2023 |
Hannay v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2015The defendant contended that the language of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity precluded this form of damage recovery “because the damages recoverable pursuant to the motor vehicle exception are for the treatment of the bodily injury itself but not the broader damages associated with the bodily injury.” Hannay, 299 Mich App at 268 . 2015In the present case, the exception at issue is the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, which provides in pertinent part, “Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner . . . .” In Hannay, 299 Mich App 261, 270 ; 829 NW2d 883 (2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 497 Mich 45 (2014), this Court held that the motor-vehicle exception contemplates awarding economic damages. | 5 | 2013–2015 |
Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor
green
2 sentences2003In so holding, the Court overruled Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461 ; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), which had employed a broad reading of the motor vehicle exception to conclude that the excessive speed of a fleeing vehicle “resulted from” the police pursuit, and that it was this high speed that caused the fleeing driver to lose control and collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle. 2003In so holding, the Court overruled Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461 ; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), which had employed a broad reading of the motor vehicle exception to conclude that the excessive speed of a fleeing vehicle “resulted from” the police pursuit, and that it was this high speed that caused the fleeing driver to lose control and collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle. | 5 | 1998–2003 |
Bruce T Wood v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences2024In support, the estate directs this Court to Wood v Detroit, 323 Mich App 416, 421 ; 917 NW2d 709 (2018) for the proposition that the decision to drive a defective vehicle can constitute negligent operation of that vehicle for purposes of the motor-vehicle exception to the GTLA. 2024In support, the estate directs this Court to Wood v Detroit, 323 Mich App 416, 421 ; 917 NW2d 709 (2018) for the proposition that the decision to drive a defective vehicle can constitute negligent operation of that vehicle for purposes of the motor-vehicle exception to the GTLA. | 4 | 2021–2024 |
Hunter v. Sisco
neutral
2 sentences2015The complaint described Peterson’s noneconomic damages as including “great pain and suffering,” “permanent serious disfigurement,” “traumatic shock,” and “severe mental and emotional anguish.” Mount Morris moved for summary disposition based on this Court’s opinion in Hunter v Sisco, 300 Mich App 229 ; 832 NW2d 753 (2013), which held that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, precluded noneconomic damage claims in cases arising from a governmental employee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 2015The complaint described Peterson’s noneconomic damages as including “great pain and suffering,” “permanent serious disfigurement,” “traumatic shock,” and “severe mental and emotional anguish.” Mount Morris moved for summary disposition based on this Court’s opinion in Hunter v Sisco, 300 Mich App 229 ; 832 NW2d 753 (2013), which held that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, precluded noneconomic damage claims in cases arising from a governmental employee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle. | 4 | 2014–2015 |
Allstate Insurance Co v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co
green
2 sentences2025“The purpose of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., is to ensure the compensation of persons injured in automobile accidents.” Allstate Ins Co v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 321 Mich App 543, 552 ; 909 NW2d 495 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] person who suffers accidental bodily injury while not an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits under the assigned claims plan.” MCL 500.3115. 2025“The purpose of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., is to ensure the compensation of persons injured in automobile accidents.” Allstate Ins Co v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 321 Mich App 543, 552 ; 909 NW2d 495 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] person who suffers accidental bodily injury while not an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits under the assigned claims plan.” MCL 500.3115. | 3 | 2021–2025 |
Jackson v. Detroit
green
2 sentences2023Respecting his claims against SMART, plaintiff invoked the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, which provides that “[g]overnmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner . . . .” Id. 2021This provision provides that “[g]overnmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner . . . .” Id. | 3 | 2021–2023 |
| Stone v. Auto-Owners Insurance green | 3 | 2015–2021 |
| People v. Feezel green | 3 | 2017–2019 |
| Royal Globe Insurance v. Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance green | 3 | 1985–2018 |
| Wesche v. Mecosta County Road Commission green | 3 | 2007–2017 |
| Kik v. Sbraccia green | 3 | 2008–2013 |
| Wells v. Department of Corrections green | 3 | 1982–2003 |
| Porter v. Michigan Mutual Liability Co. green | 3 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Thompson green | 3 | 1947–1950 |
| United States v. Ross green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| Carroll v. United States green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| Pennsylvania v. Labron green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| Terry v. Ohio green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Russo green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Levine green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| Curtis v. City of Flint green | 2 | 2023–2024 |
| Michelle Renee Fairley v. Department of Corrections green | 2 | 2020–2023 |
| Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC green | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| Lash v. City of Traverse City green | 2 | 2013–2022 |
| KNUE v. Smith green | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| Watts v. Nevils green | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| Newton v. Michigan State Police green | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| Dextrom v. Wexford County green | 2 | 2011–2021 |
| City of Huntington Woods v. City of Detroit green | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| Auto-Owners Insurance v. Amoco Production Co. green | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| McCORMICK v. CARRIER green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Regan v. Washtenaw County Board of County Road Commissioners green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Coleman v. Kootsillas green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Tenneco Inc. v. Amerisure Mutual Insurance green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.