motor vehicle violation in Vermont

2020See State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 34 , 757 A.2d 1017, 1027 (2000) (“[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.”).

2020See State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 34 , 757 A.2d 1017, 1027 (2000) (“[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.”).

2020“The relevant question is not whether a motor vehicle violation actually occurred, but rather only ‘whether the 3 officer had a reasonable basis to suspect that a motor vehicle violation was taking place.’ ” Hayes, 2016 VT 105, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Rutter, 2011 Vt. 13, ¶ 10 , 189 Vt. 574 , 15 A.3d 132 (mem.)); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (explaining that reasonable suspicion is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[,]’

2020“The relevant question is not whether a motor vehicle violation actually occurred, but rather only ‘whether the 3 officer had a reasonable basis to suspect that a motor vehicle violation was taking place.’ ” Hayes, 2016 VT 105, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Rutter, 2011 Vt. 13, ¶ 10 , 189 Vt. 574 , 15 A.3d 132 (mem.)); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (explaining that reasonable suspicion is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[,]’

2019State v. Tuma , 2013 VT 70 , ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 345 , 79 A.3d 883 ("[E]ven a minor traffic infraction can be the basis of a traffic stop."); see Manning , 2015 VT 124 , ¶ 12, 200 Vt. 423 , 132 A.3d 716 (stating that "an officer's reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation can form the basis for a lawful stop"); *493 State v. Lussier , 171 Vt. 19 , 34, 757 A.2d 1017 , 1027 (2000) ("[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.").

2019State v. Tuma , 2013 VT 70 , ¶ 8, 194 Vt. 345 , 79 A.3d 883 ("[E]ven a minor traffic infraction can be the basis of a traffic stop."); see Manning , 2015 VT 124 , ¶ 12, 200 Vt. 423 , 132 A.3d 716 (stating that "an officer's reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation can form the basis for a lawful stop"); *493 State v. Lussier , 171 Vt. 19 , 34, 757 A.2d 1017 , 1027 (2000) ("[T]he law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.").

2002The level of suspicion required for a lawful investigatory stop is considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it must be more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” State v. Sutphin, 159 Vt. 9, 11 , 614 A.2d 792, 793 (1992) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

2002The level of suspicion required for a lawful investigatory stop is considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it must be more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” State v. Sutphin, 159 Vt. 9, 11 , 614 A.2d 792, 793 (1992) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

1991On the testimony before it, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in its finding that the officer articulated sufficient facts to justify the stop. “[T]o justify a legal investigatory stop ... a police officer need have no more than an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.” State v. Boardman, 148 Vt. 229, 231 , 531 A.2d 599, 601 (1987).

1991On the testimony before it, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in its finding that the officer articulated sufficient facts to justify the stop. “[T]o justify a legal investigatory stop ... a police officer need have no more than an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place.” State v. Boardman, 148 Vt. 229, 231 , 531 A.2d 599, 601 (1987).

1989See State v. Hewey, 144 Vt. 10, 13 , 471 A.2d 236, 238 (1983) (stop permissible where officer had “reasonable suspicion when he stopped the car” of a violation).

1989See State v. Hewey, 144 Vt. 10, 13 , 471 A.2d 236, 238 (1983) (stop permissible where officer had “reasonable suspicion when he stopped the car” of a violation).

2019Id. at 472 , 816 A.2d at 553 .

2019Id. at 472 , 816 A.2d at 553 .

2020“The relevant question is not whether a motor vehicle violation actually occurred, but rather only ‘whether the 3 officer had a reasonable basis to suspect that a motor vehicle violation was taking place.’ ” Hayes, 2016 VT 105, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Rutter, 2011 Vt. 13, ¶ 10 , 189 Vt. 574 , 15 A.3d 132 (mem.)); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (explaining that reasonable suspicion is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[,]’

2020“The relevant question is not whether a motor vehicle violation actually occurred, but rather only ‘whether the 3 officer had a reasonable basis to suspect that a motor vehicle violation was taking place.’ ” Hayes, 2016 VT 105, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Rutter, 2011 Vt. 13, ¶ 10 , 189 Vt. 574 , 15 A.3d 132 (mem.)); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (explaining that reasonable suspicion is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[,]’

2020Hayes, 2016 VT 105, ¶ 12 (concluding that officer had reasonable suspicion because “[r]egardless of whether any one of defendant’s ‘missteps’ actually amounted to a motor vehicle violation, the officer could have reasonably believed that there was a traffic violation”); Rutter, 2011 VT 13, ¶¶ 9-10 (holding “brief squealing of tires” sufficient to support reasonable suspicion that defendant violated motor-vehicle law requiring vehicles to remain stationary unless “movement can be made with reasonable safety”).

2020Indeed, this Court has repeatedly “found stops justified where officers had reason only to suspect that a noncriminal motor vehicle code violation occurred.” State v. Marshall, 2010 VT 81, ¶ 6 , 188 Vt. 640 , 8 A.3d 1086 (mem.) (emphasis added) (citing cases); see also State v. 4 Howard, 2016 VT 49, ¶ 5, 202 Vt. 51 , 147 A.3d 88 (noting that under reasonable-suspicion standard, “the State need not show that the driver actually committed a [traffic violation] before the stop”); State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 404 , 765 A.2d 862, 864 (2000) (observing that reasonable suspicion standard is less dema

2020Indeed, this Court has repeatedly “found stops justified where officers had reason only to suspect that a noncriminal motor vehicle code violation occurred.” State v. Marshall, 2010 VT 81, ¶ 6 , 188 Vt. 640 , 8 A.3d 1086 (mem.) (emphasis added) (citing cases); see also State v. 4 Howard, 2016 VT 49, ¶ 5, 202 Vt. 51 , 147 A.3d 88 (noting that under reasonable-suspicion standard, “the State need not show that the driver actually committed a [traffic violation] before the stop”); State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 404 , 765 A.2d 862, 864 (2000) (observing that reasonable suspicion standard is less dema

2020Indeed, this Court has repeatedly “found stops justified where officers had reason only to suspect that a noncriminal motor vehicle code violation occurred.” State v. Marshall, 2010 VT 81, ¶ 6 , 188 Vt. 640 , 8 A.3d 1086 (mem.) (emphasis added) (citing cases); see also State v. 4 Howard, 2016 VT 49, ¶ 5, 202 Vt. 51 , 147 A.3d 88 (noting that under reasonable-suspicion standard, “the State need not show that the driver actually committed a [traffic violation] before the stop”); State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 404 , 765 A.2d 862, 864 (2000) (observing that reasonable suspicion standard is less dema

2020Indeed, this Court has repeatedly “found stops justified where officers had reason only to suspect that a noncriminal motor vehicle code violation occurred.” State v. Marshall, 2010 VT 81, ¶ 6 , 188 Vt. 640 , 8 A.3d 1086 (mem.) (emphasis added) (citing cases); see also State v. 4 Howard, 2016 VT 49, ¶ 5, 202 Vt. 51 , 147 A.3d 88 (noting that under reasonable-suspicion standard, “the State need not show that the driver actually committed a [traffic violation] before the stop”); State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 404 , 765 A.2d 862, 864 (2000) (observing that reasonable suspicion standard is less dema

2020“The relevant question is not whether a motor vehicle violation actually occurred, but rather only ‘whether the 3 officer had a reasonable basis to suspect that a motor vehicle violation was taking place.’ ” Hayes, 2016 VT 105, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Rutter, 2011 Vt. 13, ¶ 10 , 189 Vt. 574 , 15 A.3d 132 (mem.)); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (explaining that reasonable suspicion is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act[,]’

2019These three changes complement each other and demonstrate that of law pursuant to Fourth Amendment); see also State v. Dopslaf, 2015-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 16-17 , 356 P.3d 559 (referring to standard set forth in Heien concurrence in determining that officer’s stop of defendant’s vehicle was based on objectively reasonable mistake of law). 39 the Legislature amended § 511 to add the requirement that registration stickers be displayed and kept unobscured, thus making the failure to display an unobscured validation sticker a motor vehicle violation. ¶ 67.

2019Plaintiff asserts that this Court has rejected the balancing test that the U.S. Supreme Court applies in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see State v. Savva, 159 Vt. 75, 85-86 , 616 A.2d 774, 780 (1991) (stating that Article 11’s warrant requirement itself reflects “the balance reached by the constitutional drafters, a balance in which the individual’s interest in privacy outweighs the burdens imposed on law enforcement”), as exemplified by our rejection of the good- faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2019Plaintiff asserts that this Court has rejected the balancing test that the U.S. Supreme Court applies in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see State v. Savva, 159 Vt. 75, 85-86 , 616 A.2d 774, 780 (1991) (stating that Article 11’s warrant requirement itself reflects “the balance reached by the constitutional drafters, a balance in which the individual’s interest in privacy outweighs the burdens imposed on law enforcement”), as exemplified by our rejection of the good- faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2019Here, the parties debate whether there actually was a motor vehicle infraction justifying the stop and, if there was not, whether this Court should adopt under Article 11 the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Heien that a stop based on a law enforcement officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law as to whether there was a motor vehicle violation may “rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”14 Heien, ___ 14 Regarding the latter argument, plaintiff contends that adopting the Heien holding would be inconsistent with the broader protection we

2019Here, the parties debate whether there actually was a motor vehicle infraction justifying the stop and, if there was not, whether this Court should adopt under Article 11 the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Heien that a stop based on a law enforcement officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law as to whether there was a motor vehicle violation may “rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”14 Heien, ___ 14 Regarding the latter argument, plaintiff contends that adopting the Heien holding would be inconsistent with the broader protection we

2019Here, the parties debate whether there actually was a motor vehicle infraction justifying the stop and, if there was not, whether this Court should adopt under Article 11 the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Heien that a stop based on a law enforcement officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law as to whether there was a motor vehicle violation may "rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment." 14 *494 Heien , --- U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 534 ; see id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) ("If the statute is genuinely ambiguous,

2019Here, the parties debate whether there actually was a motor vehicle infraction justifying the stop and, if there was not, whether this Court should adopt under Article 11 the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Heien that a stop based on a law enforcement officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law as to whether there was a motor vehicle violation may "rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the Fourth Amendment." 14 *494 Heien , --- U.S. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 534 ; see id. at ----, 135 S.Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) ("If the statute is genuinely ambiguous,

2016See Rodriguez v. United States, _ U.S. _, _, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (“A relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 34 , 757 A.2d 1017, 1027 (2000).

2004Plaintiff cites State v. Record, 150 Vt. 84, 86 (1988),ostensibly for its recognition of the difference in the two provisions, and of our Supreme Court’s rightful authority to interpret Article Eleven in a manner different from the Fourth Amendment.