10 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1983–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rose v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2012The *505 Supreme Court noted that “to sustain a conviction for driving a motor vehicle in violation of [Code § 46.2-357(A) ], the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant’s driving privilege has been revoked.” Id. at 434, 578 S.E.2d at 760 . 2012Reversing Rose’s conviction for violating Code § 46.2-357, the Court reasoned that the order before it “determined Rose to be an habitual offender but failed to direct him not to operate a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth.” Id. at 435, 578 S.E.2d at 761 . | 1 | 2 |
Sutherland v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2019The “About the Person” Requirement In considering whether a weapon is “about the person,” the Supreme Court has consistently considered “whether the weapon remained ‘so accessible as to afford prompt and immediate use’ by the defendant while it was concealed.” Pruitt v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 382, 387-88 (2007) (quoting Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 109 Va. 834, 835 (1909)). | 1 | 1 |
Pruitt v. Com.green1 sentence2019The “About the Person” Requirement In considering whether a weapon is “about the person,” the Supreme Court has consistently considered “whether the weapon remained ‘so accessible as to afford prompt and immediate use’ by the defendant while it was concealed.” Pruitt v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 382, 387-88 (2007) (quoting Sutherland v. Commonwealth, 109 Va. 834, 835 (1909)). | 1 | 1 |
Elias P. Doulgerakis v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen2 sentences2019In Doulgerakis v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 417 (2013), this Court also found that the motor vehicle exception applied and reversed a conviction where Doulgerakis was driving the vehicle and a handgun was found in the glove compartment, which was closed and latched, but not locked. 2019The Court noted that for a weapon to be “secured,” as required in the motor vehicle exception, “does not mean ‘locked.’” Id. at 421 . | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen1 sentence2007Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). | 1 | 1 |
Penton v. City of Norfolkgreen2 sentences1995While Code § 46.2-360(2) references Code § 18.2-271.1, this reference is for the limited purpose of using the latter’s procedures for issuing a restricted permit, not for using its punishment provisions, which are part of the Code sections dealing with DUI offenders, not habitual offenders. 5 In our view, appellant was violating restrictions imposed pursuant to Code §§ 46.2-360 and 46.2-357, not Code § 18.2-271.1. “[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and w 1995While Code § 46.2-360(2) references Code § 18.2-271.1, this reference is for the limited purpose of using the latter’s procedures for issuing a restricted permit, not for using its punishment provisions, which are part of the Code sections dealing with DUI offenders, not habitual offenders. 5 In our view, appellant was violating restrictions imposed pursuant to Code §§ 46.2-360 and 46.2-357, not Code § 18.2-271.1. “[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and w | 1 | 1 |
Virginia National Bank v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1995While Code § 46.2-360(2) references Code § 18.2-271.1, this reference is for the limited purpose of using the latter’s procedures for issuing a restricted permit, not for using its punishment provisions, which are part of the Code sections dealing with DUI offenders, not habitual offenders. 5 In our view, appellant was violating restrictions imposed pursuant to Code §§ 46.2-360 and 46.2-357, not Code § 18.2-271.1. “[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and w 1995While Code § 46.2-360(2) references Code § 18.2-271.1, this reference is for the limited purpose of using the latter’s procedures for issuing a restricted permit, not for using its punishment provisions, which are part of the Code sections dealing with DUI offenders, not habitual offenders. 5 In our view, appellant was violating restrictions imposed pursuant to Code §§ 46.2-360 and 46.2-357, not Code § 18.2-271.1. “[W]hen one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and w | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Steven Lee Hodges v. Commonwealth of Virginia
green
2 sentences2021Hodges, 64 Va. App. at 694 n.2. 7 the statute. 2019In Hodges v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 687 (2015), this Court found that the motor vehicle exception applied and reversed a conviction for concealed carry of a handgun where Hodges was in the driver’s seat and a handgun was located in the vehicle’s center console and the console’s lid was closed. | 2 | 2019–2021 |
Leith v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2017Although the amendment in part abrogated Leith, 17 Va. App. 620 , 440 S.E.2d 152 , the reasoning in Leith remains applicable to a case such as this one where the defendant does not claim to qualify for the exception and the facts show that he was accessing the compartment. 2017Although the amendment in part abrogated Leith, 17 Va. App. 620 , 440 S.E.2d 152 , the reasoning in Leith remains applicable to a case such as this one where the defendant does not claim to qualify for the exception and the facts show that he was accessing the compartment. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Curtis Mays v. William Harris, Sheriff Nelson County
green
2 sentences1998Also, the District Court *649 voided the two 1973 convictions for operating a motor vehicle in violation of the order, holding “that the nullity of the 1970 adjudication necessarily voided the 1973 convictions for driving while adjudged an habitual offender.” Id. at 1259 . 1998The Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and reinstated the convictions for driving after having been adjudicated an habitual offender “because the sentence about which Mays complains does not depend on the validity of his underlying convictions.” Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Williams v. Petersburg & Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1997Operation of Motor Vehicle The defendant argues that the defendant did not “drive or operate” a motor vehicle within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266. 2 In Williams v. City of Petersburg, 216 Va. 297 , 217 S.E.2d 893 (1975), the Virginia Supreme Court defined operating a motor vehicle as follows: “Operating” not only includes the process of moving the vehicle from one place to another, but also includes starting the engine, or manipulating the mechanical or electrical equipment of the vehicle without actually putting the car in motion. 1997Operation of Motor Vehicle The defendant argues that the defendant did not “drive or operate” a motor vehicle within the meaning of Code § 18.2-266. 2 In Williams v. City of Petersburg, 216 Va. 297 , 217 S.E.2d 893 (1975), the Virginia Supreme Court defined operating a motor vehicle as follows: “Operating” not only includes the process of moving the vehicle from one place to another, but also includes starting the engine, or manipulating the mechanical or electrical equipment of the vehicle without actually putting the car in motion. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Chadwick
red
2 sentences1983And this Court recognizes that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , declined to extend the rationale of the "automobile exception" to permit a warrantless search of any movable container found in a public place. 1983And this Court recognizes that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , declined to extend the rationale of the "automobile exception" to permit a warrantless search of any movable container found in a public place. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.