motor vehicle waiver in Texas

1987See California v. Carney, [471] U.S. [386], 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 [L.Ed.2d] 406 (1985)." Id.

1987See California v. Carney, [471] U.S. [386], 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 [L.Ed.2d] 406 (1985)." Id.

2024See id. § 51.014(a)(8) (allowing interlocutory appeal from order that grants or denies plea to jurisdiction by governmental unit); Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544 , 549 (Tex. 2019) (stating that section 51.014(a)(8) “allows an interlocutory appeal to be taken when ‘the trial court denies the governmental entity’s claim of no jurisdiction, whether it has been asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion for summary judgment, or otherwise’”) (quoting Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004)). 7 Texas Tort Claims Act Analysis In its first issue, the City contends

2024See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28; Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 .

2024As the Texas Supreme Court repeatedly has stated, “any purported statutory waiver of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed in favor of retention of immunity.” Id. at 303 (quoting Prairie View A&M Univ. v Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 513 (Tex. 2012)). 12 In light of the evidence presented and applicable law, I would hold the City retained its immunity under the TTCA’s motor vehicle waiver, because the evidence does not satisfy the “operation or use” requirement under Section 101.021(1)(A) of the TTCA and thus Branch did not establish his injuries arose from a government employee’s negligen

2024The City argues that it is a “truth universally acknowledged” that the Tort Claims Act “only waives governmental immunity for publicly owned vehicles.” Branch responds that the City’s argument contravenes the plain text of the statute and multiple opinions from Texas intermediate courts. “[W]e take statutes as we find them and refrain from rewriting the Legislature’s text.” Cadena Comercial USA, 518 S.W.3d at 326 .

2024See PHI, 593 S.W.3d at 305 (“The statute itself—and only the statute—provides the governing rule of decision.”); Cadena Comercial USA, 518 S.W.3d at 326 (“[W]e take statutes as we find them and refrain from rewriting the Legislature’s text.”). 26 We conclude that section 101.021(1) does not require a plaintiff to establish that the vehicle at issue was publicly owned by a governmental unit in order to rely on the motor-vehicle immunity waiver.

2024Rather, the City points to dicta from Lowe v. Texas Tech University, 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976), stating that “The [Texas Tort Claims Act] provide[s] for waiver of governmental immunity in three general areas: use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property.” Lowe was a case involving a football injury to a Texas Tech player, and it did not involve the motor- vehicle immunity waiver.

2024Id.

1998See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex.1987).

1998CODE § 521.221(c) (driving a motor vehicle in violation of a license restriction is a misdemeanor criminal offense). [5] See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex.1987). [1] TEX.

1995See Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (on rehearing). 6 In the alternative, appellant argues that the stop of Mr. Hudlin’s automobile was unlawful because it was pretextual.

1992See Robinson, 780 S.W.2d at 171 , and Hitchcock v. Garvin, 738 S.W.2d 34, 36-38 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (negligent failure to use or operate the warning lights on a vehicle may subject the State to liability under the negligent operation and use of a motor vehicle clause of section 101.021).

1992See Robinson, 780 S.W.2d at 171 , and Hitchcock v. Garvin, 738 S.W.2d 34, 36-38 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (negligent failure to use or operate the warning lights on a vehicle may subject the State to liability under the negligent operation and use of a motor vehicle clause of section 101.021).

1985See Estate of Garza v. McAllen Independent School District, 613 S.W.2d at 527-28 .

1939Further, with respect to appellants’ said contention, it is held in New Way Lumber Co. et al., v. Smith et al., 128 Tex. 173 , 96 S.W.2d 282, 290 (speaking of inspectors), that “* * * if the officer should have probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle is being operated without a permit, or that it is being operated with an unlawful load, he would have the right, without a search warrant, to stop the driver and question him about his right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways, and, if need be, ascertain whether the operation of the motor vehicle is in violation of law”.

1939Further, with respect to appellants’ said contention, it is held in New Way Lumber Co. et al., v. Smith et al., 128 Tex. 173 , 96 S.W.2d 282, 290 (speaking of inspectors), that “* * * if the officer should have probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle is being operated without a permit, or that it is being operated with an unlawful load, he would have the right, without a search warrant, to stop the driver and question him about his right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways, and, if need be, ascertain whether the operation of the motor vehicle is in violation of law”.