motor vehicle violation in Georgia

2013See OCGA § 40-5-55 (a). “[W]here the facts relevant to a suppression motion are undisputed, the proper standard of review on appeal is de novo, not clearly erroneous.” (Footnote omitted.) Underwood, supra. In State v. Gray, 267 Ga. App. 753 ( 600 SE2d 626 ) (2004), the case relied upon by the trial court in granting Hughes’s motion to suppress, we applied the clearly erroneous standard to affirm the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress the results of the defendant’s breath test where the trial court found that the arresting officer lacked credibility and that the defendant’s outward man

2013See OCGA § 40-5-55 (a). “[W]here the facts relevant to a suppression motion are undisputed, the proper standard of review on appeal is de novo, not clearly erroneous.” (Footnote omitted.) Underwood, supra. In State v. Gray, 267 Ga. App. 753 ( 600 SE2d 626 ) (2004), the case relied upon by the trial court in granting Hughes’s motion to suppress, we applied the clearly erroneous standard to affirm the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress the results of the defendant’s breath test where the trial court found that the arresting officer lacked credibility and that the defendant’s outward man

2014Accordingly, the testimony in the case sub judice was tenuous at best and insufficient to satisfy the strict requirement of former OCGA § 24-3-17 (b) that, prior to admission, the State must establish that a GCIC printout was obtained from a computer terminal lawfully connected to the GCIC.18 The testimony by the probate-court employee as to the status of Christian’s license at the time of his arrest was the only evidence the State presented that Christian was driving in violation of OCGA § 40-5-65, which makes it a crime to operate a motor vehicle in violation of the conditions of a limited d

2014See Tolbert, 227 Ga. App. at 647-48 (reversing conviction for driving with a revoked or suspended license when the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of driving history).

2001Mullinax challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of both murder and theft by taking a motor vehicle under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). (a) Although largely circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to have found Mullinax guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder.

2001Jackson v. Virginia, supra. The jury was authorized to consider evidence that the victim was last seen alive with Mullinax; his conduct and conflicting explanations on the night of her disappearance; his access to the area where the struggle ensued and the body was found; his subsequent inculpatory statements; and his admission that the two had argued on the night of her murder.

2014In 2006, however, the Legislature amended OCGA § 40-5-67.1, adding subsection (d.1), which states that “[n]othing in this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this [S]tate or the United States.”7 The plain meaning of this language and its addition to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 on the heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Collier support the State’s argument that the search warrant used to take McAlliser’s blood was valid

2014In 2006, however, the Legislature amended OCGA § 40-5-67.1, adding subsection (d.1), which states that “[n]othing in this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this [S]tate or the United States.”7 The plain meaning of this language and its addition to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 on the heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Collier support the State’s argument that the search warrant used to take McAlliser’s blood was valid

2014Accordingly, the testimony in the case sub judice was tenuous at best and insufficient to satisfy the strict requirement of former OCGA § 24-3-17 (b) that, prior to admission, the State must establish that a GCIC printout was obtained from a computer terminal lawfully connected to the GCIC.18 The testimony by the probate-court employee as to the status of Christian’s license at the time of his arrest was the only evidence the State presented that Christian was driving in violation of OCGA § 40-5-65, which makes it a crime to operate a motor vehicle in violation of the conditions of a limited d

2014In 2006, however, the Legislature amended OCGA § 40-5-67.1, adding subsection (d.1), which states that “[n]othing in this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this [S]tate or the United States.”7 The plain meaning of this language and its addition to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 on the heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Collier support the State’s argument that the search warrant used to take McAlliser’s blood was valid

2014In 2006, however, the Legislature amended OCGA § 40-5-67.1, adding subsection (d.1), which states that “[n]othing in this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this [S]tate or the United States.”7 The plain meaning of this language and its addition to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 on the heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Collier support the State’s argument that the search warrant used to take McAlliser’s blood was valid