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44 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Duesterhoeftgreen2 sentences2024An investigatory stop of a vehicle is valid if an officer has “specific and articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation or criminal activity.” State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted). 2016An investigatory stop of a vehicle is valid if an officer has “specific and articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation or criminal activity.” State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2016But “[l]imited investigatory stops are allowed if police have reasonable articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation or of criminal activity.” State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Minn. App. 2002). 2015But “[l]imited investigatory stops are allowed if police have reasonable articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation or of criminal activity.” State v. Johnson, 645 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Minn. App. 2002). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Georgegreen2 sentences2016To justify an investigatory traffic stop, “the police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon 5 specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004) (quotations omitted). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). 2016Suspicion must be based on more than a “mere hunch.” State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 1997). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Olsongreen2 sentences1984The test may be required of a person when an officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 169.-121 [the DWI statute] and one of the following conditions exist: (1) the person has been lawfully placed under arrest for violation of section 169.121, or an ordinance in conformity with it * * * “Reasonable and probable grounds” to believe a person has been driving while under the influence of alcohol has been equated with the term “probable cause.” State v. Olson, 342 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn 1984The test may be required of a person when an officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 169.121 [the DWI statute] and one of the following conditions exist: * * * (2) the person has been involved in a motor vehicle accident or collision resulting in property damage, personal injury, or death (Emphasis supplied.) “Reasonable and probable grounds” to believe a person was driving while under the influence of alcohol has been equated with the term “probable cause,” State v. Olson, 342 N | 2 | 3 |
State v. Bigelowgreen2 sentences2016Probable cause to search a vehicle “justifies a search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” State v. Bigelow, 451 N.W.2d 311, 311 (Minn. 1990). 1999The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 ; see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 136 , 45 S.Ct. 280 (upholding, under the motor vehicle exception, a search in which the police found and seized illegal alcohol only by tearing open the seat covers of the car); State v. Bigelow, 451 N.W.2d 311, 312 (Minn.1990). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2016To justify an investigatory traffic stop, “the police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon 5 specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004) (quotations omitted). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). 2015To justify an investigatory traffic stop, “the police must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). 3 “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Crippsgreen2 sentences2014A reasonable articulable suspicion exists if the police officer can present “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). 2014A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if the police officer can present “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity.” State v. Cripps, 533 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Garske v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1984Probable cause has been defined as “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty.” Id. at 640 , quoting Garske v. United States, 1 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir.1924). 1984The test may be required of a person when an officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 169.121 [the DWI statute] and one of the following conditions exist: * * * (2) the person has been involved in a motor vehicle accident or collision resulting in property damage, personal injury, or death (Emphasis supplied.) “Reasonable and probable grounds” to believe a person was driving while under the influence of alcohol has been equated with the term “probable cause,” State v. Olson, 342 N | 2 | 2 |
State v. Schultzgreen2 sentences2025We noted that, at the time Wicklund was 4 See, e.g., State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1978) (citing Wicklund for the proposition that “the odor of marijuana” justified a “warrantless search of the passenger compartment for marijuana pursuant to the so-called motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement”); State v. Hodgman, 257 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. 1977) (citing Wicklund for the proposition that the odor of marijuana gave the officer “probable cause to arrest defendant and conduct a full search of both defendant and the car” (emphasis added)); State v. Veigel, 304 N.W.2d 900 1981State v. Armstrong, 291 N.W.2d 918 (Minn.1980); State v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 346 (Minn.1979); State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.1978); City of St. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Munsongreen2 sentences2016The supreme court held “that the corroborated details of the [informant’s] tip, together with the past reliability of the [informant], gave the police probable cause to believe that the Blazer was carrying illegal drugs and thus justified the search of the Blazer under the motor vehicle exception.” Id. at 136-37 . 2016“Under this motor vehicle exception, the police may search an automobile without a warrant if they have probable cause for believing that the vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hodgmangreen1 sentence2025We noted that, at the time Wicklund was 4 See, e.g., State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1978) (citing Wicklund for the proposition that “the odor of marijuana” justified a “warrantless search of the passenger compartment for marijuana pursuant to the so-called motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement”); State v. Hodgman, 257 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. 1977) (citing Wicklund for the proposition that the odor of marijuana gave the officer “probable cause to arrest defendant and conduct a full search of both defendant and the car” (emphasis added)); State v. Veigel, 304 N.W.2d 900 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bourkegreen1 sentence2024The reasonable suspicion standard is “not high.” State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Dutcher v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence2016Safety, 406 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Minn. App. 1987) (“The Commissioner’s burden extends only to the concentration at 4 the time of testing, insofar as implied consent is concerned.” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Koppigreen1 sentence2016Such probable cause exists “whenever there 4 are facts and circumstances known to the officer which would warrant a prudent man in believing that the individual was driving or was operating or was in physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired.” State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Battlesongreen1 sentence2016Suspicion must be based on more than a “mere hunch.” State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 1997). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Llona v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen1 sentence2015Safety, 389 N.W.2d 210, 211 (Minn. App. 1986); Roberts v. Comm’r of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal.green2 sentences2014Camara 2 Poitra does not rely on Frost, 271 U.S. at 593-94 , 46 S. Ct. at 607 (discussing the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine). 3 Unlike the regulation in Camara, Minnesota’s implied-consent law does not authorize chemical testing unless “an officer has probable cause to believe the person [to be tested] was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 169A.20 (driving while impaired).” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2012); see also Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(c) (2012) (“The test may also be required of a person 5 contended that he could no 2014Camara 2 Poitra does not rely on Frost, 271 U.S. at 593-94 , 46 S. Ct. at 607 (discussing the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine). 3 Unlike the regulation in Camara, Minnesota’s implied-consent law does not authorize chemical testing unless “an officer has probable cause to believe the person [to be tested] was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 169A.20 (driving while impaired).” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2012); see also Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(c) (2012) (“The test may also be required of a person 5 contended that he could no | 1 | 1 |
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Duffygreen1 sentence2002See Duffy, 618 N.W.2d at 616 . | 1 | 1 |
Carroll v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 ; see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 136 , 45 S.Ct. 280 (upholding, under the motor vehicle exception, a search in which the police found and seized illegal alcohol only by tearing open the seat covers of the car); State v. Bigelow, 451 N.W.2d 311, 312 (Minn.1990). 1999The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 ; see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 136 , 45 S.Ct. 280 (upholding, under the motor vehicle exception, a search in which the police found and seized illegal alcohol only by tearing open the seat covers of the car); State v. Bigelow, 451 N.W.2d 311, 312 (Minn.1990). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Richardsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Byrd v. O'NEILLgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sammie Jackson, Jr. v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fraziergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Alessogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Ross
green
2 sentences2014In that case the Court held that, under the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, police officers “may conduct a search of a vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant ‘particularly describing the place to be searched.’” 456 U.S. at 800 , 102 S. Ct. at 2159 . 2014In that case the Court held that, under the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, police officers “may conduct a search of a vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant ‘particularly describing the place to be searched.’” 456 U.S. at 800 , 102 S. Ct. at 2159 . | 5 | 1982–2014 |
State v. Veigel
green
2 sentences2025We noted that, at the time Wicklund was 4 See, e.g., State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1978) (citing Wicklund for the proposition that “the odor of marijuana” justified a “warrantless search of the passenger compartment for marijuana pursuant to the so-called motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement”); State v. Hodgman, 257 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. 1977) (citing Wicklund for the proposition that the odor of marijuana gave the officer “probable cause to arrest defendant and conduct a full search of both defendant and the car” (emphasis added)); State v. Veigel, 304 N.W.2d 900 1984United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 110 ; State v. Frazier, 318 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn.1982); State v. Veigel, 304 N.W.2d 900 (Minn.1981). | 3 | 1983–2025 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2002State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn.1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 2002Id. | 3 | 1996–2002 |
State v. McKinley
green
2 sentences1981In State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297 , 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975), relied on in Vaughn , we held that police may not make investigatory stops of motor vehicles without first having “specific and articulable facts” establishing “reasonable suspicion” of a motor vehicle violation or criminal activity. 1979We do not need to decide this issue because (a) they clearly had reasonable grounds for stopping the truck for minimally intrusive investigative questioning, see, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), and State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297 , 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975); (b) upon doing this and before they ever actually entered the vehicle one of the officers saw through the window and in open view a partially uncased gun; 2 (c) this observation provided them with all they needed in the way of probable cause; and (d) under the motor vehicle exception they at that poi | 3 | 1979–1996 |
State v. Schinzing
green
2 sentences1988After detecting the odor of alcohol, pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, the officer is “justified in searching anywhere in the passenger compartment where those open bottles or cans might be found.” Id. 1984Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d at 109 ; State v. Alesso, 328 N.W.2d 685, 688 (Minn.1982); State v. Veigel, 304 N.W.2d *415 900 (Minn.1981). | 2 | 1984–1988 |
State v. McKinley
green
2 sentences1981In State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297 , 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975), relied on in Vaughn , we held that police may not make investigatory stops of motor vehicles without first having “specific and articulable facts” establishing “reasonable suspicion” of a motor vehicle violation or criminal activity. 1979We do not need to decide this issue because (a) they clearly had reasonable grounds for stopping the truck for minimally intrusive investigative questioning, see, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), and State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297 , 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975); (b) upon doing this and before they ever actually entered the vehicle one of the officers saw through the window and in open view a partially uncased gun; 2 (c) this observation provided them with all they needed in the way of probable cause; and (d) under the motor vehicle exception they at that poi | 2 | 1979–1981 |
Delaware v. Prouse
green
2 sentences1979We do not need to decide this issue because (a) they clearly had reasonable grounds for stopping the truck for minimally intrusive investigative questioning, see, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), and State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297 , 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975); (b) upon doing this and before they ever actually entered the vehicle one of the officers saw through the window and in open view a partially uncased gun; 2 (c) this observation provided them with all they needed in the way of probable cause; and (d) under the motor vehicle exception they at that poi 1979We do not need to decide this issue because (a) they clearly had reasonable grounds for stopping the truck for minimally intrusive investigative questioning, see, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), and State v. McKinley, 305 Minn. 297 , 232 N.W.2d 906 (1975); (b) upon doing this and before they ever actually entered the vehicle one of the officers saw through the window and in open view a partially uncased gun; 2 (c) this observation provided them with all they needed in the way of probable cause; and (d) under the motor vehicle exception they at that poi | 2 | 1979–1981 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1981State v. Armstrong, 291 N.W.2d 918 (Minn.1980); State v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 346 (Minn.1979); State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.1978); City of St. 1980State v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 346 (Minn.1979); State v. Schultz, 271 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.1978); City of St. | 2 | 1980–1981 |
McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety
green
1 sentence2018Based on the parties' presentation of this case, we assume, without deciding, that Johnson's claim is best analyzed as a challenge under McDonnell . 473 N.W.2d 848 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Flowers
green
1 sentence2016McIntosh asserts that this case is like State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. 2007). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State Farm Insurance Companies v. Seefeld
green
1 sentence2000Id. at 65 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Moseng green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Lothenbach green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamonte green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Dietrich v. Commissioner of Public Safety green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In re Turner green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| New York v. Belton red | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. Johnny Williams, Gregory Leon Murchison, Lawrence Daniels, Charged as Paul Abrams green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. Jozsef Tibor Wiga, United States of America v. Jozsef Tibor Wiga green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. Darrell Combs, and Steven Brown, A/K/A Steve Newman green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Francoeur yellow | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. Bowles green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Mower green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| The United States of America v. Aubrey Westley Miller green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| United States v. Johnnie Hudson and Michael Dean Johnson neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hunter v. Wainwright green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Tarkowski v. Scott green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Garrett v. Director, Department of Corrections of Virginia green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Pennington v. Housewright green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Taylor v. United States green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Trimmer v. Van Bomel green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Troy v. United States green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Spencer v. American Consulting Ass'n green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Armstrong neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Tungland green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Cooper v. California green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Landon neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Yaeger green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Lee green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Wicklund green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.