11 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1971–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Oatesgreen1 sentence2010We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in judging the appropriateness of specific questions and in the conduct of voir dire, State v. Oates, 12 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Mo. banc 2000); that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo.banc 1993); and there was no instructional error, plain or otherwise, Missouri Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.20 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Grimgreen1 sentence2010We have reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in judging the appropriateness of specific questions and in the conduct of voir dire, State v. Oates, 12 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Mo. banc 2000); that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo.banc 1993); and there was no instructional error, plain or otherwise, Missouri Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.20 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Testerman v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence2002The standard for probable cause is an objective one, as probable cause “exists when the facts and circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Testerman v. Dir. of Revenue, 31 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Mo.App.2000) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Wilcox v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence2001Wilcox v. Dir. of Revenue, 842 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sollarsgreen1 sentence1998State v. Sollars, 747 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Mo. banc 1988). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Director of Revenuegreen1 sentence1989See: Stewart v. Director of Revenue, 702 S.W.2d 472, 475 [5] (Mo. banc 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson Ex Rel. Carter v. Carthellgreen1 sentence1988The fact that this particular vehicle was equipped with a trash compactor and that the compactor caused the injury in no way removes the vehicle from this exception. *163 In Johnson v. Carthell, 631 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Mo.App.1982), the court, in examining specific case authority, namely, Teters v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 300 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.1957), and Karnes v. Ace Cab Co., 287 S.W.2d 378 (Mo.App.1956), stated, “These cases demonstrate that the operation of a motor vehicle includes nearly any activity that deals specifically with the motor vehicle, i.e., the actual physical structure and | 1 | 1 |
State v. Svendrowskigreen1 sentence1986See State v. Svendrowski, 692 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Mo.App.1985). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Co. v. American Alternative Insurance Corp.
green
1 sentence2017Although AAIC’s policy involved only the motor vehicle exception to sovereign immunity, the Court relied on the insurance exception for other torts under § 537.610.1, Kunzie and another case involving insurance for retaliatory discharge, Hummel, 114 S.W.3d at 282 , in concluding that “the Fire District waived sovereign immunity to the limits of the AAIC policy.” Farm Bureau, 347 S.W.3d at 533 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hummel v. St. Charles City R-3 School District
green
1 sentence2017Although AAIC’s policy involved only the motor vehicle exception to sovereign immunity, the Court relied on the insurance exception for other torts under § 537.610.1, Kunzie and another case involving insurance for retaliatory discharge, Hummel, 114 S.W.3d at 282 , in concluding that “the Fire District waived sovereign immunity to the limits of the AAIC policy.” Farm Bureau, 347 S.W.3d at 533 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Duncan
green
1 sentence2010It is used to indicate “the presence of alcohol based on a breath sample” and “is designed for use by police officers to assist them in determining whether they have probable cause to arrest a suspect.” Id. *750 Any state, county or municipal law enforcement officer who has the power of arrest for violations of section 577.010 or 577.012 and who is certified pursuant to chapter 590, RSMo, may, prior to arrest, administer a chemical test to any person suspected of operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 577.010 or 577.012. *751 As such, the portable breathalyzer test “is not subject t | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Karnes v. Ace Cab Company
green
1 sentence1988The fact that this particular vehicle was equipped with a trash compactor and that the compactor caused the injury in no way removes the vehicle from this exception. *163 In Johnson v. Carthell, 631 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Mo.App.1982), the court, in examining specific case authority, namely, Teters v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 300 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.1957), and Karnes v. Ace Cab Co., 287 S.W.2d 378 (Mo.App.1956), stated, “These cases demonstrate that the operation of a motor vehicle includes nearly any activity that deals specifically with the motor vehicle, i.e., the actual physical structure and | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Arkansas v. Sanders
red
2 sentences1980Moreover, the state’s reliance on the motor vehicle exception is totally misplaced because as carefully pointed out in the concurring opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, “[t]he relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick", 99 S.Ct. at 2595 . 1980Moreover, the state’s reliance on the motor vehicle exception is totally misplaced because as carefully pointed out in the concurring opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, “[t]he relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick", 99 S.Ct. at 2595 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Kennedy v. Dixon
green
1 sentence1971In support of this contention, defendant cites Kennedy v. Dixon, Mo., 439 S.W.2d 173 , where a decision by a divided court held that Missouri law would be applied regarding the host-guest relationship between an injured passenger and a deceased driver of a motor vehicle in a claim for personal injuries where both the parties resided in Missouri, the trip was to originate and terminate in Missouri, and the automobile was licensed and garaged in Missouri. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.