probation revocation hearing in Tennessee

2022State v. Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim.

2022State v. Mitchell, 810 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tenn. Crim.

2025Therefore, the confrontation rights of a defendant, although reduced at a probation revocation hearing, -4- nonetheless preclude the admission of hearsay evidence unless two requirements are met: 1) a finding of “good cause” that would justify the denial of the defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness, and 2) a showing that the “evidence” established that the hearsay “was reliable.” Id.

2013App., Jackson, Oct. 20, 2010) (“A trial court may admit reliable hearsay evidence in a probation revocation hearing so long as the opposing party is given a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence and the evidence was not ‘secured in violation of the United States or Tennessee constitutions.’” (quoting T.C.A. § 40-35-209(b) (Supp. 2009), and citing Wade, 863 S.W.2d at 409 ).

2014Cf. State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that, “at the conclusion of a probation revocation hearing, a trial court can: (1) order incarceration; (2) cause execution of the judgment as it was originally entered; or (3) extend the remaining probationary period for a period not to exceed two years”).

2013Cf. State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that, “at the conclusion of a probation revocation hearing, a trial court can: (1) order incarceration; (2) cause execution of the judgment as it was originally entered; or (3) extend the remaining probationary period for a period not to exceed two years”).

2022Moreover, our supreme court has determined that hearsay evidence is admissible at a probation revocation hearing, thus depriving the probationer of the right to cross- examination, when minimum confrontation requirements of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973), are met.

2014To ensure the “minimum requirements of due process” necessary prior to a probation revocation hearing, the following requirements must be met: “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of (probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body . . .; and (f) a written stat

2025“Reliable hearsay has been held admissible in a probation revocation hearing so long as the defendant had a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Carney, 752 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. Crim.

2015In State v. Coggins, this Court conducted a similar analysis as to whether a probation revocation hearing is a “trial,” but came to a different conclusion, stating the following: It is generally recognized that there is a distinction between probation violation proceedings and criminal trials.” State v. Jackson, 60 S.W.3d 738 , 743 n.5 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Barker v. State, 483 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tenn. Crim.

2017See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613 (1985) (stating that “the flexible, informal nature of the revocation hearing, . . . does not require the full panoply of procedural safeguards associated with criminal trial”); Bledsoe v.. State, 387 S.W.2d 811, 814 (1965) (stating that “the defendant [in a probation revocation hearing] is not entitled to the same guarantees as a person who is not convicted and is merely on trial upon an accusation of crime”).

2006See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613 (1985) (stating that “the flexible, informal nature of the revocation hearing, . . . does not require the full panoply of procedural safeguards associated with criminal trial”); Bledsoe v. State, 387 S.W.2d 811, 814 (1965) (stating that “the defendant [in a probation revocation hearing] is not entitled to the same guarantees as a person who is not convicted and is merely on trial upon an accusation of crime”).

2017See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613 (1985) (stating that “the flexible, informal nature of the revocation hearing, . . . does not require the full panoply of procedural safeguards associated with criminal trial”); Bledsoe v.. State, 387 S.W.2d 811, 814 (1965) (stating that “the defendant [in a probation revocation hearing] is not entitled to the same guarantees as a person who is not convicted and is merely on trial upon an accusation of crime”).

2006See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613 (1985) (stating that “the flexible, informal nature of the revocation hearing, . . . does not require the full panoply of procedural safeguards associated with criminal trial”); Bledsoe v. State, 387 S.W.2d 811, 814 (1965) (stating that “the defendant [in a probation revocation hearing] is not entitled to the same guarantees as a person who is not convicted and is merely on trial upon an accusation of crime”).

2014To ensure the “minimum requirements of due process” necessary prior to a probation revocation hearing, the following requirements must be met: “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of (probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body . . .; and (f) a written stat

2013In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the United States Supreme Court set out the “minimum requirements of due process” that must be afforded to appellants in a probation revocation hearing, which includes the “right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).” 411 U.S. 778,786 (1973) (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (emphasis added)).

2025In a probation revocation hearing, “‘reliable hearsay’ may be admitted if the opposing party is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay evidence so admitted.” State v. Wall, 909 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tenn. Crim.

2014See State v. Wall, 909 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tenn. -7- Crim.

2016However, the trial court‟s failure to make specific written findings related to a probation revocation does not necessarily warrant reversal, because when “the transcript demonstrates the trial court provided adequate findings at the conclusion of the probation revocation hearing showing both the grounds for the revocation and reasons for the court‟s findings, the due process requirement of a „written statement‟ is satisfied.” Leiderman, 86 S.W.3d at 591 .

2011This court has noted “ where, as here, the transcript demonstrates the trial court provided adequate findings at the conclusion of the probation revocation hearing showing both the grounds for the revocation and reasons for the court’s findings, the due process requirement of a ‘written statement’ is satisfied.” Id. at 591 ; see also State v. Shawn Mitchell, No. M2008-00913-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3031183 , at *8 (Tenn. Crim.

2013Therefore, the disposition of a new charge does not determine the outcome of a revocation hearing: “a trial judge at a probation revocation hearing is not bound by an acquittal of a criminal offense which occurs . . . after a suspended sentence is granted when it appears that a defendant is guilty of conduct -4- inconsistent with good citizenship.” State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tenn. Crim.

2013App. 1995); see Delp, 614 S.W.2d at 396-97 (“This Court has previously held that a trial judge at a probation revocation hearing is not bound by an acquittal of a criminal offense which occurs, as in this case, after a suspended sentence is granted, when it appears that a defendant is guilty of conduct inconsistent with good citizenship.”); accord State v. Adams, 650 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tenn. Crim.

2022App. 2009); see State v. Moss, 13 S.W.3d 374, 385 (Tenn. Crim.

2001The right to confrontation is contained in Amendment VI to the United States Constitution, which provides that the accused has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Additionally, Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution explains that “the accused hath the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face.” However, “the right to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness ‘is not absolute and may be relaxed’ in a probation revocation hearing.” State v. Moss, 13 S.W.3d 374, 386 (Tenn. Crim.

2016“In order to find such an abuse, there must be no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of 2 According to the record, at the time of the probation revocation hearing on December 10, 2015, the DUI, vandalism, and driving on a revoked license charges were pending in Sumner County. 3 The trial court afforded the defendant three days of jail credit for time served on June 16, 2013, March 16, 2015, and October 1, 2015. -3- the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation has occurred.” Id. (citing State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn.1991)).

1998“In order for a reviewing Court to be warranted in finding an abuse of discretion in a probation revocation hearing, it must be established that the record contains no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial judge that a violation of the 4 conditions of probation has occurred.” State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991).

2025“Reliable hearsay has been held admissible in a probation revocation hearing so long as the defendant had a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Carney, 752 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. Crim.

2025“Reliable hearsay has been held admissible in a probation revocation hearing so long as the defendant had a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Carney, 752 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. Crim.

2025The Defendant acknowledges that reliable hearsay may be “admissible in a probation revocation hearing so long as the defendant ha[s] a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence,” State v. Lewis, 917 S.W.2d 251, 257 (Tenn. Crim.

2025“Reliable hearsay has been held admissible in a probation revocation hearing so long as the defendant had a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Carney, 752 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. Crim.

2018See Allen, 505 S.W.2d at 717 (considering whether the delay of two and one-half years between issuance of the probation violation warrant and the probation revocation hearing denied the defendant his right to a speedy trial); State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tenn. 1997) (providing that a delay approaching one year triggers Barker v. Wingo analysis).

2015Id. at 719 ; see Christopher Johnson, 2012 WL 1066502 , at *2 (noting that although there is a constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases, there is no constitutional right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing).

2022Because the revocation deprives the accused of only a conditional liberty granted as part of probation, “[p]robationers are not entitled to receive the full range of due process rights.” Id. “[The trial court at a probation revocation hearing may consider documentary evidence that does not meet usual evidentiary requirements.” State v. Walker, 307 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Tenn. Crim.

2022Because the revocation deprives the accused of only a conditional liberty granted as part of probation, “[p]robationers are not entitled to receive the full range of due process rights.” Id. “[T]he trial court at a probation revocation hearing may consider documentary evidence that does not meet usual evidentiary requirements.” State v. Walker, 307 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Tenn. Crim.

2018“The right to a speedy trial arises under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States made applicable to the State by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and Article 1, § 9 of the Constitution of Tennessee.” State v. Bishop, 493 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tenn. 1973).

2014Therefore, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief. -3- As to the appellant’s claim that the four-year delay between the probation violations and the probation revocation hearing violated his rights to due process and a speedy trial, we note that “[t]he right to a speedy trial arises under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States made applicable to the State by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and Article 1, § 9 of the Constitution of Tennessee.” State v. Bishop, 493 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tenn. 1973).

2016Id. at *2 (citing State v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tenn. 1999)); see also State v. Steven Thacker, No. M2011-01061- CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1072005 , at *3 (Tenn. Crim.

2012Reeves at *2 (citing State v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tenn. 1999)).

2013App. 1980) (citing Ray v. State, 576 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tenn. Crim.

1980Ray v. State, 576 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tenn.Cr.App.1978), citing Galyon v. State, 189 Tenn. 505 , 226 S.W.2d 279 , 282 (1949).

2010Id. (citing Carver v. State, 570 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tenn. Crim.

2010Id. (citing Carver v. State, 570 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tenn. Crim.

2022Because the revocation deprives the accused of only a conditional liberty granted as part of probation, “[p]robationers are not entitled to receive the full range of due process rights.” Id. “[The trial court at a probation revocation hearing may consider documentary evidence that does not meet usual evidentiary requirements.” State v. Walker, 307 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Tenn. Crim.

2022App. Feb. 25, 2009). “‘Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty’ provided in the terms of probation.” Hayes, 190 S.W.3d at 669 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

2008See id. § 40 — 35—311(e) (stating “that in a case of the revocation of probation and suspension, the defendant has the right to appeal”); State v. Dye, 715 S.W.2d 36, 40 (Tenn.1986); Tenn. R.App.

2000Id. at 39 .

2026App. Nov. 24, 2004) (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655).

2025App. Nov. 24, 2004) (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 ).

2014Id. at 504 . -6- In State v. Coggins, this Court conducted a similar analysis as to whether a probation revocation hearing is a “trial,” but came to a different conclusion, stating the following: It is generally recognized that there is a distinction between probation violation proceedings and criminal trials.” State v. Jackson, 60 S.W.3d 738 , 743 n.5 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Barker v. State, 483 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tenn. Crim.

2013See Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 502-04 (Tenn. 2012) (examining various definitions for “trial”).

2021See id. at 202 .