149 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lindseygreen2 sentences2010The Tilden court found support for its decision in People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 470 , 771 N.E.2d 399, 407 (2002), wherein the supreme court held that a probationer could be compelled to testify at a probation-revocation hearing, a proceeding that was civil in nature. 2010The Tilden court found support for its decision in People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 470 , 771 N.E.2d 399, 407 (2002), wherein the supreme court held that a probationer could be compelled to testify at a probation-revocation hearing, a proceeding that was civil in nature. | 5 | 10 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences2006Assuming, arguendo, that the majority is correct, then I would suggest that People v. Hall, 198 Ill. 2d 173 (2001), is at odds with the majority’s analysis that the label in Lindsey is precedential and that a probation revocation hearing is either civil or criminal without qualification. 2006Const. 1970, art. 1, § 2), is a flexible concept which calls for procedural safeguards tailored to the demands of a particular legal context.” Hall, 198 Ill. 2d at 177 (where failure to advise the defendant of his due process rights at a probation revocation hearing required reversal). | 5 | 5 |
People v. Graysongreen2 sentences2007Citing this court’s decision in People v. Grayson, 58 Ill. 2d 260, 265 (1974), the court noted that Grayson prohibits the relitigation of an issue in a probation revocation hearing that has been litigated in a previous trial, regardless of the differences in the burdens of proof in the two proceedings. 2007The State suggests that, under the approach taken by the appellate court, defense counsel has a strong incentive to intentionally provide ineffective assistance of counsel, which “perverts the salutary principles established in Strickland.” Alternatively, the State urges us to overrale People v. Grayson, 58 Ill. 2d 260 , which makes it impermissible for the State to proceed with a probation revocation hearing after a defendant has been acquitted of the substantive charge in a separate trial. | 4 | 14 |
People v. Bellgreen2 sentences2001See 730 ILCS 5/5–6–4(b) (West 1998) (the defendant has the right to a hearing on the alleged probation violation); 730 ILCS 5/5–6–4(c) (West 1998) (at a probation revocation hearing, the State bears the burden of proof, and the defendant has the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel); see People v. Bell , 296 Ill. 2001See 730 ILCS 5/5—6—4(b) (West 1998) (the defendant has the right to a hearing on the alleged probation violation); 730 ILCS 5/5—6—4(c) (West 1998) (at a probation revocation hearing, the State bears the burden of proof, and the defendant has the rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel); see People v. Bell, 296 Ill. | 4 | 5 |
People v. Kruszynagreen2 sentences1999A probation revocation hearing is not a proceeding in which guilt or innocence is determined; rather, "`[i]t takes place only after the defendant has already been convicted, sentenced to probation, and then has violated the conditions of the probation.'" Kruszyna, 245 Ill.App.3d at 980-81 , 185 Ill.Dec. 878 , 615 N.E.2d 748 , quoting People v. Allegri, 109 Ill.2d 309, 313 , 93 Ill.Dec. 781 , 487 N.E.2d 606 (1985). 1999A probation revocation hearing is not a proceeding in which guilt or innocence is determined; rather, "`[i]t takes place only after the defendant has already been convicted, sentenced to probation, and then has violated the conditions of the probation.'" Kruszyna, 245 Ill.App.3d at 980-81 , 185 Ill.Dec. 878 , 615 N.E.2d 748 , quoting People v. Allegri, 109 Ill.2d 309, 313 , 93 Ill.Dec. 781 , 487 N.E.2d 606 (1985). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Allegrigreen2 sentences2002In People v. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 313-14 (1985), we noted that a probation revocation hearing is not a proceeding at which guilt or innocence is to be determined; rather, it takes place “only after the defendant has already been convicted, sentenced to probation, and then has violated the conditions of the probation.” Furthermore, our appellate court has relied on Murphy and Gagnon to hold that probation revocation proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. 2002In People v. Allegri, 109 Ill.2d 309, 313-14 , 93 Ill.Dec. 781 , 487 N.E.2d 606 (1985), we noted that a probation revocation hearing is not a proceeding at which guilt or innocence is to be determined; rather, it takes place "only after the defendant has already been convicted, sentenced to probation, and then has violated the conditions of the probation." Furthermore, our appellate court has relied on Murphy and Gagnon to hold that probation revocation proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature. | 3 | 8 |
In Re JEMYgreen2 sentences2002App. 3d 389, 391 , 682 N.E.2d 451, 452 (1997), this court applied the Tufte holding to an admission to a probation violation and held that, following a probation revocation hearing, the filing of a motion to reconsider and compliance with the requirements of Rule 604(d) are unnecessary before taking an appeal. 1997App. 3d 389, 390-91 , 682 N.E.2d 451, 452 (1997), this court held the requirements of Rule 604(d) do not apply following a probation revocation hearing. | 3 | 3 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2001Ed. 2d 656, 664 , 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62 (1973), the United States Supreme Court outlined the minimum requirements of due process in a probation revocation hearing: (1) written notice of the claimed probation violation; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and present testimonial and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5) a neutral arbiter; and (6) a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reason for revoking probation. 2001Ed. 2d 656, 664 , 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1761-62 (1973), the United States Supreme Court outlined the minimum requirements of due process in a probation revocation hearing: (1) written notice of the claimed probation violation; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and present testimonial and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5) a neutral arbiter; and (6) a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reason for revoking probation. | 2 | 12 |
People v. Martingreen2 sentences2002In Martin, the appellate court concluded that the State may call a defendant to testify at a probation revocation hearing to elicit testimony which would show that the defendant had violated conditions of his probation, “but which would not incriminate him in any other proceedings.” Martin, 226 Ill. 2002In Martin , the appellate court concluded that the State may call a defendant to testify at a probation revocation hearing to elicit testimony which would show that the defendant had violated conditions of his probation, "but which would not incriminate him in any other proceedings." Martin, 226 Ill.App.3d at 759 , 168 Ill.Dec. 415 , 589 N.E.2d 815 . | 2 | 6 |
People v. Piergreen2 sentences2001We first addressed what due process means in this context in People v. Pier , 51 Ill. 2d 96 (1972). 2001We first addressed what due process means in this context in People v. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96 (1972). | 2 | 6 |
People v. Bonneygreen2 sentences2026However, at a probation revocation hearing, the court is “entitled to draw reasonable inferences and reach conclusions therefrom.” People v. Bonney, 251 Ill. 2023We conclude that the State’s evidence was adequate to establish the reasonableness of the notice. ¶ 36 At a probation revocation hearing, the trial court is “entitled to draw reasonable inferences and reach conclusions therefrom.” People v. Bonney, 251 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Colongreen2 sentences2025A challenge as to the sufficiency of the evidence at a probation revocation hearing “will succeed only if the trial court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 158 (2007) (citing People v. Houston, 118 Ill. 2d 194, 199 (1987); People v. Cooper, 66 Ill. 2d 509, 514 (1977); People v. Crowell, 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451-52 (1973)). “ ‘A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.’ ” People v. Colquitt, 2013 IL App 2022Because we have reversed McKinstry’s conviction in No. 15-CF-151, we also reverse the revocation of his conditional discharge in case No. 14-CF-33 and remand for further proceedings (see People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 155 (2007) (holding that “collateral estoppel does not preclude the State 10 from proceeding with a probation revocation hearing after a defendant has been acquitted of the substantive charge”). ¶ 31 III. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sherrodgreen2 sentences2023See People v. Sherrod, 279 Ill. 2022See id. | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Lipscombgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Price v. Georgiagreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Coxgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Dowerygreen2 sentences2008The Dowery court reached the same result, reasoning that society’s interest must be sufficiently considered during a probation revocation hearing and that, “[mjerely because there may exist a technical deficiency in police conduct, a trial court should not be forced to release a defendant and return him to a probationary status where there is patent evidence of a serious probation violation.” Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d at 206 . 2008The Dowery court reached the same result, reasoning that society's interest must be sufficiently considered during a probation revocation hearing and that, "[m]erely because there may exist a technical deficiency in police conduct, a trial court should not be forced to release a defendant and return him to a probationary status where there is patent evidence of a serious probation violation." Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d at 206 . | 1 | 10 |
People v. Petersongreen2 sentences1980This principle was applied in People v. Peterson (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 478 , 384 N.E.2d 348 , where the supreme court held that if a confession was, in fact, involuntary, it was not a “mere technical violation” as was the Miranda violation in Dowery and the confession should not be admissible at a probation revocation hearing. 1980This principle was applied in People v. Peterson (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 478 , 384 N.E.2d 348 , where the supreme court held that if a confession was, in fact, involuntary, it was not a “mere technical violation” as was the Miranda violation in Dowery and the confession should not be admissible at a probation revocation hearing. | 1 | 6 |
People v. Crowellgreen2 sentences2025A challenge as to the sufficiency of the evidence at a probation revocation hearing “will succeed only if the trial court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 158 (2007) (citing People v. Houston, 118 Ill. 2d 194, 199 (1987); People v. Cooper, 66 Ill. 2d 509, 514 (1977); People v. Crowell, 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451-52 (1973)). “ ‘A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.’ ” People v. Colquitt, 2013 IL App 1979Even if there had been no plea, there wás enough evidence to show guilt by a preponderance, as is required in a probation revocation hearing (People v. Crowell (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451 , 292 N.E.2d 721 ), and petitioner would have been imprisoned. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Dennisgreen2 sentences2020Dennis, 354 Ill. 2020App. 3d 491, 495 , 820 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (2004) (“As Hall in effect adopted the same admonition required by Rule 402 for admissions at a probation revocation hearing, it would seem logical that the case law that developed under [Rule 402], which requires substantial compliance, would apply to the mandate -9- of Hall ***.”). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Tuftegreen2 sentences1997This court affirmed, finding that under People v. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d 66 , 649 N.E.2d 374 (1995), an admission during a probation revocation hearing is not the same as a guilty plea and, therefore, compliance with Rules 605(b) and 604(d) is unnecessary. 1997This court affirmed, finding that under People v. Tufte, 165 Ill. 2d 66 , 649 N.E.2d 374 (1995), an admission during a probation revocation hearing is not the same as a guilty plea and, therefore, compliance with Rules 605(b) and 604(d) is unnecessary. | 1 | 2 |
| In Re DTgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. DeWittgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Minnesota v. Murphygreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Voightgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Bazydlo v. Volantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Currygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Houstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Coopergreen | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. Currygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Acevedogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Belvin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Barkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. SHARIFPOURgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Merrittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McConnell v. Rhay
green
2 sentences2002See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 90 S.Ct. 1757 , 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970): rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States; McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 , 89 S.Ct. 32 , 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968): rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 , 89 S.Ct. 35 , 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968): rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968): rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty; Jackson v. Denno, 378 2002See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 90 S.Ct. 1757 , 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970): rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States; McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 , 89 S.Ct. 32 , 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968): rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 , 89 S.Ct. 35 , 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968): rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968): rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty; Jackson v. Denno, 378 | 4 | 2000–2002 |
Arsenault v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2002See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 90 S.Ct. 1757 , 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970): rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States; McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 , 89 S.Ct. 32 , 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968): rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 , 89 S.Ct. 35 , 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968): rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968): rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty; Jackson v. Denno, 378 2002See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 90 S.Ct. 1757 , 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970): rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States; McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 , 89 S.Ct. 32 , 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968): rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 , 89 S.Ct. 35 , 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968): rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968): rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty; Jackson v. Denno, 378 | 4 | 2000–2002 |
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2002See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 90 S.Ct. 1757 , 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970): rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States; McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 , 89 S.Ct. 32 , 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968): rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 , 89 S.Ct. 35 , 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968): rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968): rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty; Jackson v. Denno, 378 2002See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 90 S.Ct. 1757 , 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970): rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States; McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 , 89 S.Ct. 32 , 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968): rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 , 89 S.Ct. 35 , 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968): rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968): rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty; Jackson v. Denno, 378 | 4 | 2000–2002 |
In Re NW
green
2 sentences2001In re N.W. , 293 Ill. 2001In re N.W., 293 Ill. | 4 | 1999–2001 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1985Ed. 2d 484, 493-94 , 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2599-2600 .) The Supreme Court has held that “minimum requirements of due process” apply to a probation revocation hearing. 1975A defendant is entitled to “due process of law” at a probation revocation hearing (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 ), but not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kinds of procedures (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ). | 4 | 1975–1991 |
People v. Beard
green
2 sentences1976If he fails to meet the imposed standards and this is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the probation may be revoked. ( People v. Crowell (1973), 53 Ill.2d 447 , 292 N.E.2d 721 .) A probation revocation hearing is qualitatively different from a criminal trial and not every right in a criminal trial is extended to probation revocation hearings. ( People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill.2d 220 , 319 N.E.2d 745 .) The right to be found guilty of a probation violation beyond a *277 reasonable doubt is expressly not extended by section 5-6-4(c). 1976If he fails to meet the imposed standards and this is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the probation may be revoked. ( People v. Crowell (1973), 53 Ill.2d 447 , 292 N.E.2d 721 .) A probation revocation hearing is qualitatively different from a criminal trial and not every right in a criminal trial is extended to probation revocation hearings. ( People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill.2d 220 , 319 N.E.2d 745 .) The right to be found guilty of a probation violation beyond a *277 reasonable doubt is expressly not extended by section 5-6-4(c). | 4 | 1975–1991 |
People v. Hall
green
2 sentences1997When a defendant challenges a trial court’s decision to hold a probation revocation hearing in his absence, "[t]he issue then becomes whether defendant voluntarily waived his right to be present.” People v. Hall, 134 Ill. 1989App. 3d at 841-42 , 480 N.E.2d at 1390-91 .) The focus in such a case “becomes whether defendant voluntarily waived his right to be present by failing to appear at the probation revocation hearing.” (Hall, 134 Ill. | 3 | 1988–1997 |
People v. Kondo
green
2 sentences1990In People v. Kondo (1977), 51 Ill. 1990In People v. Kondo (1977), 51 Ill. | 3 | 1979–1990 |
People v. Huff
green
2 sentences1977(People v. Beard (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 220 , 319 N.E.2d 745 ; People v. Huff (4th Dist. 1976), 44 Ill. 1977(See People v. Huff (1976), 44 Ill. | 3 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Kostaken
green
2 sentences1974In People v. Kostaken, 16 Ill.App.2d 395 , 148 N.E.2d 615 , where it was contended on appeal from an order revoking probation that defendant had been placed in double jeopardy, the court held that one who is on probation is not in the same category as one charged by information or indictment. 1974In People v. Kostaken, 16 Ill.App.2d 395 , 148 N.E.2d 615 , where it was contended on appeal from an order revoking probation that defendant had been placed in double jeopardy, the court held that one who is on probation is not in the same category as one charged by information or indictment. | 3 | 1969–1974 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences2008In People v. Brown, 171 Ill. 2008In People v. Brown, 171 Ill. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences2008Shortly after defendant’s probation was revoked, we reversed defendant’s 2005 convictions and sent the case back for a new trial in People v. Allen, 376 Ill. 2008Shortly after defendant’s probation was revoked, we reversed defendant’s 2005 convictions and sent the case back for a new trial in People v. Allen, 376 Ill. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| In Re A.V. green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Motta green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Porter green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Village of Algonquin v. Tilden green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Griffin v. Illinois green | 2 | 2000–2002 |
| Hamilton v. Alabama green | 2 | 2000–2002 |
| Douglas v. California green | 2 | 2000–2002 |
| Gideon v. Wainwright green | 2 | 2000–2002 |
| Jackson v. Denno green | 2 | 2000–2002 |
| People v. Steele green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| In re Marriage of Betts green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Turner green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Bedenkop green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Walsh green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Yantis green | 2 | 1992–1996 |
| Arizona v. Fulminante green | 2 | 1991–1993 |
| People v. Williams green | 2 | 1978–1992 |
| People v. Myles green | 2 | 1983–1986 |
| The People v. Hessenauer green | 2 | 1981–1985 |
| People v. Howell green | 2 | 1978–1980 |
| People v. Armstrong green | 2 | 1974–1977 |
| People v. Price green | 2 | 1969–1973 |
| People v. Bryan neutral | 2 | 1973–1973 |
| People v. Sturdivant green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Colquitt green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Gregory green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Ellis green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Fields green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.