121 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1963–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. McKnightgreen2 sentences2000State v. Bernard (Sept. 27, 1990), Paulding App. No. 11-89-17, unreported; State v. Setler (Sept. 25, 1998), Lake App. No. 97-L-214, unreported; State v. McNight (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 312 , 313 . 1999See also State v. McKnight (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 312 , 314 , and State v. Avery (February 12, 1998), Union App. No. 14-98-28, unreported. 2 The former version of the statute allows the penalty enhancement only if "there has been a court finding" that the offender failed to support for that period. | 3 | 4 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2025Therefore, the question of defendant’s competency may be raised and “the decision whether to hold such hearing must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. “[A] defendant shall be presumed competent unless the issue is raised before or during a probation revocation hearing and there is demonstrated a substantial basis for the suggestion of incompetency.” Id.; State v. Holman, 2014-Ohio-3908, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.) (“in a probation hearing, a defendant has a due process right to a competency hearing when there is a substantial basis for the suggestion that appellant is incompetent”). 2024Erie No. E-05- 052, 2006-Ohio-2353, ¶ 21 . {¶ 9} Nevertheless, “probation-revocation proceedings are subject to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution." Id. at ¶ 20, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). “[T]he admission of hearsay evidence at a probation-revocation hearing can compromise the probationer’s due process right to confront adverse witnesses * * *.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 37 , 601 N.E.2d 61 (10th Dist.1991). | 2 | 34 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2020(Tr. 58.) A probation revocation hearing is not a formal criminal trial but is “‘an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a * * * [probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the * * * [probationer’s] behavior.’” State v. Hylton, 75 Ohio App.3d 778, 781 , 600 N.E.2d 821 (4th Dist.1991), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 2020(Tr. 58.) A probation revocation hearing is not a formal criminal trial but is “‘an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a * * * [probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the * * * [probationer’s] behavior.’” State v. Hylton, 75 Ohio App.3d 778, 781 , 600 N.E.2d 821 (4th Dist.1991), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). | 2 | 22 |
City of Columbus v. Bickelgreen2 sentences2026R. 101(D)(3). “‘The rationale for the exception is that, since a probation revocation hearing is an informal proceeding, not a criminal trial, the trier of fact should be able to consider any reliable and relevant evidence to determine whether the probationer has violated the conditions of his probation.’” State v. Ryan, 2007-Ohio-4743, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 36 (10th Dist. 1991). 2024Erie No. E-05- 052, 2006-Ohio-2353, ¶ 21 . {¶ 9} Nevertheless, “probation-revocation proceedings are subject to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution." Id. at ¶ 20, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). “[T]he admission of hearsay evidence at a probation-revocation hearing can compromise the probationer’s due process right to confront adverse witnesses * * *.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 37 , 601 N.E.2d 61 (10th Dist.1991). | 2 | 11 |
State v. Hyltongreen2 sentences2024Hinzman’s due process rights that shall be observed at the probation revocation hearing are as follows: ‘“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses . . . ; (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body . . . ; and, (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole . . . .’” Reese, 2020(Tr. 58.) A probation revocation hearing is not a formal criminal trial but is “‘an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a * * * [probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the * * * [probationer’s] behavior.’” State v. Hylton, 75 Ohio App.3d 778, 781 , 600 N.E.2d 821 (4th Dist.1991), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). | 2 | 9 |
Wood v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1997In support of his argument, appellant cites Wood v. Georgia (1981), 450 U.S. 261, 272 , 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1104 , 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 231, fn. 18 , where the court stated that the United States Constitution “mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it ‘knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In Wood , the trial court failed to inquire into a possible conflict of interest after the court was alerted to its potential during a probation revocation hearing. 1997In support of his argument, appellant cites Wood v. Georgia (1981), 450 U.S. 261, 272 , 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1104 , 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 231, fn. 18 , where the court stated that the United States Constitution “mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it ‘knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In Wood , the trial court failed to inquire into a possible conflict of interest after the court was alerted to its potential during a probation revocation hearing. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Patton, Unpublished Decision (3-22-2007)green2 sentences2025“Other courts have assumed that contempt proceedings could be used in such cases.” Patton at ¶ 11, citing State v. Daugherty, 2006-Ohio-240, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.) (“While Daugherty claims that the appropriate course of action for the court was to consider revocation of probation under Crim.R. 32.2, we do not understand him to argue that this was the only course open to the court. 2021Franklin No. 06AP-665, 2007-Ohio-1296, ¶ 12 (“Unquestionably, the preferred method for dealing with [violations of community control sanctions] would be the institution of revocation proceedings,” but courts have broad authority to use contempt in those actions as well.). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ohlygreen2 sentences2026“Nevertheless, the admission of hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hearing can compromise the probationer's due process right to confront adverse witnesses…” Ohly, 2006-Ohio-2353, at ¶ 21 . 2024Erie No. E-05- 052, 2006-Ohio-2353, ¶ 21 . {¶ 9} Nevertheless, “probation-revocation proceedings are subject to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution." Id. at ¶ 20, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). “[T]he admission of hearsay evidence at a probation-revocation hearing can compromise the probationer’s due process right to confront adverse witnesses * * *.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 37 , 601 N.E.2d 61 (10th Dist.1991). | 1 | 8 |
In re L.A.B.green2 sentences2018R. 34(C), been notified." {¶ 47} The Ohio Supreme Court held in In re L.A.B. , 121 Ohio St.3d 112 , 2009-Ohio-354 , 902 N.E.2d 471 , ¶ 49 that "[s]ince a probation revocation hearing may result in a finding that the juvenile has violated a court order and is delinquent, a probation hearing qualifies as an adjudicatory hearing under the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure." Juv.R. 29, therefore, applies to probation revocation hearings. 2018R. 34(C), been notified." {¶ 47} The Ohio Supreme Court held in In re L.A.B. , 121 Ohio St.3d 112 , 2009-Ohio-354 , 902 N.E.2d 471 , ¶ 49 that "[s]ince a probation revocation hearing may result in a finding that the juvenile has violated a court order and is delinquent, a probation hearing qualifies as an adjudicatory hearing under the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure." Juv.R. 29, therefore, applies to probation revocation hearings. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Holmangreen2 sentences2025Therefore, the question of defendant’s competency may be raised and “the decision whether to hold such hearing must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. “[A] defendant shall be presumed competent unless the issue is raised before or during a probation revocation hearing and there is demonstrated a substantial basis for the suggestion of incompetency.” Id.; State v. Holman, 2014-Ohio-3908, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.) (“in a probation hearing, a defendant has a due process right to a competency hearing when there is a substantial basis for the suggestion that appellant is incompetent”). 2025Therefore, the question of defendant's competency may be raised and “the decision whether to hold such hearing must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. “[A] defendant shall be presumed competent unless the issue is raised before or during a probation revocation hearing and there is demonstrated a substantial basis for the suggestion of incompetency.” Id.; State v. Holman, 2014-Ohio-3908, ¶ 8 , 2014 WL 4460347 (8th Dist.) (“in a probation hearing, a defendant has a due process right to a competency hearing when there is a substantial basis for the suggestion that appellant is incompetent”). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sallaz, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2004)green2 sentences2024At the June 5, 2023 show cause hearing the judge specifically Case No. 23 CO 0054 –8– asked him: "And are you asking the Court to appoint counsel to represent you?" (6/5/23 Tr., p. 2.) Appellant answered: "I have." (6/5/23 Tr., p. 2.) The court found Appellant was indigent and appointed counsel at the start of the hearing. {¶14} "The probation revocation hearing is not a criminal trial but an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a probation violation will be grounded on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by accurate knowledge of the probati 2019Trumbull No. 2003-T-0009, 2004-Ohio-3508, ¶ 46-47 . (finding that the “court was under no duty to continue the probation revocation hearing until the [pending new] DUS charge was resolved”). | 1 | 2 |
Mempa v. Rhaygreen2 sentences2014See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). 2014See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 , 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ryan, 14-06-55 (9-17-2007)green1 sentence2026R. 101(D)(3). “‘The rationale for the exception is that, since a probation revocation hearing is an informal proceeding, not a criminal trial, the trier of fact should be able to consider any reliable and relevant evidence to determine whether the probationer has violated the conditions of his probation.’” State v. Ryan, 2007-Ohio-4743, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 36 (10th Dist. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Daughertygreen1 sentence2025“Other courts have assumed that contempt proceedings could be used in such cases.” Patton at ¶ 11, citing State v. Daugherty, 2006-Ohio-240, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.) (“While Daugherty claims that the appropriate course of action for the court was to consider revocation of probation under Crim.R. 32.2, we do not understand him to argue that this was the only course open to the court. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lofton, 89572 (6-19-2008)green1 sentence2024See also State v. Lofton, 2008-Ohio-3015 (8th Dist.). {¶29} In further support of his contention, Hinzman also cited Crim.R. 32.1, which provide, in part: “At the time of imposing sentence, the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and address the defendant personally and ask if he or she wishes to make a statement in his or her own behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment.” The record reflects that the trial court questioned numerous times if Hinzman wanted to testify on his own behalf or speak to the court. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Selfgreen1 sentence2023The similar provisions of Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution “provide[ ] no greater -5- Case No. 6-23-01 right of confrontation than the Sixth Amendment * * *.” State v. Self, 56 Ohio St.3d 73, 79 (1990). {¶11} However, Evid.R. 101(D)(3) expressly provides that the rules of evidence do not apply to “proceedings with respect to community control sanctions.” “A probation revocation hearing is not a formal criminal trial but is ‘“an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a * * * [probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretio | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Paynegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McCantsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Estep, Unpublished Decision (3-31-2004)green | 1 | 1 |
| Defiance v. Cannongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Belcher, Unpublished Decision (8-7-2007)green | 1 | 1 |
| In re L.A.B.green | 1 | 1 |
| Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Frendengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Weavergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2018Where at a probation revocation hearing the trial court permits a probation officer who did not prepare the entries in the probation department record to testify as to the contents of that record and the probation officer who prepared the entries does not appear, there is a denial of the probationer's right to confront the witnesses against him, and, where the record does not show that the probation officer who prepared the entries was unavailable or that a specific finding was made of good cause for not allowing confrontation , there is a denial of the minimum requirements of due process of l 2018Where at a probation revocation hearing the trial court permits a probation officer who did not prepare the entries in the probation department record to testify as to the contents of that record and the probation officer who prepared the entries does not appear, there is a denial of the probationer's right to confront the witnesses against him, and, where the record does not show that the probation officer who prepared the entries was unavailable or that a specific finding was made of good cause for not allowing confrontation , there is a denial of the minimum requirements of due process of l | 16 | 1984–2018 |
State v. Qualls
green
2 sentences2025Therefore, the question of defendant's competency may be raised and “the decision whether to hold such hearing must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. “[A] defendant shall be presumed competent unless the issue is raised before or during a probation revocation hearing and there is demonstrated a substantial basis for the suggestion of incompetency.” Id.; State v. Holman, 2014-Ohio-3908, ¶ 8 , 2014 WL 4460347 (8th Dist.) (“in a probation hearing, a defendant has a due process right to a competency hearing when there is a substantial basis for the suggestion that appellant is incompetent”). 2015C-110445 and C-110446, 2012-Ohio-1603, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. Qualls, 50 Ohio App.3d 56, 60 , 552 N.E.2d 957 (10th Dist.1988) (“insanity is not a complete defense in a probation revocation hearing but is a mitigating factor which a court should consider when the issue is timely raised”). {¶46} In the present case, the trial court duly considered Payne’s mental health issues: 15 I think that the evidence before the court frankly does show exactly what’s been suggested, that although the defendant probably does have some depression and other issues, that she’s a manipulative person and is seeki | 7 | 1990–2025 |
City of Columbus v. Lacy
green
2 sentences2007He cites State v. Gullet , Muskingum App. No. CT2006-0010, 2006-Ohio-6564 , and Columbus v. Lacy (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 161 , 546 N.E.2d 445 , for the proposition that at "a probation revocation hearing, due process requires the direct testimony of the probation officer who prepared the defendant's statement of probation violation unless the record shows good cause for the officer's absence from the hearing." Gullet , 2006-Ohio-6564 , at ¶ 30 . {¶ 8} The cases cited by Ault address a defendant's constitutional right to confront the probation officer who prepared the violation charges. 2007He cites State v. Gullet , Muskingum App. No. CT2006-0010, 2006-Ohio-6564 , and Columbus v. Lacy (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 161 , 546 N.E.2d 445 , for the proposition that at "a probation revocation hearing, due process requires the direct testimony of the probation officer who prepared the defendant's statement of probation violation unless the record shows good cause for the officer's absence from the hearing." Gullet , 2006-Ohio-6564 , at ¶ 30 . {¶ 8} The cases cited by Ault address a defendant's constitutional right to confront the probation officer who prepared the violation charges. | 4 | 2003–2007 |
State v. Adams
green
2 sentences2017State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶10} The state's burden at a probation revocation hearing is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 2017State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶10} The state's burden at a probation revocation hearing is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. | 3 | 2013–2017 |
State v. Delaney
green
2 sentences2006To accord proper due process, a probation revocation hearing must contain: "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses * * *; (e) a `neutral and detached' hearing body * * *; and (f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole." Id. at 786 . {¶ 13} Where a trial judge directs or 2006To accord proper due process, a probation revocation hearing must contain: "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses * * *; (e) a `neutral and detached' hearing body * * *; and (f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole." Id. at 786 . {¶ 13} Where a trial judge directs or | 3 | 2000–2006 |
State v. Reese
green
2 sentences2024Hinzman’s due process rights that shall be observed at the probation revocation hearing are as follows: ‘“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses . . . ; (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body . . . ; and, (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole . . . .’” Reese, 2023Cuyahoga No. 109055, 2020-Ohio-4747, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. Hylton, 75 Ohio App.3d 778, 781 (4th Dist.1991), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972). {¶12} Nonetheless, “[a] defendant charged with violating community control and facing imprisonment is entitled to due process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. Theisen, 4th Dist. | 2 | 2023–2024 |
State v. Gibson
green
2 sentences2018Portage No. 2013-P-0047, 2014-Ohio-433 , 2014 WL 530242 , concluded "there is no right of allocution at a probation revocation hearing." Id. at ¶ 40 ; see also State v. Payne , 2015-Ohio-5073 , 53 N.E.3d 872 , ¶ 34 (relying on Gibson , this court again held an offender has no right to allocution at a revocation hearing). 2015Portage No. 2013- P-0047, 2014-Ohio-433 , this court found “there is no right of allocution at a probation revocation hearing.” Id. at ¶40. | 2 | 2015–2018 |
State v. Partin, 07 Ca 104 (8-1-2008)
neutral
2 sentences2011Although a probationer's right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at a probation revocation hearing is not absolute, that right is preserved by the fourth requirement of Gagnon [v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778 ], supra, unless the sentencing court specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation." {¶16} In State v. Partin, Richland App. No. 07CA104, 2008-Ohio-3904, ¶14 , this court stated, "[t]he admission of hearsay evidence into a probation revocation hearing can only be construed as reversible error when it constituted the sole, crucial evidence in support of 2011Although a probationer's right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at a probation revocation hearing is not absolute, that right is preserved by the fourth requirement of Gagnon [v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778 ], supra, unless the sentencing court specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation." {¶16} In State v. Partin, Richland App. No. 07CA104, 2008-Ohio-3904, ¶14 , this court stated, "[t]he admission of hearsay evidence into a probation revocation hearing can only be construed as reversible error when it constituted the sole, crucial evidence in support of | 2 | 2009–2011 |
State v. Mingua
green
2 sentences2007Id. at *3, citing Columbus v. Bickel (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 26 , 33-34 , 601 N.E.2d 61 , citing State v. Mingua (1974), 42 Ohio App.2d 35 , 40 , 71 O.O.2d 234, 327 N.E.2d 791 . *Page 8 {¶ 19} We acknowledge that it is not the best practice to hold a probation revocation hearing before a jury trial on charges that serve as a basis for the probation violation and/or the decision to revoke probation. 2007Id. at *3, citing Columbus v. Bickel (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 26 , 33-34 , 601 N.E.2d 61 , citing State v. Mingua (1974), 42 Ohio App.2d 35 , 40 , 71 O.O.2d 234, 327 N.E.2d 791 . *Page 8 {¶ 19} We acknowledge that it is not the best practice to hold a probation revocation hearing before a jury trial on charges that serve as a basis for the probation violation and/or the decision to revoke probation. | 2 | 1999–2007 |
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2006(This has become known as a Brooks violation, under State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , 814 N.E.2d 837 .) The Supreme Court recognized in Fraley that when a convicted felon was given a probation-revocation hearing, the hearing was, in substance, a new sentencing at which the earlier Brooks violation could be corrected. {¶ 13} Fraley allowed multiple sentencing hearings. 2006(This has become known as a Brooks violation, under State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134 , 2004-Ohio-4746 , 814 N.E.2d 837 .) The Supreme Court recognized in Fraley that when a convicted felon was given a probation-revocation hearing, the hearing was, in substance, a new sentencing at which the earlier Brooks violation could be corrected. {¶ 13} Fraley allowed multiple sentencing hearings. | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Bearden v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2003Specifically, Schlecht claims that a defense to probation revocation exists where a probationer cannot comply with probation conditions for reasons other than a threat to public safety. {¶ 12} In Qualls , the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that "insanity is not a complete defense in a probation revocation hearing but is a mitigating factor which a court should consider when the issue is timely raised." Id. at 60 , following the reasoning in Knight v. Estelle (C.A. 5, 1974), 501 F.2d 963 , and Bearden v. Georgia (1983), 461 U.S. 660 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 , 762 L.Ed.2d 221 . 2003Specifically, Schlecht claims that a defense to probation revocation exists where a probationer cannot comply with probation conditions for reasons other than a threat to public safety. {¶ 12} In Qualls , the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that "insanity is not a complete defense in a probation revocation hearing but is a mitigating factor which a court should consider when the issue is timely raised." Id. at 60 , following the reasoning in Knight v. Estelle (C.A. 5, 1974), 501 F.2d 963 , and Bearden v. Georgia (1983), 461 U.S. 660 , 103 S.Ct. 2064 , 762 L.Ed.2d 221 . | 2 | 1988–2003 |
State v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences2000Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778 ; United States v. Johnson (1972), 455 F.2d 932 ; State v. Ferguson (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 714 . 1996Ferguson, supra, 72 Ohio App.3d at 717 , 595 N.E.2d at 1013-1014 . | 2 | 1996–2000 |
In Re Zilba
green
2 sentences2000State v. Thomason (Feb. 23, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67012, unreported; cf., In re Zilba (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 258 . 1999Cf. In re Zilba (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 258 . | 2 | 1999–2000 |
State v. Bell
green
1 sentence2025The Bell court also noted that Qualls held that “a trial court may revoke probation even when the violation of a probation condition was beyond the control of the defendant (such as insanity) because there remains a threat to the safety and welfare of society.” Id. at 56 . “ ‘[I]nsanity is not a complete defense in a probation revocation hearing but is a mitigating factor which a court should consider when the issue is timely raised.’ ” Bell at 56 , quoting Qualls at 60 . {¶18} Thus, the issue presented in Bell is distinguishable from the issue Howard presents on appeal because in Bell, the tr | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Jacob Egerstaffer, Cross-Appellant v. Thomas Israel, Cross-Appellee green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Ohio v. Tims green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In Re D.S. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Bailey v. State green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Blanks v. State green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Castellini neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Harian neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Lester green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Thompson, Wd-06-034 (6-1-2007) neutral | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Miller neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Adkins, 21810 (9-21-2007) green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Wolfson, Unpublished Decision (5-25-2004) green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Bradley green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Picklesimer, 06-Ca-118 (10-26-2007) neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Michaels green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| In re C.S. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Tumey v. Ohio green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Woods v. Telb green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Ramey green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| In Re Motley green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Ferranto green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Woods v. Telb green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Jordan green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Herring, Unpublished Decision (10-31-2005) green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.