28 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Songer v. Stategreen2 sentences2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) ("When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing."); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) ("[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty."); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) ("When a probationer violat 2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) ("When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing."); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) ("[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty."); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) ("When a probationer violat | 3 | 3 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) ("When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing."); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) ("[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty."); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) ("When a probationer violat 2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) ("When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing."); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) ("[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty."); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) ("When a probationer violat | 3 | 3 |
Alfred v. Stategreen2 sentences2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) (“When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing.”); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) (“[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty.”); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) (“When a probationer violat 2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) ("When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing."); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) ("[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty."); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) ("When a probationer violat | 3 | 3 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) ("When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing."); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) ("[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty."); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) ("When a probationer violat 2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) ("When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing."); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) ("[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty."); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) ("When a probationer violat | 3 | 3 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) (“When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing.”); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) (“[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty.”); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) (“When a probationer violat 2010E.g., Alfred v. State, 758 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska Ct.App. 1988) ("When a defendant violates a condition of probation, we believe that fairness requires that the court adhere to the terms of its agreement, and conduct a probation revocation hearing, not a contempt hearing."); Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C.1989) ("[T]he only appropriate sanction [for a violation of probation] is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty."); Williams v. State, 72 Md.App. 233 , 528 A.2d 507, 508 (1987) ("When a probationer violat | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences2023Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780 . 2023The first step in analyzing a probation revocation claim is to determine whether the trial court properly considered KRS 439.3106(1) before revoking the defendant’s probation. [Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014)]. | 1 | 5 |
Hunt v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2021Hunt, 326 S.W.3d at 439 . 2019In that case, rather than requiring the Commonwealth to prove its case, the trial court placed the burden on the defendant to show cause why his probation should not be revoked. 326 S.W.3d at 440 . | 1 | 3 |
Hornal v. Kentucky Bar Ass'ngreen1 sentence2026Commonwealth v. Lopez, 292 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Ky. 2009). 1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -9- In the case sub judice, the trial court clearly considered an array of factors and explicitly considered the criteria set forth in KRS 439.3106. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024“A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Ky. App. 2002) (noting that due process affords a defendant at a probation revocation hearing the right to, among other things “be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Romanogreen1 sentence2019Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985), a probation revocation case, also cites Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 , stating “[T]he probationer has a right to the assistance of counsel in some circumstances.” 32 In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 498 (1980), Justice Powell’s concurring opinion succinctly recounted Gagnon’s holding as follows: We noted that probationers would not always need counsel because in most hearings the essential facts are undisputed. | 1 | 1 |
Vitek v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2019Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985), a probation revocation case, also cites Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 , stating “[T]he probationer has a right to the assistance of counsel in some circumstances.” 32 In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 498 (1980), Justice Powell’s concurring opinion succinctly recounted Gagnon’s holding as follows: We noted that probationers would not always need counsel because in most hearings the essential facts are undisputed. | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. Harpergreen1 sentence2012Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 111 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ky.1989) (5-2 decision) (J. | 1 | 1 |
AW v. Com.green2 sentences2010A.W. v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 4, 8-9 (Ky.2005) (Cooper, J., dissenting). 2010A.W. v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 4, 8-9 (Ky.2005) (Cooper, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jess Farmergreen1 sentence1979See also United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences2019As described in Gagnon, a constitutional right to counsel presumptively arises when the petitioner raises a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. 411 U.S. at 790 . imprisonment does not ordinarily have a right to counsel at a probation revoc 2010RECORDED ORAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND REASONS FOR REVOCATION ARE SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS UNDER MORRISSEY In Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , and Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756 , the United States Supreme Court set out the minimum requirements of due process that must be afforded a defendant at a probation revocation hearing. | 3 | 2001–2019 |
Sullivan v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2026His first argument is that the court denied “his due process and confrontation rights by allowing multiple layers of unreliable hearsay to be the basis for revoking his probation.” We begin our analysis by reference to Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.3d 260 (Ky. App. 2015), which ably sets forth the procedures underlying a probation revocation hearing: This court’s standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s probation is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. . . . 2026We begin our analysis by citing Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.3d 260 (Ky. App. 2015), which ably sets forth the procedures underlying a probation revocation hearing: This court’s standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s probation is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. . . . | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Tapp
green
2 sentences2022Id. (citing KRS 533.020(4)) (“A probationer is entitled to due process protections, one of which is a ‘duly entered court order.’”).7 Thus, here, to extend the probationary period – so as to postpone Barbour’s automatic discharge – the trial court needed to enter an order stating it was extending “the probationary period for a reasonable time until a probation revocation hearing could occur.” Id. at 242 (citing KRS 533.020(4)). 2022Id. (citing KRS 533.020(4)) (“A probationer is entitled to due process protections, one of which is a ‘duly entered court order.’”).7 Thus, here, to extend the probationary period – so as to postpone Barbour’s automatic discharge – the trial court needed to enter an order stating it was extending “the probationary period for a reasonable time until a probation revocation hearing could occur.” Id. at 242 (citing KRS 533.020(4)). | 2 | 2022–2025 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2024Even if counsel were deficient for failing to introduce the above documents into evidence at the probation revocation hearing, we do not believe that Nikolov has demonstrated prejudice as required by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . 2024Even if counsel were deficient for failing to introduce the above documents into evidence at the probation revocation hearing, we do not believe that Nikolov has demonstrated prejudice as required by Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Helms v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 640 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Small v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 61 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Whitcomb v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 419 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kiser v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2022Bentley argued under Kiser v. Commonwealth, 829 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. App. 1992), the 90 days to revoke starts at the time the Commonwealth moved to revoke his probation, and if probation is not revoked during that period, it must run concurrent with the new charges. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Marshall v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2015Marshall, 638 S.W.2d at 289 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Messer v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2012See Hunt, 326 S.W.3d at 439-40 ; Messer, 754 S.W.2d at 874 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Donald E. Ryan v. State of Montana
green
1 sentence2012Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.1978), holds that a state is not required, under the federal constitution, to grant immunity from the use of the probationer’s testimony at a probation revocation hearing. . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences2010RECORDED ORAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND REASONS FOR REVOCATION ARE SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS UNDER MORRISSEY In Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , and Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756 , the United States Supreme Court set out the minimum requirements of due process that must be afforded a defendant at a probation revocation hearing. 2010RECORDED ORAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND REASONS FOR REVOCATION ARE SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS UNDER MORRISSEY In Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , and Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756 , the United States Supreme Court set out the minimum requirements of due process that must be afforded a defendant at a probation revocation hearing. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Delago
green
1 sentence1979In United States v. Delago, 397 F.Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y.1974), that court held, under a similar fact situation, that the failure to advise the probationer of his Miranda rights had no bearing upon the admissibility of the statements in a subsequent probation revocation hearing. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.