probation revocation hearing in California

2026DISCUSSION Whiteside contends the superior court erred in relying on statements she made at her parole hearing because, according to Whiteside, those statements “should not be admissible as substantive evidence of guilt at a subsequent criminal proceeding, including an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).” She relies on People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), where the Supreme Court held testimony by a probationer at a probation revocation hearing “is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges” (id

2026Turning to the merits, “[i]n Coleman, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant’s testimony at a probation revocation proceeding was inadmissible against him at a later trial to prove guilt on the related criminal charges. ( Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 889-890.) The court reasoned that a defendant should not be forced to choose between the privilege against self-incrimination at trial and the right to be heard at a probation revocation hearing.

2024(Id. at p. 164, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 786 ; Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 489 .) “ ‘[C]onventional substitutes for live testimony’ ” that would not be admissible in a criminal trial—such as letters, affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence—may be admissible in a probation revocation hearing.

2023The probationer or parolee’s concern is ‘to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the [People’s] to make certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community.’ ” (Winson, at p. 715.) A defendant during a probation revocation hearing has no Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.3 (See U.S. Const., 6th Amend. [“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him” (italics added)].) But due process principles p

2024(See Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1201–1202 [witness’s live testimony of out-of-court statements is a form of testimonial hearsay and good cause standard applies]; Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1159, 1160 [a showing of good cause is required before admitting hearsay at a probation revocation hearing].) The hearsay statements here are like those in Miller and Shepherd, which also concerned live testimony regarding a witness’s out-of-court statements.

2023(Ibid.) As previously noted, the Courts of Appeal are divided on the question of whether a showing of good cause for not allowing confrontation (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489 ; Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 786 ) and application of Arreola’s balancing test (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1160 ) are required before statements that come within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule may be admitted at a probation revocation hearing.

2024(Id. at p. 164, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 786 ; Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 489 .) “ ‘[C]onventional substitutes for live testimony’ ” that would not be admissible in a criminal trial—such as letters, affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence—may be admissible in a probation revocation hearing.

2023(Ibid.) As previously noted, the Courts of Appeal are divided on the question of whether a showing of good cause for not allowing confrontation (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 489 ; Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 786 ) and application of Arreola’s balancing test (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1160 ) are required before statements that come within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule may be admitted at a probation revocation hearing.

2026Applicable Law and Standard of Review In conducting a probation revocation hearing, a trial court exercises its discretion to “ ‘revoke and terminate the supervision of the person if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation or parole officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of their supervision, or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless of whether the person has been prosecuted for those offenses.’ ” (People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152 , 163, quoting § 1203.2, subd.

2023More lenient rules of evidence apply than at criminal trials [citation], and the facts supporting revocation need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Monette (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1575 .) “‘[T]he standard of proof used in a criminal trial, namely the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard . . . [,] is inapplicable to the probation revocation hearing. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 445 .) 1.

2023The probationer or parolee’s concern is ‘to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the [People’s] to make certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community.’ ” (Winson, at p. 715.) A defendant during a probation revocation hearing has no Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.3 (See U.S. Const., 6th Amend. [“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him” (italics added)].) But due process principles p

2023This court first addressed the admissibility of hearsay evidence in a probation revocation hearing in Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d 711 .

2023Burks appears to argue that a dismissal of charges or allegations at a preliminary hearing may become a final finding and thereby “bar future 14 prosecution if the state does not timely contest them.” He cites to Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335 , in which the California Supreme Court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar a prosecution for indecent exposure after the People failed to appeal the lower court’s finding that insufficient evidence of that charge had been presented at a probation revocation hearing.

2016A. Lucido v. Superior Court In Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d 335 , the Supreme Court held that a determination following a probation revocation hearing had no preclusive effect on a subsequent criminal trial based on the same charges.

2025(See, e.g., Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 709 [addressing whether car rental invoice and hotel receipt, both of which were present and examined at the probation revocation hearing, were admissible documentary hearsay]; O’Connell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [discussing admissibility of drug treatment program report which stated defendant had been terminated from the program due to “ ‘Too Many Absences’ ”]; People v. Gomez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028 , 1038−1039 [evaluating admissibility of probation report reviewed by the trial court which indicated defendant had failed to report to proba

2025(See, e.g., Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 709 [addressing whether car rental invoice and hotel receipt, both of which were present and examined at the probation revocation hearing, were admissible documentary hearsay]; O’Connell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [discussing admissibility of drug treatment program report which stated defendant had been terminated from the program due to “ ‘Too Many Absences’ ”]; People v. Gomez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028 , 1038−1039 [evaluating admissibility of probation report reviewed by the trial court which indicated defendant had failed to report to proba

2025(See, e.g., Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 709 [addressing whether car rental invoice and hotel receipt, both of which were present and examined at the probation revocation hearing, were admissible documentary hearsay]; O’Connell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [discussing admissibility of drug treatment program report which stated defendant had been terminated from the program due to “ ‘Too Many Absences’ ”]; People v. Gomez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028 , 1038−1039 [evaluating admissibility of probation report reviewed by the trial court which indicated defendant had failed to report to proba

2025(See, e.g., Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 709 [addressing whether car rental invoice and hotel receipt, both of which were present and examined at the probation revocation hearing, were admissible documentary hearsay]; O’Connell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [discussing admissibility of drug treatment program report which stated defendant had been terminated from the program due to “ ‘Too Many Absences’ ”]; People v. Gomez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028 , 1038−1039 [evaluating admissibility of probation report reviewed by the trial court which indicated defendant had failed to report to proba

2021(People v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 156 .) Thus, “an indigent criminal defendant has the right to appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing and a constitutional right to counsel at a deferred (postprobation revocation) sentencing hearing.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 461 [“efficient administration of justice requires” assistance of counsel at parole revocation proceedings].) However, deferred sentencing hearings are not relevant to PRCS revocation proceedings.

2016Defendant relies on People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 , which established that a probationer has a due process right to be “heard in person” at a probation revocation hearing.

2025We therefore do not address questions about the admissibility of the probation report. 10 revocation hearing would “substantially lighten[ ]” the prosecution’s burden of proof in a subsequent criminal trial, where, normally, the defendant would be free to remain silent until the prosecution has made out a prima facie case. 5 (Coleman, at p. 876; see id. at pp. 873–876.) Second, requiring a defendant to choose between exercising the privilege against self- incrimination and the right to be heard at a probation revocation hearing would undermine “our ‘unwillingness to subject those suspected of

2015In order to alleviate the harsh testimonial choice such a person must make, the Supreme Court fashioned ‘a judicial rule of evidence that henceforth upon timely objection the testimony of a probationer at a probation revocation hearing held prior to the disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation of the conditions of his probation, and any evidence derived from such testimony, is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges, save for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal where the probationer’s revocation hearing test

2025(See, e.g., Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 709 [addressing whether car rental invoice and hotel receipt, both of which were present and examined at the probation revocation hearing, were admissible documentary hearsay]; O’Connell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [discussing admissibility of drug treatment program report which stated defendant had been terminated from the program due to “ ‘Too Many Absences’ ”]; People v. Gomez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028 , 1038−1039 [evaluating admissibility of probation report reviewed by the trial court which indicated defendant had failed to report to proba

2025(See, e.g., Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 709 [addressing whether car rental invoice and hotel receipt, both of which were present and examined at the probation revocation hearing, were admissible documentary hearsay]; O’Connell, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [discussing admissibility of drug treatment program report which stated defendant had been terminated from the program due to “ ‘Too Many Absences’ ”]; People v. Gomez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1028 , 1038−1039 [evaluating admissibility of probation report reviewed by the trial court which indicated defendant had failed to report to proba

2019Admission of Keo’s statements to the dependency investigator did not violate his due process rights Keo urges us to expand the immunity provided for testimony under section 355.1, subdivision (f), to out-of-court statements made to a dependency investigator, relying on Jessica B., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at page 521 , which expanded immunity to cover statements made in court-ordered therapy, People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), which conferred immunity for an individual’s statements made in a probation revocation hearing, and Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 (Ramona

1994(See Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 803 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ]; In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 596 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Hicks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 757 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 484 P.2d 65 ]; People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 471 P.2d 961 ].) In each of these cases, however, the prohibited use of the statement was in a proceeding relating to an adjudication of guilt, not in a probation revocation hearing.

2015(People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773 ; People v. Haddad (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 270, 272 .) We accord deference to the trial court’s ruling, and, because the granting of probation is an act of “clemency and grace,” the burden of proof at a probation revocation hearing is preponderance of the evidence.

2014Again, I don’t know where he got it, but I know he didn’t get it from [Young].” DISCUSSION I General Legal Principles At the time of the probation revocation hearing, former section 1203.2, subdivision (a), provided, in relevant part, that “the court may revoke and terminate . . . probation if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her probation . . . or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless whether he or she has b

1994(See Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 803 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ]; In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 596 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Hicks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 757 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 484 P.2d 65 ]; People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 471 P.2d 961 ].) In each of these cases, however, the prohibited use of the statement was in a proceeding relating to an adjudication of guilt, not in a probation revocation hearing.

1994(See Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 803 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ]; In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 596 P.2d 1 ]; People v. Hicks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 757 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 393 , 484 P.2d 65 ]; People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 471 P.2d 961 ].) In each of these cases, however, the prohibited use of the statement was in a proceeding relating to an adjudication of guilt, not in a probation revocation hearing.

2016In a probation revocation hearing, the trial court must determine “ ‘whether the convicted offender “can be safely allowed to return to and remain in society.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 57 (Coughlin).) Similarly, at issue in the section 1170.126 hearing is whether resentencing an eligible inmate “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) The California Supreme Court has held that a trial court may consider evidence which is insufficient to prove guilt at trial in determining whether to revoke probation as long as it does not

2016In a probation revocation hearing, the trial court must determine “ ‘whether the convicted offender “can be safely allowed to return to and remain in society.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 57 (Coughlin).) Similarly, at issue in the section 1170.126 hearing is whether resentencing an eligible inmate “would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) The California Supreme Court has held that a trial court may consider evidence which is insufficient to prove guilt at trial in determining whether to revoke probation as long as it does not

2026(People v. Davis (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 634, 638 ; see People v. Martinez (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 537, 545 [“the corpus delicti rule has never been applied to other-crimes evidence introduced for impeachment purposes in the guilt phase of a trial”]; cf. People v. Monette (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1575 [the corpus delicti rule does not apply to proof of alleged probation violations, because “the probation revocation hearing differs so substantially from a criminal prosecution”].) Conner argues that the court erred by relying on his statements to the undercover agents that he was involved i

2023More lenient rules of evidence apply than at criminal trials [citation], and the facts supporting revocation need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Monette (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1575 .) “‘[T]he standard of proof used in a criminal trial, namely the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard . . . [,] is inapplicable to the probation revocation hearing. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 445 .) 1.

2024(See Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1201–1202 [witness’s live testimony of out-of-court statements is a form of testimonial hearsay and good cause standard applies]; Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1159, 1160 [a showing of good cause is required before admitting hearsay at a probation revocation hearing].) The hearsay statements here are like those in Miller and Shepherd, which also concerned live testimony regarding a witness’s out-of-court statements.

2023Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a).) It may not, however, “revoke probation unless the evidence supports ‘a conclusion [the] probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.’ ” (People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295 , italics added.) Even though a probationer at a probation revocation hearing is not entitled to “ ‘the full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal] 4 proceeding’ ” (People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198 ), the probationer still retains the “limited right to confront witnesses” under the due process clause

2016The Attorney General relies primarily on People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191 (Dale), which held that because a probation revocation hearing does not involve all of the fundamental constitutional rights afforded to a defendant at a trial (id. at p. 195), a probationer need not “personally waive his [or her] right to present evidence and to confront witnesses against him [or her]” at a probation revocation hearing.

2014(See People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191 , 194- 195 (Dale); People v. Martin (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 482, 486 (Martin).) In Dale, the appellant contended that an order revoking probation should be reversed because the trial court had failed to conduct a proper probation revocation hearing.

2017(People v. Brown (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 452, 454-455 .) “A trial court‟s decision to admit or exclude evidence in a probation revocation hearing will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1197-1198 .) With respect to hearsay evidence to replace the live testimony of a witness, such evidence is inadmissible absent a showing of good cause.

2016General Principles It is well established that “relaxed rules of evidence govern[ ] probation revocation proceedings[.]” (People v. Brown (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 452, 454 .) “Under this approach, hearsay evidence that is inadmissible to prove guilt in a criminal trial may be admissible to prove an adult probation violation under certain circumstances.” (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 501 .) A probationer has only a limited right to cross-examine and confront witnesses at a probation revocation hearing.

2021(People v. Stanphill (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 61, 78 .) When the prosecution seeks to admit testimonial hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hearing, it may be admitted upon a showing of good cause as to the witness’ absence—a determination that is made on a case by case basis. ( Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1159‒1160; People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1202 [Arreola’s good cause standard governs testimonial hearsay].) As relevant here, good cause exists “(1) when the declarant is ‘unavailable’ under the traditional hearsay standard (see Evid.

2014Again, I don’t know where he got it, but I know he didn’t get it from [Young].” DISCUSSION I General Legal Principles At the time of the probation revocation hearing, former section 1203.2, subdivision (a), provided, in relevant part, that “the court may revoke and terminate . . . probation if the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has reason to believe from the report of the probation officer or otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his or her probation . . . or has subsequently committed other offenses, regardless whether he or she has b

2026DISCUSSION Whiteside contends the superior court erred in relying on statements she made at her parole hearing because, according to Whiteside, those statements “should not be admissible as substantive evidence of guilt at a subsequent criminal proceeding, including an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).” She relies on People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 (Coleman), where the Supreme Court held testimony by a probationer at a probation revocation hearing “is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges” (id

1994The purpose of the use immunity is to allow the probation officer “to get full cooperation from a defendant [by advising him] that any statement he makes will be used only for the information of the court in a probationary hearing. . . . [I]f [defendants] knew their damaging admissions could be used against them in another trial they would not talk freely and the purpose of the interview would be frustrated.” (People v. Alesi (1967) 67 Cal.2d 856, 862 [ 434 P.2d 360 ].) Similarly, the rationale of People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ] and its progeny, als

2021Courts have held that any “minimal deterrent effect” of applying the exclusionary rule at a probation revocation hearing is “significantly outweighed by [the] potential damage to the probation system.” (People v. Nixon (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 687 , 691–692 (Nixon); People v. Harrison, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 811 .) As the Nixon court explained, “[t]he purpose of probation conditions is to enhance the chance for rehabilitation while simultaneously affording society a measure of protection.

1985Prejudice has been found from denial of a continuance of a probation revocation hearing where a defendant could have benefited from a later motion to suppress evidence in the related case. ( People v. Fuller, supra, 148 Cal. App.3d 257 ; People v. Howard, supra, 162 Cal. App.3d 8 .) There was not prejudice in a similar case because the prosecutor represented that the related case was going to be dismissed before trial because of search and seizure problems. ( People v. Nixon, supra, 131 Cal. App.3d 687 .) While our attention has not been called to any other cases finding prejudice from a pretr

1989People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 932-934 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 663 P.2d 206 ], reaffirming People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ], held that a probation revocation hearing based on a charge of criminal conduct may be held prior to the trial on the underlying criminal offense, despite the choice such a sequence frequently imposes on the defendant: to keep silent at the revocation hearing, thereby increasing his chances of going to prison, or to testify to mitigating circumstances and possibly incriminate himself.

1989People v. Jasper (1983) 33 Cal.3d 931, 932-934 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 663 P.2d 206 ], reaffirming People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ], held that a probation revocation hearing based on a charge of criminal conduct may be held prior to the trial on the underlying criminal offense, despite the choice such a sequence frequently imposes on the defendant: to keep silent at the revocation hearing, thereby increasing his chances of going to prison, or to testify to mitigating circumstances and possibly incriminate himself.

2023Code, § 3044, subd. (a)(5); see In re Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234-1235 ; see also People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441-442, 446-447 [preponderance of the evidence standard applies at a probation revocation hearing; “[p]arole and probation revocation hearings are equivalent in terms of the requirements of due process”].) We review a decision to revoke parole for substantial evidence (see People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 ; People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848 )—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.

2016(See People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206 ; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314 .) At a probation revocation hearing, our review is “limited to the determination of whether, upon review of the entire record, there is substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the trial court’s decision.” (People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848 , fn. omitted.) “[A]ll conflicting evidence will be resolved in favor of the decision.” (Id. at p. 849, fn. omitted.) 3 We also decline to consider arguments not properly before us.

2023Code, § 3044, subd. (a)(5); see In re Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234-1235 ; see also People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 441-442, 446-447 [preponderance of the evidence standard applies at a probation revocation hearing; “[p]arole and probation revocation hearings are equivalent in terms of the requirements of due process”].) We review a decision to revoke parole for substantial evidence (see People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 ; People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848 )—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.

2021(People v. Butcher (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318 [discussing standard in the context of a probation revocation hearing]; see also Rodriguez, at pp. 441–447.) A. Validity of Parole Conditions 18 and 20 Appellant argues that the parole conditions he was found to have violated were invalid because they are not reasonably related to the offense of failing to register as a sex offender or to further criminality.

2022(Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 611 .) “A probation revocation hearing involves some, but by no means all, of the fundamental rights afforded a defendant at trial.

2021(Gagnon, at pp. 782-783, 786; Vickers, at p. 460.) And at the final 6 revocation hearing, due process requires, among other things,2 “‘the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation).’” (Gagnon, at p. 786; Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 612 ; People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 716 (Winson); Vickers, at p. 457; Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1147, 1152-1153.) In Arreola, our Supreme Court further elaborated on when a trial court may dispense with the due process-based “right to confro

2012Lazio argued that section 1538.5, subdivision (d), and People v. Zimmerman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 673 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 188 ] (Zimmerman) mandated suppression of the evidence at the probation revocation hearing because it had been ordered suppressed in her criminal case.

2012Lazio argued that section 1538.5, subdivision (d), and People v. Zimmerman (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 673 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 188 ] (Zimmerman) mandated suppression of the evidence at the probation revocation hearing because it had been ordered suppressed in her criminal case.