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28 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jamesongreen2 sentences1985This procedure was expressly disapproved by our supreme court in State v. Jameson, 112 Ariz. 315, 318 , 541 P.2d 912, 915 (1975). 1985This procedure was expressly disapproved by our supreme court in State v. Jameson, 112 Ariz. 315, 318 , 541 P.2d 912, 915 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Regenoldgreen2 sentences2026But if not, “[a]ny punishment imposed after a probation revocation hearing is a consequence that would not exist but for the defendant’s violation of probation.” Id. 2020See Regenold, 226 Ariz. at 379 ¶ 8 (“Any punishment imposed after a probation revocation hearing is a consequence that would not exist but for the defendant’s violation of probation.” (emphasis added)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Korzuchgreen1 sentence2024The Court held that, in some cases, a probationer may have a right to counsel at the revocation hearing because effectiveness of the due process requirements may “depend on the use of skills which the probationer . . . is unlikely to possess.” Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 ; see also Korzuch, 186 Ariz. at 194 (When assessing the rights guaranteed during probation extensions, rules and cases addressing probation revocation proceedings are instructive.). 7 STATE v. MOORE Opinion of the Court consents to a search, even if the individual is unaware of the right to refuse consent. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Vanderbeke v. Endicottgreen1 sentence2023Vanderbeke v. Endicott, 563 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Wis. 1997) (“The core of the process due at a probation revocation proceeding, the opportunity for a meaningful hearing . . . is not available to an incompetent probationer.”); see also Harrison v. State, 905 So.2d 858 , 860–61 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Donald v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Ct. App. 2019) (“With probationers . . . the liberty interest at stake is sufficiently valuable and the risk of error sufficiently grave that due process requires they be competent.”); Donald v. State, 930 N.E.2d 76, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that a defendant be competent when participating in a probation revocation hearing.”); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Vanderbeke v. Endicott, 563 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Wis. 1997) (“The core of the process due at a probation revocation proceeding, the opportunity for a meaningful hearing . . . is not available to an incompetent probationer.”); see also Harrison v. State, 905 So.2d 858 , 860–61 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Cuciak v. Stategreen1 sentence1990A basic philosophy underlying discovery is the prevention of surprise and the implementation of an improved fact finding process____ “If a probationer needs additional information in order to properly prepare a defense to the charges, the *285 various methods of discovery under our rules are available to him____” Fair play and justice require that a defendant in a probation revocation hearing be entitled to reasonable discovery____ Cuciak v. State, 410 So.2d 916, 917-918 (Fla.1982) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schlenkergreen2 sentences1985See State v. Schlenker, 26 Ariz.App. 401 , 549 P.2d 181 (1976); State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz.App. 232 , 532 P.2d 174 (1975). 1985See State v. Schlenker, 26 Ariz.App. 401 , 549 P.2d 181 (1976); State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz.App. 232 , 532 P.2d 174 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rochagreen2 sentences1981See People v. Rocha, 86 Mich.App. 497 , 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1978); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 77 Wis.2d 225 , 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 (1975). 1981See People v. Rocha, 86 Mich.App. 497 , 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1978); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 77 Wis.2d 225 , 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. DeWittgreen2 sentences1990But see People v. DeWitt, 66 Ill.App.3d 146 , 22 Ill.Dec. 886 , 383 N.E.2d 694 (1978). 1990But see People v. DeWitt, 66 Ill.App.3d 146 , 22 Ill.Dec. 886 , 383 N.E.2d 694 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
red
2 sentences1977The United States Supreme Court decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), illuminate the dual nature of a probation revocation hearing. 1977The United States Supreme Court decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), illuminate the dual nature of a probation revocation hearing. | 6 | 1975–2024 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1977The United States Supreme Court decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), illuminate the dual nature of a probation revocation hearing. 1977The United States Supreme Court decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), illuminate the dual nature of a probation revocation hearing. | 3 | 1975–1981 |
State v. Salinas
green
2 sentences2017And "[w]hen the reliability of such hearsay evidence goes unchallenged at a probation revocation hearing, the evidence is normally considered reliable." Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 82 . ¶11 In State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz. App. 232 (1975), the superior court revoked the defendant's probation based solely on a probation officer's hearsay testimony. 23 Ariz. App. at 232-34 . 2017And "[w]hen the reliability of such hearsay evidence goes unchallenged at a probation revocation hearing, the evidence is normally considered reliable." Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 82 . ¶11 In State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz. App. 232 (1975), the superior court revoked the defendant's probation based solely on a probation officer's hearsay testimony. 23 Ariz. App. at 232-34 . | 2 | 1985–2017 |
Russ v. State
green
2 sentences1981Russ v. State, 313 So.2d 758 (Fla.1975). 1975Russ v. State, 313 So.2d 758 (Fla.1975). | 2 | 1975–1981 |
People v. Grayson
green
2 sentences1981In People v. Grayson, 58 Ill.2d 260 , 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 , 95 S.Ct. 2001 , 44 L.Ed.2d 484 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the view that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the state from relitigating the question of armed robbery in a probation revocation hearing after the probationer had been acquitted of the charge in a previous criminal proceeding. 1981In People v. Grayson, 58 Ill.2d 260 , 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 , 95 S.Ct. 2001 , 44 L.Ed.2d 484 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the view that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the state from relitigating the question of armed robbery in a probation revocation hearing after the probationer had been acquitted of the charge in a previous criminal proceeding. | 2 | 1975–1981 |
Goodspeed v. Griggs
green
2 sentences1981In People v. Grayson, 58 Ill.2d 260 , 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 , 95 S.Ct. 2001 , 44 L.Ed.2d 484 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the view that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the state from relitigating the question of armed robbery in a probation revocation hearing after the probationer had been acquitted of the charge in a previous criminal proceeding. 1975In People v. Grayson, 58 I11.2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 994 , 95 S.Ct. 2001 , 44 L.Ed.2d 484 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the view that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the state from relitigating the question of armed robbery in a probation revocation hearing after the probationer had been acquitted of the charge in a previous criminal proceeding. | 2 | 1975–1981 |
Illinois v. Grayson
green
2 sentences1981In People v. Grayson, 58 Ill.2d 260 , 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 , 95 S.Ct. 2001 , 44 L.Ed.2d 484 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the view that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the state from relitigating the question of armed robbery in a probation revocation hearing after the probationer had been acquitted of the charge in a previous criminal proceeding. 1975In People v. Grayson, 58 I11.2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 994 , 95 S.Ct. 2001 , 44 L.Ed.2d 484 (1975), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the view that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the state from relitigating the question of armed robbery in a probation revocation hearing after the probationer had been acquitted of the charge in a previous criminal proceeding. | 2 | 1975–1981 |
State v. Fahringer
green
1 sentence2023In Fahringer, we held that the superior court abused its discretion by continuing a probation revocation hearing until after a separate trial, the date for which had not even been set. 136 Ariz. at 415 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Stotts
green
1 sentence2017And "[w]hen the reliability of such hearsay evidence goes unchallenged at a probation revocation hearing, the evidence is normally considered reliable." Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 82 . ¶11 In State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz. App. 232 (1975), the superior court revoked the defendant's probation based solely on a probation officer's hearsay testimony. 23 Ariz. App. at 232-34 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Adler
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 282 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. LeMatty
green
2 sentences2015Accordingly, we will not reverse the superior court’s factual finding the defendant violated his or her probation unless the finding was “arbitrary and unsupported by any reasonable theory of evidence.” Id. at 336 , 590 P.2d at 452 . 2 STATE v. EATON Decision of the Court 12”); and refrain from consuming any substance containing alcohol (“Term 16”). ¶3 On July 25, 2014, Eaton’s probation officer petitioned to revoke Eaton’s probation, alleging Eaton had violated Term 1 by driving on a suspended license, Term 12 by failing numerous drug tests and admitting to methamphetamine use, and Term 16 by 2015Accordingly, we will not reverse the superior court’s factual finding the defendant violated his or her probation unless the finding was “arbitrary and unsupported by any reasonable theory of evidence.” Id. at 336 , 590 P.2d at 452 . 2 STATE v. EATON Decision of the Court 12”); and refrain from consuming any substance containing alcohol (“Term 16”). ¶3 On July 25, 2014, Eaton’s probation officer petitioned to revoke Eaton’s probation, alleging Eaton had violated Term 1 by driving on a suspended license, Term 12 by failing numerous drug tests and admitting to methamphetamine use, and Term 16 by | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2015The supreme court took a similar approach in Williams, in which the prior litigation was a probation revocation hearing. 131 Ariz. at 212 , 639 P.2d at 1037 . 2015The supreme court took a similar approach in Williams, in which the prior litigation was a probation revocation hearing. 131 Ariz. at 212 , 639 P.2d at 1037 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2011Therefore, although the range of punishment for a probation violation may be constrained by a plea agreement, the sentence imposed after a contested probation revocation is not entered “pursuant to [the] plea agreement” for purposes of § 13-4033(B). ¶ 9 The State also argues that Regenold waived his right to appeal by signing a plea agreement that provided, “By entering this agreement, the Defendant further waives and gives up the right to appeal.” Although we agree that Regenold waived his right to direct appeal by pleading guilty, instead implicitly consenting to review by petition for post- 2011Therefore, although the range of punishment for a probation violation may be constrained by a plea agreement, the sentence imposed after a contested probation revocation is not entered “pursuant to [the] plea agreement” for purposes of § 13-4033(B). ¶ 9 The State also argues that Regenold waived his right to appeal by signing a plea agreement that provided, “By entering this agreement, the Defendant further waives and gives up the right to appeal.” Although we agree that Regenold waived his right to direct appeal by pleading guilty, instead implicitly consenting to review by petition for post- | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Drozd
green
2 sentences1993Citing MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 , 96 S.Ct. 2086 , and Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330 , 569 P.2d 272 , the state posits that "the right to receive transcripts at public expense in connection with ancillary post conviction proceedings is not a right guaranteed either by the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution." 116 Ariz. at 331 , 569 P.2d at 273 . 1993Citing MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 , 96 S.Ct. 2086 , and Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330 , 569 P.2d 272 , the state posits that "the right to receive transcripts at public expense in connection with ancillary post conviction proceedings is not a right guaranteed either by the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution." 116 Ariz. at 331 , 569 P.2d at 273 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
United States v. MacCollom
green
2 sentences1993Citing MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 , 96 S.Ct. 2086 , and Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330 , 569 P.2d 272 , the state posits that "the right to receive transcripts at public expense in connection with ancillary post conviction proceedings is not a right guaranteed either by the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution." 116 Ariz. at 331 , 569 P.2d at 273 . 1993Citing MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 , 96 S.Ct. 2086 , and Drozd, 116 Ariz. 330 , 569 P.2d 272 , the state posits that "the right to receive transcripts at public expense in connection with ancillary post conviction proceedings is not a right guaranteed either by the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution." 116 Ariz. at 331 , 569 P.2d at 273 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Manning
green
1 sentence1991Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences1984The intention to eliminate rule 32 post-conviction relief as a remedy for one who is being held in custody after his probation or parole has been unlawfully revoked is sub *141 stantiated further by the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Brown, 112 Ariz. 29 , 536 P.2d 1047 (1975). 1984The intention to eliminate rule 32 post-conviction relief as a remedy for one who is being held in custody after his probation or parole has been unlawfully revoked is sub *141 stantiated further by the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Brown, 112 Ariz. 29 , 536 P.2d 1047 (1975). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Druke
green
2 sentences1984This court had the occasion to construe an identical form in State v. Druke, 128 Ariz. 604 , 627 P.2d 1102 (App.1981): “At a probation revocation hearing the trial court found that real party in interest had violated the regulations of his probation, but did not revoke his probation and refused to designate the previously open-ended offense a felony. 1984This court had the occasion to construe an identical form in State v. Druke, 128 Ariz. 604 , 627 P.2d 1102 (App.1981): “At a probation revocation hearing the trial court found that real party in interest had violated the regulations of his probation, but did not revoke his probation and refused to designate the previously open-ended offense a felony. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Simmons v. United States green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. DeLomba
green
2 sentences1981See People v. Rocha, 86 Mich.App. 497 , 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1978); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 77 Wis.2d 225 , 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 (1975). 1981See People v. Rocha, 86 Mich.App. 497 , 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1978); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 77 Wis.2d 225 , 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Coleman
green
2 sentences1981See People v. Rocha, 86 Mich.App. 497 , 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1978); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 77 Wis.2d 225 , 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 (1975). 1981See People v. Rocha, 86 Mich.App. 497 , 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1978); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673 , 370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 77 Wis.2d 225 , 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 (1975). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Evans green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Hass green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Shirley green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| In Re Coughlin green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Simmerman green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| State v. Settle green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Anders v. California green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| State v. Marlar green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.