10 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2003See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 2003See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Lucio FTgreen2 sentences2009See also, e.g., In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249, 255 (1976) (probation revocation hearing was not a “criminal prosecution, nor was it intended to authorize criminal punishment” because “the sole consequence of revocation of probation is that the offender must commence to serve a term for an offense of which he previously was properly convicted”); Johnson v. United States, 763 A.2d 707, 711 (D.C.Ct.App.2000) (“Because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, ... and any consequent revocation does not punish the defendant for any crime charg 2009See also, e.g., In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249, 255 (1976) (probation revocation hearing was not a “criminal prosecution, nor was it intended to authorize criminal punishment” because “the sole consequence of revocation of probation is that the offender must commence to serve a term for an offense of which he previously was properly convicted”); Johnson v. United States, 763 A.2d 707, 711 (D.C.Ct.App.2000) (“Because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, ... and any consequent revocation does not punish the defendant for any crime charg | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quarlesgreen2 sentences2009See also, e.g., In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249, 255 (1976) (probation revocation hearing was not a “criminal prosecution, nor was it intended to authorize criminal punishment” because “the sole consequence of revocation of probation is that the offender must commence to serve a term for an offense of which he previously was properly convicted”); Johnson v. United States, 763 A.2d 707, 711 (D.C.Ct.App.2000) (“Because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, ... and any consequent revocation does not punish the defendant for any crime charg 2009See also, e.g., In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249, 255 (1976) (probation revocation hearing was not a “criminal prosecution, nor was it intended to authorize criminal punishment” because “the sole consequence of revocation of probation is that the offender must commence to serve a term for an offense of which he previously was properly convicted”); Johnson v. United States, 763 A.2d 707, 711 (D.C.Ct.App.2000) (“Because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, ... and any consequent revocation does not punish the defendant for any crime charg | 1 | 1 |
State v. Arcandgreen1 sentence2009State v. Arcand, 403 N.W.2d 23, 24 (N.D. 1987). [¶ 9] The record shows that contrary to Neva’s argument, the district court did not make a pronouncement at the probation revocation hearing of the sentence it would *881 impose or that the credit for the time Neva served in custody should be counted toward all four counts. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Triebgreen1 sentence2009State v. Leingang, 2009 ND 38, ¶ 15 , 763 N.W.2d 769 ; State v. Trieb, 516 N.W.2d 287, 292 (N.D.1994). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Coughlingreen2 sentences2009See also, e.g., In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249, 255 (1976) (probation revocation hearing was not a “criminal prosecution, nor was it intended to authorize criminal punishment” because “the sole consequence of revocation of probation is that the offender must commence to serve a term for an offense of which he previously was properly convicted”); Johnson v. United States, 763 A.2d 707, 711 (D.C.Ct.App.2000) (“Because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, ... and any consequent revocation does not punish the defendant for any crime charg 2009See also, e.g., In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249, 255 (1976) (probation revocation hearing was not a “criminal prosecution, nor was it intended to authorize criminal punishment” because “the sole consequence of revocation of probation is that the offender must commence to serve a term for an offense of which he previously was properly convicted”); Johnson v. United States, 763 A.2d 707, 711 (D.C.Ct.App.2000) (“Because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, ... and any consequent revocation does not punish the defendant for any crime charg | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2009See also, e.g., In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249, 255 (1976) (probation revocation hearing was not a “criminal prosecution, nor was it intended to authorize criminal punishment” because “the sole consequence of revocation of probation is that the offender must commence to serve a term for an offense of which he previously was properly convicted”); Johnson v. United States, 763 A.2d 707, 711 (D.C.Ct.App.2000) (“Because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, ... and any consequent revocation does not punish the defendant for any crime charg | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2009See also, e.g., In re Coughlin, 16 Cal.3d 52 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249, 255 (1976) (probation revocation hearing was not a “criminal prosecution, nor was it intended to authorize criminal punishment” because “the sole consequence of revocation of probation is that the offender must commence to serve a term for an offense of which he previously was properly convicted”); Johnson v. United States, 763 A.2d 707, 711 (D.C.Ct.App.2000) (“Because probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, ... and any consequent revocation does not punish the defendant for any crime charg | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tupagreen2 sentences2008See Tupa, 2005 ND 25, ¶ 14 , 691 N.W.2d 579 ; Gill, 2004 ND 137, ¶ 14 , 681 N.W.2d 832 . *409 [¶ 13] Jacobsen did not testify at the probation revocation hearing and presented no financial records or other evidence explaining what had happened to the $55,000 house sale proceeds or to the $13,000 he claimed to have earned between August and November. 2008See Tupa, 2005 ND 25, ¶ 14 , 691 N.W.2d 579 ; Gill, 2004 ND 137, ¶ 14 , 681 N.W.2d 832 . *409 [¶ 13] Jacobsen did not testify at the probation revocation hearing and presented no financial records or other evidence explaining what had happened to the $55,000 house sale proceeds or to the $13,000 he claimed to have earned between August and November. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hassgreen2 sentences2008State v. Olson, 2003 ND 23 , ¶ 8 n. 2, 656 N.W.2d 650 ; State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479, 481 (N.D.1990); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 460 (N.D.1978). 2008In light of our rule in Hass, 268 N.W.2d at 460 , “that testimony given by the accused at a revocation hearing would be excluded, and could not be used directly at the subsequent trial on the substantive charge,” McAvoy could have testified at the probation revocation hearing or he could have called his own witnesses to rebut the State’s contention that he left his registered address on December 22. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gefrohgreen1 sentence2008State v. Olson, 2003 ND 23 , ¶ 8 n. 2, 656 N.W.2d 650 ; State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479, 481 (N.D.1990); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 460 (N.D.1978). | 1 | 1 |
McGuire v. WARDEN OF STATE FARM, ETC.green2 sentences1978In the case of McGuire v. Warden of State Farm, 229 N.W.2d 211, 218 (N.D.1975), this court made the following statement regarding the requirement of a preliminary probation revocation hearing: “Nor do we believe that Gagnon and Morrissey contain an absolute requirement that there must be two hearings, rather than one, when probation violation proceedings are commenced on the motion of the court itself. 1978In the case of McGuire v. Warden of State Farm, 229 N.W.2d 211, 218 (N.D.1975), this court made the following statement regarding the requirement of a preliminary probation revocation hearing: “Nor do we believe that Gagnon and Morrissey contain an absolute requirement that there must be two hearings, rather than one, when probation violation proceedings are commenced on the motion of the court itself. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hemmes
neutral
2 sentences2025State v. Hemmes, 2007 ND 161, ¶ 9 , 740 N.W.2d 81 (quoting Wardner, ¶ 18); see also N.D.R.Crim.P. 32(f)(3). 2025State v. Hemmes, 2007 ND 161, ¶ 9 , 740 N.W.2d 81 (quoting Wardner, ¶ 18); see also N.D.R.Crim.P. 32(f)(3). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Wardner
green
2 sentences2025“Consequently, a probationer facing revocation has limited rights.” State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 18 , 725 N.W.2d 215 ; see also Olson, ¶ 14 (“The full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not apply to a probation revocation hearing.”). 5 The minimum rights afforded to a probationer include: written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relie 2025“Consequently, a probationer facing revocation has limited rights.” State v. Wardner, 2006 ND 256, ¶ 18 , 725 N.W.2d 215 ; see also Olson, ¶ 14 (“The full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not apply to a probation revocation hearing.”). 5 The minimum rights afforded to a probationer include: written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relie | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Gonzalez
green
2 sentences2017Gonzalez appealed; this Court affirmed in State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106 , 862 N.W.2d 535 . [¶ 5] In September 2015, Gonzalez filed his third application for post-conviction relief, alleging his representation during his second post-conviction relief case was ineffective. 2017Gonzalez appealed; this Court affirmed in State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106 , 862 N.W.2d 535 . [¶ 5] In September 2015, Gonzalez filed his third application for post-conviction relief, alleging his representation during his second post-conviction relief case was ineffective. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Leingang
green
2 sentences2009State v. Leingang, 2009 ND 38, ¶ 15 , 763 N.W.2d 769 ; State v. Trieb, 516 N.W.2d 287, 292 (N.D.1994). 2009State v. Leingang, 2009 ND 38, ¶ 15 , 763 N.W.2d 769 ; State v. Trieb, 516 N.W.2d 287, 292 (N.D.1994). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Gill
green
2 sentences2008See Tupa, 2005 ND 25, ¶ 14 , 691 N.W.2d 579 ; Gill, 2004 ND 137, ¶ 14 , 681 N.W.2d 832 . *409 [¶ 13] Jacobsen did not testify at the probation revocation hearing and presented no financial records or other evidence explaining what had happened to the $55,000 house sale proceeds or to the $13,000 he claimed to have earned between August and November. 2008See Tupa, 2005 ND 25, ¶ 14 , 691 N.W.2d 579 ; Gill, 2004 ND 137, ¶ 14 , 681 N.W.2d 832 . *409 [¶ 13] Jacobsen did not testify at the probation revocation hearing and presented no financial records or other evidence explaining what had happened to the $55,000 house sale proceeds or to the $13,000 he claimed to have earned between August and November. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Olson
green
2 sentences2008State v. Olson, 2003 ND 23 , ¶ 8 n. 2, 656 N.W.2d 650 ; State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479, 481 (N.D.1990); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 460 (N.D.1978). 2008State v. Olson, 2003 ND 23 , ¶ 8 n. 2, 656 N.W.2d 650 ; State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479, 481 (N.D.1990); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 460 (N.D.1978). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences1978Hass’ contention is based primarily on the reasoning enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). 1978Hass’ contention is based primarily on the reasoning enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Robert W. Flint, Jr. v. James Mullen, Warden, Etc.
green
2 sentences1978The case of Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 , 95 S.Ct. 505 , 42 L.Ed.2d 301 , involved substantially the same issue as Hass has raised in the instant case. 1978Here, however, the government had to prove its case by extrinsic evidence and there is no indication that defendant was penalized for silence except to the degree that anyone who claims the privilege may be said to forego the possibility of persuading a court in his favor.” We agree with this reasoning of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Flint, supra. We conclude that Hass was not unconstitutionally deprived of his constitutional right to testify at the probation revocation hearing, or of his constitutional right against self-incrimination at a subsequent criminal trial regarding the same | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Hass
green
2 sentences1978The threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.’ and the North Dakota Supreme Court held in Hass, supra 264 N.W.2d at 472 : “In the instant case, Hass’ difficult decision of whether or not to testify at the probation revocation hearing is essentially the same type of decision that defendant was required to make in McGautha, supra. The circumstances required Hass to make a difficult decision, but neither his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination nor his due process right to testify wa 1978The threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.’ and the North Dakota Supreme Court held in Hass, supra 264 N.W.2d at 472 : “In the instant case, Hass’ difficult decision of whether or not to testify at the probation revocation hearing is essentially the same type of decision that defendant was required to make in McGautha, supra. The circumstances required Hass to make a difficult decision, but neither his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination nor his due process right to testify wa | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Flint v. Mullen
green
1 sentence1978The case of Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 , 95 S.Ct. 505 , 42 L.Ed.2d 301 , involved substantially the same issue as Hass has raised in the instant case. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Sander v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1978The case of Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 , 95 S.Ct. 505 , 42 L.Ed.2d 301 , involved substantially the same issue as Hass has raised in the instant case. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.