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14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hobsongreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., State v. Hobson, 68 Conn.App. 40 , 789 A.2d 557, 561-62 (2002) ("[D]ue process ... mandates that a defendant in a probation revocation hearing possesses the right to be heard in person and thus to testify on one's behalf ... [but] that privilege is not triggered unless [the defendant] takes some affirmative action regarding his right to testify. 2015See, e.g., State v. Hobson, 68 Conn.App. 40 , 789 A.2d 557, 561-62 (2002) ("[D]ue process ... mandates that a defendant in a probation revocation hearing possesses the right to be heard in person and thus to testify on one's behalf ... [but] that privilege is not triggered unless [the defendant] takes some affirmative action regarding his right to testify. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015We can find no plain error, as neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that the required “opportunity to be heard in person” at a probation revocation hearing invariably requires that the court sua sponte conduct a direct inquiry of the probationer. 5 This court has recognized that the requirement of “an opportunity to be heard in person” is not satisfied where the probationer’s counsel does “not know his client’s explanation” for the alleged failure to comply with the terms of probation and where the probationer is afforded “no opportunity to elaborate upon evidence proffered in mit 2015We can find no plain error, as neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that the required “opportunity to be heard in person” at a probation revocation hearing invariably requires that the court sua sponte conduct a direct inquiry of the probationer. 5 This court has recognized that the requirement of “an opportunity to be heard in person” is not satisfied where the probationer’s counsel does “not know his client’s explanation” for the alleged failure to comply with the terms of probation and where the probationer is afforded “no opportunity to elaborate upon evidence proffered in mit | 1 | 1 |
State v. Coltranegreen2 sentences2015We can find no plain error, as neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that the required “opportunity to be heard in person” at a probation revocation hearing invariably requires that the court sua sponte conduct a direct inquiry of the probationer. 5 This court has recognized that the requirement of “an opportunity to be heard in person” is not satisfied where the probationer’s counsel does “not know his client’s explanation” for the alleged failure to comply with the terms of probation and where the probationer is afforded “no opportunity to elaborate upon evidence proffered in mit 2015We can find no plain error, as neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that the required “opportunity to be heard in person” at a probation revocation hearing invariably requires that the court sua sponte conduct a direct inquiry of the probationer. 5 This court has recognized that the requirement of “an opportunity to be heard in person” is not satisfied where the probationer’s counsel does “not know his client’s explanation” for the alleged failure to comply with the terms of probation and where the probationer is afforded “no opportunity to elaborate upon evidence proffered in mit | 1 | 1 |
Mihas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011Appellant notes that at the conclusion of the probation revocation hearing, the court stated that “probation is revoked and that is how this matter will now end.” He argues, as he claimed at trial, that as a result of that comment, he “thought that his former condition of annual reporting to CSOSA was ... over.” Whether appellant knowingly failed to register is a question of fact, and we will overturn the trial court’s factual findings only if they are “plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.” D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2011); Mattete v. United States, 902 A.2d 113, 115 (D.C.2006) (quoti | 1 | 1 |
Mattete v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011Appellant notes that at the conclusion of the probation revocation hearing, the court stated that “probation is revoked and that is how this matter will now end.” He argues, as he claimed at trial, that as a result of that comment, he “thought that his former condition of annual reporting to CSOSA was ... over.” Whether appellant knowingly failed to register is a question of fact, and we will overturn the trial court’s factual findings only if they are “plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.” D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2011); Mattete v. United States, 902 A.2d 113, 115 (D.C.2006) (quoti | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2007See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 . [7] Although the transcript of the probation revocation hearing was introduced as an exhibit at the suppression hearing, it is not part of the record on appeal, so we do not have a transcript of what counsel actually said at the probation revocation hearing nor the sequence of events. 2007See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 . [7] Although the transcript of the probation revocation hearing was introduced as an exhibit at the suppression hearing, it is not part of the record on appeal, so we do not have a transcript of what counsel actually said at the probation revocation hearing nor the sequence of events. | 1 | 1 |
Krochta v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000Krochta v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 711 , 711 N.E.2d 142, 144-45 (1999) (citations omitted); see also Jones v. United States, 669 A.2d 724, 727 (D.C.1995) (“[T]his court has noted that jeopardy does not attach in parole, probation, or bond revocation hearings, because these proceedings are not designed to punish a defendant for violation of a criminal law.”) (internal quotations omitted); Hardy v. United States, 578 A.2d 178, 181 (D.C.1990) (“[J]eopardy does not attach in probation or parole revocation proceedings because they are not new criminal prosecutions, but rather, continuations of the 2000Krochta v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 711 , 711 N.E.2d 142, 144-45 (1999) (citations omitted); see also Jones v. United States, 669 A.2d 724, 727 (D.C.1995) (“[T]his court has noted that jeopardy does not attach in parole, probation, or bond revocation hearings, because these proceedings are not designed to punish a defendant for violation of a criminal law.”) (internal quotations omitted); Hardy v. United States, 578 A.2d 178, 181 (D.C.1990) (“[J]eopardy does not attach in probation or parole revocation proceedings because they are not new criminal prosecutions, but rather, continuations of the | 1 | 1 |
Hardy v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000Krochta v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 711 , 711 N.E.2d 142, 144-45 (1999) (citations omitted); see also Jones v. United States, 669 A.2d 724, 727 (D.C.1995) (“[T]his court has noted that jeopardy does not attach in parole, probation, or bond revocation hearings, because these proceedings are not designed to punish a defendant for violation of a criminal law.”) (internal quotations omitted); Hardy v. United States, 578 A.2d 178, 181 (D.C.1990) (“[J]eopardy does not attach in probation or parole revocation proceedings because they are not new criminal prosecutions, but rather, continuations of the | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000Krochta v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 711 , 711 N.E.2d 142, 144-45 (1999) (citations omitted); see also Jones v. United States, 669 A.2d 724, 727 (D.C.1995) (“[T]his court has noted that jeopardy does not attach in parole, probation, or bond revocation hearings, because these proceedings are not designed to punish a defendant for violation of a criminal law.”) (internal quotations omitted); Hardy v. United States, 578 A.2d 178, 181 (D.C.1990) (“[J]eopardy does not attach in probation or parole revocation proceedings because they are not new criminal prosecutions, but rather, continuations of the | 1 | 1 |
Head v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000Judge Huvelle decided to address what appeared to be “[Littlejohn’s] real challenge ... [-] Judge Scott’s alleged failure to make a ‘no benefit’ finding at the time of sentencing (as opposed to at the probation revocation hearing) ....” In considering Littlejohn’s challenge, Judge Huvelle cited Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28 (D.C.1993) and concluded that he had not shown the required “cause for his failure to [raise the “no benefit” argument in pri- or collateral attacks on his sentence] and prejudice as a result of his failure.” 631 A.2d at 30 (quoting Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450 | 1 | 1 |
Ramsey v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998See Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C.1990) (finding appellant free to pursue his ineffectiveness claim in a § 23-110 motion when appellant pled guilty on advice of counsel, thereby precluding a direct appeal, and was represented by the same counsel at a subsequent probation revocation hearing where counsel’s ineffectiveness was raised). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998“It would be a conflict of interest for a lawyer to appeal a ruling premised on the lawyer’s own ineffectiveness.” Id.; see also Brown v. United States, 656 A.2d 1133, 1135-36 (D.C.1995) (noting the conflict of interest inherent in having trial counsel represent a defendant at a § 23-110 evidentiary hearing on ineffectiveness). | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992See Patterson, supra; see also Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839-840 (D.C.1984) (chemist report admissible at trial to establish use of controlled substance); Roy v. United States, supra note 6. 1992See Patterson, supra ; see also Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839-840 (D.C. 1984) (chemist report admissible at trial to establish use of controlled substance); Roy v. United States, supra note 6. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1992Thompson v. United States, 444 A.2d 972, 974 (D.C.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992See Patterson, supra; see also Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839-840 (D.C.1984) (chemist report admissible at trial to establish use of controlled substance); Roy v. United States, supra note 6. 1992See Patterson, supra ; see also Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835, 839-840 (D.C. 1984) (chemist report admissible at trial to establish use of controlled substance); Roy v. United States, supra note 6. | 1 | 1 |
De Veau v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1986See, e.g., DeVeau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308, 1316 (D.C.1982) (pre-trial detention hearing), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1087 , 103 S.Ct. 1781 , 76 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983); Villines v. United States, 312 A.2d 304, 306 (D.C.1973) (bail review hearing). 9 Indeed, we *98 recently stated this very proposition in dicta in a decision involving a probation revocation hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Villines v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1986See, e.g., DeVeau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308, 1316 (D.C.1982) (pre-trial detention hearing), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1087 , 103 S.Ct. 1781 , 76 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983); Villines v. United States, 312 A.2d 304, 306 (D.C.1973) (bail review hearing). 9 Indeed, we *98 recently stated this very proposition in dicta in a decision involving a probation revocation hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Gerson Merrill Kartman v. Robert Parratt, Warden, Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complexgreen1 sentence1986See Smith v. United States, supra, 474 A.2d at 1273 n. 6 (citing Kartman v. Parratt, 535 F.2d 450, 457-58 (8th Cir.1976)). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1986See Smith v. United States, supra, 474 A.2d at 1273 n. 6 (citing Kartman v. Parratt, 535 F.2d 450, 457-58 (8th Cir.1976)). | 1 | 1 |
Acker v. Administrator, General Services Administrationgreen2 sentences1986See, e.g., DeVeau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308, 1316 (D.C.1982) (pre-trial detention hearing), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1087 , 103 S.Ct. 1781 , 76 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983); Villines v. United States, 312 A.2d 304, 306 (D.C.1973) (bail review hearing). 9 Indeed, we *98 recently stated this very proposition in dicta in a decision involving a probation revocation hearing. 1986See, e.g., DeVeau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308, 1316 (D.C.1982) (pre-trial detention hearing), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1087 , 103 S.Ct. 1781 , 76 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983); Villines v. United States, 312 A.2d 304, 306 (D.C.1973) (bail review hearing). 9 Indeed, we *98 recently stated this very proposition in dicta in a decision involving a probation revocation hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Swiatek v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1986See, e.g., DeVeau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308, 1316 (D.C.1982) (pre-trial detention hearing), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1087 , 103 S.Ct. 1781 , 76 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983); Villines v. United States, 312 A.2d 304, 306 (D.C.1973) (bail review hearing). 9 Indeed, we *98 recently stated this very proposition in dicta in a decision involving a probation revocation hearing. | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Alexandergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Short v. United States
green
2 sentences1994The government goes on to state in footnote 7 to its brief: Short v. United States, 366 A.2d 781 (D.C.1976) establishes that a probation revocation hearing is not a "criminal prosecution" in which immunized testimony may not be considered. 1994The government goes on to state in footnote 7 to its brief: Short v. United States, 366 A.2d 781 (D.C.1976) establishes that a probation revocation hearing is not a “criminal prosecution” in which immunized testimony may not be considered. | 2 | 1990–1994 |
McNeil v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2007Mr. McCloud’s attempt to assert appellant’s Sixth Amendment right in this case at the probation revocation hearing had no legal effect because appellant’s presence in the courthouse was unrelated to the murder charge. 12 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-168 , 121 S.Ct. 1335 , 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense-specific” (citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175-176 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 )). 2007Mr. McCloud’s attempt to assert appellant’s Sixth Amendment right in this case at the probation revocation hearing had no legal effect because appellant’s presence in the courthouse was unrelated to the murder charge. 12 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-168 , 121 S.Ct. 1335 , 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense-specific” (citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175-176 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 )). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Texas v. Cobb
green
2 sentences2007Mr. McCloud’s attempt to assert appellant’s Sixth Amendment right in this case at the probation revocation hearing had no legal effect because appellant’s presence in the courthouse was unrelated to the murder charge. 12 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-168 , 121 S.Ct. 1335 , 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense-specific” (citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175-176 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 )). 2007Mr. McCloud’s attempt to assert appellant’s Sixth Amendment right in this case at the probation revocation hearing had no legal effect because appellant’s presence in the courthouse was unrelated to the murder charge. 12 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-168 , 121 S.Ct. 1335 , 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense-specific” (citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175-176 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 )). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2007Appellant was not presented to the court on the murder charge until November 13, when a complaint was filed, three days after assertion of his right to counsel. [3] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [4] In this case, Detective Sauls, the officer who initiated the questioning of appellant, testified that although he knew that defendants are entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing, he did not know-nor did he inquire of the U.S. Attorney's office or appellant-whether appellant had counsel. 2007Appellant was not presented to the court on the murder charge until November 13, when a complaint was filed, three days after assertion of his right to counsel. [3] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [4] In this case, Detective Sauls, the officer who initiated the questioning of appellant, testified that although he knew that defendants are entitled to counsel at a probation revocation hearing, he did not know-nor did he inquire of the U.S. Attorney's office or appellant-whether appellant had counsel. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2004In the course of answering this question, we must answer two others: (1) Does the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), preclude consideration at a probation revocation hearing of an unavailable codefendant’s custodial statement to police impheating the probationer in a-crime; and (2) by what standard of proof must the government prove a crime offered as the basis for revoking probation. 2004In the course of answering this question, we must answer two others: (1) Does the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), preclude consideration at a probation revocation hearing of an unavailable codefendant’s custodial statement to police impheating the probationer in a-crime; and (2) by what standard of proof must the government prove a crime offered as the basis for revoking probation. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Matos v. United States
green
2 sentences2000Judge Huvelle decided to address what appeared to be “[Littlejohn’s] real challenge ... [-] Judge Scott’s alleged failure to make a ‘no benefit’ finding at the time of sentencing (as opposed to at the probation revocation hearing) ....” In considering Littlejohn’s challenge, Judge Huvelle cited Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28 (D.C.1993) and concluded that he had not shown the required “cause for his failure to [raise the “no benefit” argument in pri- or collateral attacks on his sentence] and prejudice as a result of his failure.” 631 A.2d at 30 (quoting Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450 2000Judge Huvelle decided to address what appeared to be “[Littlejohn’s] real challenge ... [-] Judge Scott’s alleged failure to make a ‘no benefit’ finding at the time of sentencing (as opposed to at the probation revocation hearing) ....” In considering Littlejohn’s challenge, Judge Huvelle cited Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28 (D.C.1993) and concluded that he had not shown the required “cause for his failure to [raise the “no benefit” argument in pri- or collateral attacks on his sentence] and prejudice as a result of his failure.” 631 A.2d at 30 (quoting Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Harris v. United States
green
1 sentence1996Harris, supra, 612 A.2d at 202 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
2 sentences1994In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 [, 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 ] (1984), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege is not available at a probation revocation hearing as a bar to making the probationer respond to questions that may result in revocation of probation. 1994In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 [, 104 S.Ct. 1136 , 79 L.Ed.2d 409 ] (1984), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege is not available at a probation revocation hearing as a bar to making the probationer respond to questions that may result in revocation of probation. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1992Consequently, the formal rules of evidence governing a criminal prosecution do not apply to a probation revocation proceeding. “[T]he process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (establishing minimum due process requirements for revocation of parole). 5 All that is required before admitting evidence at a probation revocation hearing is a determination that the proffered evidence is reliabl 1992Consequently, the formal rules of evidence governing a criminal prosecution do not apply to a probation revocation proceeding. “[T]he process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (establishing minimum due process requirements for revocation of parole). 5 All that is required before admitting evidence at a probation revocation hearing is a determination that the proffered evidence is reliabl | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In Re Jamison green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| In Re Banks green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| McBride v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.