determined rule in New Jersey

2002Id. at 623-24 , 419 N.Y.S. 2d 920 , 393 N.E. 2d 994 .

2002Id. at 623-24 , 419 N.Y.S. 2d 920 , 393 N.E. 2d 994 .

2001Ibid.

2001Ibid.

2025First, the court determined defense counsel's representation at sentencing did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness because, although counsel had a right to argue for a lesser sentence under State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433 (1989), he was not obligated to do so.

2021The court determined a hearing would be held A-0629-19 7 pursuant to Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235 (2000), to determine if there was clear and convincing evidence that A.A.W. was unfit as a parent or that there were other exceptional circumstances, such as that the caretakers were the psychological parents of the children.

2019A motorist must be given a meaningful opportunity to produce ownership credentials, but if he is either unable or unwilling to do so, an officer may conduct a brief and targeted search of the area where the registration might normally be kept in the vehicle. [Id. at 238-39 (citing Keaton, 222 N.J. at 448 ).] The Court determined the exception continued to "rest[] on solid constitutional ground[,]" id. at 242, but held it did not apply where "a driver or passenger explains to an officer that he has lost or forgotten his registration, and the officer can readily determine that either is the lawf

2018Id. at 433-34 .

2017So long as the officers executing the warrant have an objectively reasonable basis, in light of the known characteristics of the location and the evidence at hand, for concluding that a structure is appurtenant to the premises specified in the search warrant, that structure may validly be searched under the purview of the warrant. [Id. at 13 (citation omitted).] The court noted case law provided "guideposts" for courts determining "[w]hether a searching officer reasonably could conclude that a specific structure is appurtenant to the premises specified in a particular search warrant." Id. at 1

2017The Court determined that the standard for the imposition of an extended term under the standard that had been established in State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987), was no longer constitutionally viable under the principles in Apprendi.

2017Pierce, supra, 188 N.J. at 168-69 .

2009The Court determined that the test of an investment contract was “whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” Id. at 301 , 66 S.Ct. at 1104 , 90 L.Ed. at 1251 .

2009The Court determined that the test of an investment contract was “whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” Id. at 301 , 66 S.Ct. at 1104 , 90 L.Ed. at 1251 .

2004Id. at 397 , 815 A. 2d 432 .

2004Id. at 397 , 815 A. 2d 432 .

1999On the merits of the claim, the court ruled that the evidence should be excluded for the following reasons: the passage of time made the evidence’s relevance suspect; the incidents in the past are not similar enough to the present incident because the past incidents involved friends and the present incident involves a stranger; and, admitting the evidence would distract the jury by “delving into the circumstances of those cases and trying to assess what [T.O.’s] mental capacity may have been at the time.” Ill The defendant was charged and convicted of sexual assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(l)

1999On the merits of the claim, the court ruled that the evidence should be excluded for the following reasons: the passage of time made the evidence’s relevance suspect; the incidents in the past are not similar enough to the present incident because the past incidents involved friends and the present incident involves a stranger; and, admitting the evidence would distract the jury by “delving into the circumstances of those cases and trying to assess what [T.O.’s] mental capacity may have been at the time.” Ill The defendant was charged and convicted of sexual assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(l)

1996The court determined that his claim was barred because he failed to follow the detailed grievance procedure set forth in the handbook: "If the plaintiff seeks to rely on provisions in the employee handbook as the source of an implied contract of employment, then he must accept that agreement as a whole with its attendant responsibilities." Id. at 951 .

1994See Westphal v. Guarino, 163 N.J.Super. 139, 145 , 394 A.2d 377 (App.Div.) (noting that exclusion of evidence is proper sanction for violation of Rule 4:17-7), af f'd o.b., 78 N.J. 308 , 394 A.2d 354 (1978).

1994See Westphal v. Guarino, 163 N.J.Super. 139, 145 , 394 A.2d 377 (App.Div.) (noting that exclusion of evidence is proper sanction for violation of Rule 4:17-7), af f'd o.b., 78 N.J. 308 , 394 A.2d 354 (1978).

1994Accordingly, the Court determined that the test to be applied in the evaluation of a content-neutral injunction should be “whether *219 the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2525, 129 L.Ed.2d at 608 .

1994Accordingly, the Court determined that the test to be applied in the evaluation of a content-neutral injunction should be “whether *219 the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2525, 129 L.Ed.2d at 608 .

1994The court determined that those factors had resulted “in a manifest denial of justice.” The Appellate Division, finding support in the record for trial court’s deter *511 mination, upheld it decision to grant a new trial. 266 N.J.Super. at 601 , 630 A.2d 368 .

1994The court determined that those factors had resulted “in a manifest denial of justice.” The Appellate Division, finding support in the record for trial court’s deter *511 mination, upheld it decision to grant a new trial. 266 N.J.Super. at 601 , 630 A.2d 368 .

1993However, the court determined that the test was not valid under the implied consent statute because the police officer did not provide Pond with any of the “advice the statute required concerning the consequences of refusing to consent.” Id. at 1057 .

1993However, the court determined that the test was not valid under the implied consent statute because the police officer did not provide Pond with any of the "advice the statute required concerning the consequences of refusing to consent." Id. at 1057 .

1993The Court determined that the defense expert's testimony had failed to link the defendant's symptoms, which consisted of rage and loss of control, with the diagnosis of a personality disorder. 116 N.J. at 609 , 562 A. 2d 1320 .

1993The Court determined that the defense expert's testimony had failed to link the defendant's symptoms, which consisted of rage and loss of control, with the diagnosis of a personality disorder. 116 N.J. at 609 , 562 A. 2d 1320 .

1992Looking to "established principles of trust law," the Court determined that this standard of review was appropriate when, as here, "the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to *666 construe the terms of the plan." 489 U.S. at 115 , 109 S.Ct. at 956 , 103 L.Ed. 2d at 95 .

1992Looking to "established principles of trust law," the Court determined that this standard of review was appropriate when, as here, "the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to *666 construe the terms of the plan." 489 U.S. at 115 , 109 S.Ct. at 956 , 103 L.Ed. 2d at 95 .

1987There the Court determined that a claim by a commercial purchaser for economic losses resulting from the purchase of defective goods is limited by the remedies afforded under the Uniform Commercial Code, id. at 561 , and that such economic expectations that are protected by the U.C.C. are not entitled to supplemental protection by negligence principles....

1980Id. 441 U.S. at 19-20 , 99 S.Ct. at 1562, 60 L.Ed.2d at 16 (citation omitted); see White Motor Co. v. United States, supra, 372 U.S. at 261-263 , 83 S.Ct. at 700-702 , 9 L.Ed.2d at 745-747 ; see also Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries, Inc., supra, 576 F.2d at 88 ; but see Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 644-645 , 100 S.Ct. 1925, 1926 , 64 L.Ed.2d 580, 583 (1980); Nannes, “A Price-Fixing Surprise, Per Se: Implications of the Catalano Case,” 2(43) Nat’l L.J. 23 (1980).

1980Id. 441 U.S. at 19-20 , 99 S.Ct. at 1562, 60 L.Ed. 2d at 16 (citation omitted); see White Motor Co. v. United States, supra, 372 U.S. at 261-263 , 83 S.Ct. at 700-702 , 9 L.Ed. 2d at 745-747 ; see also Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries, Inc., supra, 576 F. 2d at 88 ; but see Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 644-645 , 100 S.Ct. 1925, 1926 , 64 L.Ed. 2d 580, 583 (1980); Nannes, "A Price-Fixing Surprise, Per Se: Implications of the Catalano Case," 2(43) Nat'l L.J. 23 (1980).