12 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Iowa v. Deng Kon Tonggreen2 sentences2014See id. at 600 . 2014See id. at 600 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Behngreen2 sentences2016In considering whether the new evidence was merely cumulative or impeaching, the court held that it was clearly not cumulative “since no comparable evidence was offered at trial.” Id. at 344. -The court determined that the standard for whether evidence is merely cumulative or impeaching is the Brady standard: whether the. evidence . “impeaches a witness where the issue of the witness’ reliability and credibility is crucial.” Id. at 344-45. 2016The court determined that the standard for whether evidence is merely cumulative or impeaching is the Brady standard: whether the evidence “impeaches a witness where the issue of the witness’ reliability and credibility is crucial.” Id. at 344–45. | 1 | 2 |
State of Iowa v. Kenneth L. Lillygreen1 sentence2019See Lilly, 930 N.W.2d at 301–02, 304 (holding a defendant establishes the second prong of Plain/Duren under Article I, section 10 by showing the percent of the group in the jury pool is “one standard deviation or more below its percentage in the overall population of eligible jurors); Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 329 (requiring “a downward variance of two standard deviations” to meet the second prong of Plain/Duren under the Sixth Amendment). 4 The court determined standard jury management practices could constitute systematic exclusion under the Iowa Constitution, but something more than a “laundry li | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Peter Leroy Vealgreen2 sentences2019See Lilly, 930 N.W.2d at 301–02, 304 (holding a defendant establishes the second prong of Plain/Duren under Article I, section 10 by showing the percent of the group in the jury pool is “one standard deviation or more below its percentage in the overall population of eligible jurors); Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 329 (requiring “a downward variance of two standard deviations” to meet the second prong of Plain/Duren under the Sixth Amendment). 4 The court determined standard jury management practices could constitute systematic exclusion under the Iowa Constitution, but something more than a “laundry li 2019See Lilly, 930 N.W.2d at 308 (“[W]e hold today that run-of-the-mill jury management practices such as the updating of address lists, the granting of excuses, and the enforcement of jury summonses can support a systematic exclusion claim where the evidence shows 9 benefit of either Lilly or Veal’s refinements, we remand the matter to the district court to give Shaw an opportunity to develop his arguments that his constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated; if the court finds a violation occurred, it shall grant Shaw a new trial. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Allengreen1 sentence2011Id. at 661. | 1 | 1 |
Griffith v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1989In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 716 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 661 (1987), the court determined the rule in Batson was only applicable to litigation that was pending on direct state or federal review or was not yet final when Batson was decided on April 30, 1986. 1989In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 , 107 S.Ct. 708, 716 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 661 (1987), the court determined the rule in Batson was only applicable to litigation that was pending on direct state or federal review or was not yet final when Batson was decided on April 30, 1986. | 1 | 1 |
Teague v. Lanegreen2 sentences1989See also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). 1989See also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meier v. SENECAUT III
green
2 sentences2019Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 541 . 6 The last option, granting an extension of time requires a showing of good cause. 2015Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 541 . | 2 | 2015–2019 |
In RE the Detention of Harold Johnson, Harold Johnson
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 757 . 2016In Johnson, the court determined the violation of the timeliness requirement did not entitle the appellant to discharge because it “would run counter to the chapter’s framework and the legislature’s expressed purpose.” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Schimmelpfennig v. Eagle Nat. Assur. Corp.
green
1 sentence2015DuTrac cites Schimmelpfennig v. Eagle National Assurance Corporation, 641 N.W.2d 814 (Iowa 2002), claiming the court determined that a claim for attorney fees was “liquidated and complete” when the plaintiff paid the fees. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Marsh
green
2 sentences1988Id. 1988Id. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.