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23 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
MacKall v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Mackall Court distinguished the case before it from Spurrier, noting that the exceptions listed in subsection (c) were contained in “a subsection subsequent to the enacting clause of the offense” and were “not . . . so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Mackall, 283 Md. at 111 . 16 15 The Mackall Court explained that Spurrier “concerned the provisions of subsection (b) [of former Article 27, § 36], now subsection (c) and hereinafter referred to as subsection (c)[.]” Mackall, 283 Md. at 109 ; see also id. at 105 n.5 (explaining t 2024The Mackall Court distinguished the case before it from Spurrier, noting that the exceptions listed in subsection (c) were contained in “a subsection subsequent to the enacting clause of the offense” and were “not . . . so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Mackall, 283 Md. at 111 . 16 15 The Mackall Court explained that Spurrier “concerned the provisions of subsection (b) [of former Article 27, § 36], now subsection (c) and hereinafter referred to as subsection (c)[.]” Mackall, 283 Md. at 109 ; see also id. at 105 n.5 (explaining t | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Mackall Court distinguished the case before it from Spurrier, noting that the exceptions listed in subsection (c) were contained in “a subsection subsequent to the enacting clause of the offense” and were “not . . . so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Mackall, 283 Md. at 111 . 16 15 The Mackall Court explained that Spurrier “concerned the provisions of subsection (b) [of former Article 27, § 36], now subsection (c) and hereinafter referred to as subsection (c)[.]” Mackall, 283 Md. at 109 ; see also id. at 105 n.5 (explaining t 2024The Mackall Court distinguished the case before it from Spurrier, noting that the exceptions listed in subsection (c) were contained in “a subsection subsequent to the enacting clause of the offense” and were “not . . . so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Mackall, 283 Md. at 111 . 16 15 The Mackall Court explained that Spurrier “concerned the provisions of subsection (b) [of former Article 27, § 36], now subsection (c) and hereinafter referred to as subsection (c)[.]” Mackall, 283 Md. at 109 ; see also id. at 105 n.5 (explaining t | 2 | 2 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen1 sentence2022The Court determined that the presumption of prejudice did not apply to Mr. Ramirez’s case because “there was no actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether . . . .” Id. at 577 (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri ex rel. N.N.H., By His Next Friend, R.S.A. v. Honorable R. Michael Wagner, Judge, 17th Judicial Circuit, Cass County, Missourigreen1 sentence2021State v. Wagner, 504 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). | 1 | 1 |
Bond v. Slavingreen1 sentence2020We explained that though an “omission in the certificate of service is a defect, . . . [w]here there is no evidence that [the opposing party] was prejudiced or that the course of the appeal was delayed by a defect, ‘it is the practice of this Court to decide appeals on the merits rather than on technicalities.’” Id. (quoting Bond v. Slavin, 157 Md. App. 340, 352-53 (2004)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences2020We explained that though an “omission in the certificate of service is a defect, . . . [w]here there is no evidence that [the opposing party] was prejudiced or that the course of the appeal was delayed by a defect, ‘it is the practice of this Court to decide appeals on the merits rather than on technicalities.’” Id. (quoting Bond v. Slavin, 157 Md. App. 340, 352-53 (2004)). 2020In State v. Andrews, this Court determined that an error in the certificate of service in a notice of appeal did not warrant dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-323. 227 Md. App. 350, 370 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COM'N OF MARYLAND v. Atkinsongreen2 sentences2015This Court determined the hearing judge was “correct in characterizing [Atkinson’s] particular misconduct as dishonest, if only because of the substantial duration in time over which she failed to pay both state and federal income taxes.” Id. at 655 , 745 A.2d at 1091 (first emphasis added). 2015This Court determined the hearing judge was “correct in characterizing [Atkinson’s] particular misconduct as dishonest, if only because of the substantial duration in time over which she failed to pay both state and federal income taxes.” Id. at 655 , 745 A.2d at 1091 (first emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011The court determined that the error in admitting the improperly authenticated MySpace messages "did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice," however, and, therefore, did not reverse Williams's conviction, because Noyes's testimony was significantly overshadowed "by the testimony of two witnesses to the murder who identified Williams as the shooter." Id. at 1173. 2011The court determined that the error in admitting the improperly authenticated MySpace messages “did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,” however, and, therefore, did not reverse Williams’s conviction, because Noyes’s testimony was significantly overshadowed “by the testimony of two witnesses to the murder who identified Williams as the shooter.” Id. at 1173. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Waygreen2 sentences2008The Court determined that the instruction was erroneous, holding that if “the actual penetration is accomplished with the woman’s consent, the accused is not guilty of rape,” id. at 762, without any further analysis or citation of authority. 2008The Court determined that the instruction was erroneous, holding that if "the actual penetration is accomplished with the woman's consent, the accused is not guilty of rape," id. at 762, without any further analysis or citation of authority. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Interest of J. D. G.green1 sentence1999Lack of true consent of those under seventeen is not an element of the substantive crime." 561 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (citations omitted). [17] See Robinson, 438 A.2d at 967 n. 5 (concluding that, although the Model Penal Code allows a mistake-of-age defense if the victim is ten or older, "certainly the legislature may, consistently with considerations of due process, determine as a matter of public policy that the still tender age of fourteen is appropriate."); In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo.1973) ("The selection of the female age factor in a statutory rape statute is basically a | 1 | 1 |
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.red2 sentences1999See id. at 186 , 99 S.Ct. 2710 . 1999See id. at 186 , 99 S.Ct. 2710 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences1999Lack of true consent of those under seventeen is not an element of the substantive crime.” 561 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (citations omitted). . 1999Lack of true consent of those under seventeen is not an element of the substantive crime." 561 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (citations omitted). [17] See Robinson, 438 A.2d at 967 n. 5 (concluding that, although the Model Penal Code allows a mistake-of-age defense if the victim is ten or older, "certainly the legislature may, consistently with considerations of due process, determine as a matter of public policy that the still tender age of fourteen is appropriate."); In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo.1973) ("The selection of the female age factor in a statutory rape statute is basically a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Drakegreen1 sentence1999Lack of true consent of those under seventeen is not an element of the substantive crime." 561 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (citations omitted). [17] See Robinson, 438 A.2d at 967 n. 5 (concluding that, although the Model Penal Code allows a mistake-of-age defense if the victim is ten or older, "certainly the legislature may, consistently with considerations of due process, determine as a matter of public policy that the still tender age of fourteen is appropriate."); In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo.1973) ("The selection of the female age factor in a statutory rape statute is basically a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McCulloch v. Glendening
green
2 sentences2010Citing the prior jurisprudence that we have reviewed, the Court stated: "It is well settled that not all collective bargaining agreements to which the State or a governmental agency is a party require prior express legislative approval. . . ." McCulloch, 347 Md. at 275 , 701 A.2d 99 . 2010Citing the prior jurisprudence that we have reviewed, the Court stated: "It is well settled that not all collective bargaining agreements to which the State or a governmental agency is a party require prior express legislative approval. . . ." McCulloch, 347 Md. at 275 , 701 A.2d 99 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Carroll v. State
green
2 sentences2018The Court determined that an instruction that the reasonable doubt standard must be applied to each element of each offense was not required, stating, "we are, in the end, not persuaded that an otherwise-correct reasonable doubt instruction is rendered constitutionally deficient by the omission of language that each *761 element of the offense charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 692 , 53 A.3d 1159 . 2018The Court determined that an instruction that the reasonable doubt standard must be applied to each element of each offense was not required, stating, "we are, in the end, not persuaded that an otherwise-correct reasonable doubt instruction is rendered constitutionally deficient by the omission of language that each *761 element of the offense charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 692 , 53 A.3d 1159 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Lenihan
green
2 sentences2011Similarly, in People v. Lenihan, 30 Misc.3d 289 , 911 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y.Sup. 2011Similarly, in People v. Lenihan, 30 Misc.3d 289 , 911 N.Y.S.2d 588 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2010), Lenihan challenged his second degree murder conviction because he was not permitted to cross-examine two witnesses called by the State on the basis of photographs his mother had printed from MySpace, allegedly depicting the witnesses and the victim making hand gestures and wearing clothing that suggested an affiliation with the “Crips” gang. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Stanley Harley, United States of America v. Stanley Harley
green
2 sentences2009The Harley court held that "the surveillance location privilege, like the informer's privilege, applies at trials and that it, too, is to be applied through a balancing test controlled by `the fundamental requirements of fairness.'" Id. at 1020 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60 , 77 *289 S.Ct. at 628). 2009The Harley court held that “the surveillance location privilege, like the informer’s privilege, applies at trials and that it, too, is to be applied through a balancing test controlled by ‘the fundamental requirements of fairness.’ ” Id. at 1020 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60 , 77 S.Ct. at 628 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences2009The Harley court held that “the surveillance location privilege, like the informer’s privilege, applies at trials and that it, too, is to be applied through a balancing test controlled by ‘the fundamental requirements of fairness.’ ” Id. at 1020 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60 , 77 S.Ct. at 628 ). 2009The Harley court held that “the surveillance location privilege, like the informer’s privilege, applies at trials and that it, too, is to be applied through a balancing test controlled by ‘the fundamental requirements of fairness.’ ” Id. at 1020 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60 , 77 S.Ct. at 628 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
McQuay v. Schertle
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Frasher v. State
green
2 sentences2005In Frasher v. State, 8 Md.App. 439, 448 , 260 A.2d 656 (1970), this Court determined that the defense of necessity is not applicable to charges of control of heroin and possession of narcotic paraphernalia. 2005In Frasher v. State, 8 Md.App. 439, 448 , 260 A.2d 656 (1970), this Court determined that the defense of necessity is not applicable to charges of control of heroin and possession of narcotic paraphernalia. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ryder v. United States
green
2 sentences2003Acknowledging the Court’s reliance upon the doctrine “in several cases involving challenges by criminal defendants to the authority of a judge who participated in some part of the proceeding leading to their conviction and sentence,” id. at 181 , 115 S.Ct. at 2034 , 132 L.Ed.2d at 142 , the Court determined that the doctrine was inapplicable because the defendant promptly objected to the composition of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review. 2003Acknowledging the Court’s reliance upon the doctrine “in several cases involving challenges by criminal defendants to the authority of a judge who participated in some part of the proceeding leading to their conviction and sentence,” id. at 181 , 115 S.Ct. at 2034 , 132 L.Ed.2d at 142 , the Court determined that the doctrine was inapplicable because the defendant promptly objected to the composition of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
green
2 sentences2001Thomas, 48 Md.App. at 626 , 429 A.2d at 283 . 2001Thomas, 48 Md.App. at 626 , 429 A.2d at 283 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Jesse B. Manbeck v. Gerald S. Ostrowski
green
1 sentence2001Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Pressley v. State
green
2 sentences2001This Court determined that the instruction should not have been given, id. at 150 , 454 A.2d at 350 , but that the error was harmless in light of the instructions as a whole. 2001This Court determined that the instruction should not have been given, id. at 150 , 454 A.2d at 350 , but that the error was harmless in light of the instructions as a whole. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Robinson
green
1 sentence1999Lack of true consent of those under seventeen is not an element of the substantive crime." 561 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (citations omitted). [17] See Robinson, 438 A.2d at 967 n. 5 (concluding that, although the Model Penal Code allows a mistake-of-age defense if the victim is ten or older, "certainly the legislature may, consistently with considerations of due process, determine as a matter of public policy that the still tender age of fourteen is appropriate."); In re Interest of J.D.G., 498 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo.1973) ("The selection of the female age factor in a statutory rape statute is basically a | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Cooksey v. Portland Public School District No. 1
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Rupert Ex Rel. Rupert v. Stienne
green
2 sentences1996Reaching the same result is Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 290 , 267 P.2d 240 (1954), overruled in part in Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974) (abrogating parent-child immunity). 1996Reaching the same result is Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 290 , 267 P.2d 240 (1954), overruled in part in Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974) (abrogating parent-child immunity). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Strong v. Strong
green
1 sentence1996Reaching the same result is Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 290 , 267 P.2d 240 (1954), overruled in part in Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397 , 528 P.2d 1013 (1974) (abrogating parent-child immunity). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
DURHAM, a MINOR, ETC. v. Durham
green
1 sentence1996As there was no specific repeal of parent-child immunity in the statute, the court determined that the immunity still applied, stating, at 85 So.2d at 809 : The wrongful death statute should be construed and administered consistent with all the rules of common law not expressly abrogated. [Citation] We fail to find in the wrongful death statute any expression indicating a legislative intent to abrogate the rule that a minor may not sue a parent in tort. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, Inc. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Perry ex rel. Perry v. House of Refuge
green
1 sentence1994The Court referred to legislative action on the matter, reflected in Md.Code (1957, 1964 Repl.Vol.) Article 48A, § 480, see supra, and Md.Code (1957, 1965 Repl-Vol.) Article 43, § 556A, concerning tort immunity and hospitals. 6 *207 The Court determined that the rule of Perry, 63 Md. 20 , stood, “tempered only by statutory provisions directed to the insurer .... ” Howard, 249 Md. at 236 , 238 A.2d 863 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.