determined defense in Illinois

2011Our supreme court cited its previous decision in People v. Rivera, 227 Ill.2d 1, 26 , 316 Ill.Dec. 488 , 879 N.E.2d 876 (2007) ( Rivera II ), in which the court determined that a violation of the right to seven peremptory challenges afforded a defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 434(d) was subject to harmless-error review.

2011Our supreme court cited its previous decision in People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2007) (Rivera II), in which the court determined that a violation of the right to seven peremptory challenges afforded a defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 434(d) was subject to harmless-error review.

2016Old Ben Coal, 150 Ill. App. 3d 304 at 308-09 ; see also Board of Directors, Green Hills Country Club v. Human Rights Comm’n, 162 Ill. App. 3d 216, 221 (1987) (Fifth District, relying on Old Ben Coal, further held that, prior to effective date of section 2-102(D), employers were strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel regardless of whether they knew of such conduct). ¶ 39 Similarly, in Village of Bellwood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm’n, 184 Ill. App. 3d 339, 351 (1989), the First District upheld the Commission’s determination that a racially c

2016Old Ben Coal, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 308-09 ; see also Board of Directors, Green Hills Country Club v. Human Rights Comm’n, 162 Ill. App. 3d 216, 221 (1987) (Fifth District, relying on Old Ben Coal, further held that, prior to effective date of section 2-102(D), employers were strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel regardless of whether they knew of such conduct). ¶ 39 Similarly, in Village of Bellwood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm’n, 184 Ill. App. 3d 339, 351 (1989), the First District upheld the Commission’s determination that a racially charg

2016Old Ben Coal, 150 Ill. App. 3d 304 at 308-09 ; see also Board of Directors, Green Hills Country Club v. Human Rights Comm’n, 162 Ill. App. 3d 216, 221 (1987) (Fifth District, relying on Old Ben Coal, further held that, prior to effective date of section 2-102(D), employers were strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel regardless of whether they knew of such conduct). ¶ 39 Similarly, in Village of Bellwood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm’n, 184 Ill. App. 3d 339, 351 (1989), the First District upheld the Commission’s determination that a racially c

2016Old Ben Coal, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 308-09 ; see also Board of Directors, Green Hills Country Club v. Human Rights Comm’n, 162 Ill. App. 3d 216, 221 (1987) (Fifth District, relying on Old Ben Coal, further held that, prior to effective date of section 2-102(D), employers were strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel regardless of whether they knew of such conduct). ¶ 39 Similarly, in Village of Bellwood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm’n, 184 Ill. App. 3d 339, 351 (1989), the First District upheld the Commission’s determination that a racially charg

2016Old Ben Coal, 150 Ill. App. 3d 304 at 308-09 ; see also Board of Directors, Green Hills Country Club v. Human Rights Comm’n, 162 Ill. App. 3d 216, 221 (1987) (Fifth District, relying on Old Ben Coal, further held that, prior to effective date of section 2-102(D), employers were strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel regardless of whether they knew of such conduct). ¶ 39 Similarly, in Village of Bellwood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm’n, 184 Ill. App. 3d 339, 351 (1989), the First District upheld the Commission’s determination that a racially c

2016Old Ben Coal, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 308-09 ; see also Board of Directors, Green Hills Country Club v. Human Rights Comm’n, 162 Ill. App. 3d 216, 221 (1987) (Fifth District, relying on Old Ben Coal, further held that, prior to effective date of section 2-102(D), employers were strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel regardless of whether they knew of such conduct). ¶ 39 Similarly, in Village of Bellwood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm’n, 184 Ill. App. 3d 339, 351 (1989), the First District upheld the Commission’s determination that a racially charg

2004App. 3d 1060, 1064 , 563 N.E.2d 977, 980 (1990), this court determined that a claim for attorney fees is defined as a “claim” within the meaning of the applicable supreme court rules when it is “a matter involved in the action; it is a possible right of plaintiff and a possible liability for defendant.” Here, attorney fees were not involved in the litigation.

2004App. 3d 1060, 1064 , 563 N.E.2d 977, 980 (1990), this court determined that a claim for attorney fees is defined as a "claim" within the meaning of the applicable Supreme Court rules, when it is "a matter involved in the action; it is a possible right of the plaintiff and a possible liability of the defendants." Here, attorney fees were not involved in the litigation.

1997See Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248 (evidentiary hearing ordered where defense counsel waited until after defendant was convicted to prepare for mitigation hearing, then held a group interview with potential witnesses for one hour); Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168 (court remanded for a new sentencing hearing where defense counsel failed to make even a minimal investigation into the defendant’s background, although he possessed information to do so); Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s competency where defense counsel failed to contact a number of the defendant’

1997See Caballero , 126 Ill. 2d 248 (evidentiary hearing ordered where defense counsel waited until after defendant was convicted to prepare for mitigation hearing, then held a group interview with potential witnesses for one hour); Perez , 148 Ill. 2d 168 (court remanded for a new sentencing hearing where defense counsel failed to make even a minimal investigation into the defendant's background, although he possessed information to do so); Thompkins , 161 Ill. 2d 148 (court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on counsel's competency where defense counsel failed to contact a number of the defenda

1997Subsequently, in People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1995), this court determined that the analysis of Williams and Szabo was applicable to an attorney who was being investigated for criminal infractions.

1997Subsequently, in People v. Franklin , 167 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1995), this court determined that the analysis of Williams and Szabo was applicable to an attorney who was being investigated for criminal infractions.

2002Leon, 486 U.S. at 916-21, 82 L.

2002Leon , 486 U.S. at 916-21, 82 L.

2026ANALYSIS ¶ 24 The Act permits any imprisoned person to collaterally attack his conviction based on the substantial denial of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2024); People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009).

2023Therefore, we do not find error where the court determined the instruction would inaccurately state the law of the general intent required to find defendant guilty of his accountability charge, a general intent crime, based on the underlying first-degree murder charge. ¶ 88 F. Cumulative Error ¶ 89 On appeal, defendant advances that the issues mentioned above in tandem with his month-long COVID-19 delay during his second trial arose to cumulative error and deprived him of a fair trial. ¶ 90 “[W]here errors are not individually considered sufficiently egregious for an appellate court to grant t