determined defense in New York

2013This Court determined that a violation of 18 USC § 664 is a serious crime within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d) and, on May 22, 2012, entered an order suspending respondent and directing him to show cause why a final order of discipline should not be entered (Matter of Barnes, 96 AD3d 1510 [2012]).

2013This Court determined that a violation of 18 USC § 664 is a serious crime within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d) and, on May 22, 2012, entered an order suspending respondent and directing him to show cause why a final order of discipline should not be entered (Matter of Barnes, 96 AD3d 1510 [2012]).

1990The closure of the courtroom was proper since the court determined at a hearing that the undercover police officer was still operating in the community, and closure was necessary to protect his safety and the integrity of ongoing investigations (see, People v Jones, 47 NY2d 409 , cert denied 444 US 946 ).

1987In any event, the closure was proper since the court determined at a hearing that the undercover police officers were still operating in the community, and closure was necessary to protect their safety and the integrity of ongoing investigations (see, People v Jones, 47 NY2d 409 , cert denied 444 US 946 ; People v Hinton, 31 NY2d 71 , cert denied 410 US 911 ).

1990The closure of the courtroom was proper since the court determined at a hearing that the undercover police officer was still operating in the community, and closure was necessary to protect his safety and the integrity of ongoing investigations (see, People v Jones, 47 NY2d 409 , cert denied 444 US 946 ).

1987In any event, the closure was proper since the court determined at a hearing that the undercover police officers were still operating in the community, and closure was necessary to protect their safety and the integrity of ongoing investigations (see, People v Jones, 47 NY2d 409 , cert denied 444 US 946 ; People v Hinton, 31 NY2d 71 , cert denied 410 US 911 ).

2023In Kabir, which involved a Monroe County deputy sheriff, the Court clarified that the recklessness standard in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) applies solely to the privileged conduct in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b) when performed under the conditions in subdivision (c) (see 16 NY3d at 222-223 ).

2021However, in Green Tree Servicing, LLC v Frantzeskakis (___ AD3d ___, 2021 NY Slip Op 06675 ), as on the subject appeal, the presumption of proper service raised by a process server's affidavit was not sufficiently rebutted so as to justify a hearing.

2021This Court's approach did not preclude consideration of the testimony elicited at the hearing under the circumstances present in Turner v Sideris ( 187 AD3d 963 ) or HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Sprei ( 180 AD3d 763 ), as in both cases, this Court determined that a hearing to determine the validity of service of process was warranted.

2021This Court's approach did not preclude consideration of the testimony elicited at the hearing under the circumstances present in Turner v Sideris ( 187 AD3d 963 ) or HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Sprei ( 180 AD3d 763 ), as in both cases, this Court determined that a hearing to determine the validity of service of process was warranted.

2018In People v Douglas ( 73 AD3d 30, 33 ), this Court determined that the rule that a defendant ordinarily cannot be guilty of both intentional and reckless assault of the same individual "does not apply where the defendant does not harbor an intent to injure the victim but the crime is [*3]deemed intentional by operation of law under a theory of transferred intent." This Court explained that "a defendant may act with a specific intent directed at one person, while at the same time being reckless with respect to a different person" ( id. at 34 ).

2018In People v Douglas ( 73 AD3d 30, 33 ), this Court determined that the rule that a defendant ordinarily cannot be guilty of both intentional and reckless assault of the same individual "does not apply where the defendant does not harbor an intent to injure the victim but the crime is [*3]deemed intentional by operation of law under a theory of transferred intent." This Court explained that "a defendant may act with a specific intent directed at one person, while at the same time being reckless with respect to a different person" ( id. at 34 ).

2018In People v Henderson ( 78 AD3d 1506, 1507 ), the Fourth Department similarly concluded that "[w]here . . . more than one potential victim was present at the [scene of the crimes], a defendant may be convicted of both [intentional and depraved indifference crimes] because he or she may have possessed different states of mind with regard to different potential victims" (internal quotation marks omitted).

2017(Ignizio v City of New York, 29 Misc 3d 1231 [A], 2010 NY Slip Op 52106[U] [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2010], revd on separate issue 85 AD3d 1171 [2d Dept 2011].) On January 5, 2017, a hearing on the issues was held and the City of New York presented Nisha Agarwal, the Commissioner of Immigrant Affairs in the City of New York, Steven Banks, the Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration and the Department of Social Services, the IDNYC program administering agency, and John Miller, the Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the New York City Police Depar

2015In People v Evans, this Court determined that the defense counsel’s decision not to seek dismissal of a time-barred lesser charge in order to provide the jury an opportunity to make a compromise verdict was a reasonable strategy (see 16 NY3d at 576 ).

2015Decades later, Feuerman was followed by Ochs v Ochs ( 193 Misc 2d 502 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2002]), which noted the court’s concern in Feuerman that making the test results and notes available before trial might undermine the effectiveness of the evaluation.

2012This Court determined that a violation of 18 USC § 1001 is a serious crime within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d) and, on September 17, 2010, entered an order suspending respondent and directing her to show cause why a final order of discipline should not be entered (Matter of Mahler, 77 AD3d 1455 [2010]).

2010This Court determined that a violation of 18 USC § 1033 (e) (1) (B) is a serious crime within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d) and, on September 17, 2009, entered an order suspending respondent and directing him to show cause why a final order of discipline should not be entered (Matter of Kernan, 66 AD3d 1497 [2009]).

2010This Court determined that a violation of 18 USC § 371 is a “serious crime” within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d) and, on June 23, 2010, entered an order suspending respondent and directing him to show cause why a final order of discipline should not be entered pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (í) and (g) (Matter of Mancuso, 75 AD3d 1113 [2010]).

2009In effect, the court determined that defense counsel did not show “sufficient indicia of good faith and diligence” in securing the expert’s testimony (People v Ryan, 229 AD2d 623, 625 [1996], affd 90 NY2d 822 [1997]).

2009The record does not indicate that defense counsel ever advised the court when the expert would be available to testify or how long the requested adjournment would be (see People v Wright, 192 AD2d 875, 876 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 809 [1993]; People v Danaher, 115 AD2d 905, 906-907 [1985]).

2005V In its decision in Slaughter , the Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding the issue, that a claim of an ineffective waiver by the defendant of his right to be represented by counsel at a pretrial suppression hearing was subject to harmless error analysis, and the Court determined that the error was not harmless in that instance (see 78 NY2d at 492 ; see also People v Smith, 243 AD2d 738, 739 [1997], affd 92 NY2d 516 [1998] [assuming, without deciding, that harmless error analysis applies to the denial of the right to counsel at a pretrial hearing, and holding that the error was not harml

2005In Slaughter , the suppression court had not merely improperly ordered the defendant to proceed pro se at the suppression hearing but had summarily and rather punitively concluded the hearing and, in so doing, had thwarted the defendant’s exercise of the right to review Rosario material and to cross-examine a police witness using that material (see 78 NY2d at 489 ).

2005V In its decision in Slaughter , the Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding the issue, that a claim of an ineffective waiver by the defendant of his right to be represented by counsel at a pretrial suppression hearing was subject to harmless error analysis, and the Court determined that the error was not harmless in that instance (see 78 NY2d at 492 ; see also People v Smith, 243 AD2d 738, 739 [1997], affd 92 NY2d 516 [1998] [assuming, without deciding, that harmless error analysis applies to the denial of the right to counsel at a pretrial hearing, and holding that the error was not harml