determined bar in Wisconsin

2018Falk , 360 Wis.2d 67 , ¶ 3, 857 N.W.2d 156 .

2018Falk, 360 Wis. 2d 67, ¶3 .

2024Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶57 .

2022What more was there to ask her?" Id. ¶31 Guided by this precedent and having the benefit of a detailed record documenting the judge's communications with the juror as well as counsel, we conclude the judge's meeting with Juror 2 regarding her health did not constitute a critical stage of the proceedings because the meeting (1) occurred prior to deliberations and (2) involved only a discussion of the juror's health and ability to proceed.

2019The court determined those factors “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of a determination that the Habush firm’s fee [was] reasonable.” The court quoted one of our prior decisions, in which we stated the “‘time and labor’ factor in SCR 20:1.5(a) must be redefined in the contingent fee analysis ‘to mean the time and effort expended to acquire expertise in the area of practice.’” Maynard Steel Casting Co. v. Sheedy, 2008 WI App 27, ¶20 , 307 Wis. 2d 653 , 746 N.W.2d 816 (quoting Anderson, 281 Wis. 2d 66, ¶60 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 11 No. 2019AP88 concurring)).

2019The court determined those factors “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of a determination that the Habush firm’s fee [was] reasonable.” The court quoted one of our prior decisions, in which we stated the “‘time and labor’ factor in SCR 20:1.5(a) must be redefined in the contingent fee analysis ‘to mean the time and effort expended to acquire expertise in the area of practice.’” Maynard Steel Casting Co. v. Sheedy, 2008 WI App 27, ¶20 , 307 Wis. 2d 653 , 746 N.W.2d 816 (quoting Anderson, 281 Wis. 2d 66, ¶60 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., 11 No. 2019AP88 concurring)).

2009Id. at 874 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 .

2009Id. at 874 .

2009Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50 . ¶ 133.

2009Waller, 467 U.S. at 49-50 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 . ¶ 133 The Waller Court agreed with the proposition that "the defendant should not be required to prove specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee." Id.

2001Id.

1991The conflict not only "imperils the accused's right to adequate representation," but "jeopardizes the integrity of the adversarial trial process and the prospect of a fair trial with a just, reliable result." Miller, 160 Wis. 2d at 653 , 467 N.W.2d at 120 .

1991The conflict not only "imperils the accused's right to adequate representation," but "jeopardizes the integrity of the adversarial trial process and the prospect of a fair trial with a just, reliable result." Miller, 160 Wis. 2d at 653 , 467 N.W.2d at 120 .

1987It was not necessary for the trial court to take evidence to make the determination, for it was clear from the arguments of counsel that this was strictly a question of law. ...” Id. at 577 .

1987It was not necessary for the trial court to take evidence to make the determination, for it was clear from the arguments of counsel that this was strictly a question of law. ..." Id. at 577 .

1983It stated that liability was denied by the defendants in their answer and remained an issue throughout the litigation and that the trial court was in a *235 superior position to determine whether liability was a genuine issue. 107 Wis. 2d at 297 .

1974Likewise, pursuant to principles established by this court in previous constructions of similar immunity statutes, it cannot be ruled that Joseph Maniaci was imbued with immunity from criminal prosecution as a result of his delivery to the court of the corporate records of Mando, Inc. The basic principles involved in the construction of state immunity statutes were first discussed in the case of State v. Murphy (1906), 128 Wis. 201 , 107 N. W. 470 , and later solidified in Carehidi v. State (1925), 187 Wis. 438 , 204 N. W. 473 , wherein the court determined that the immunity granted by such st

1974Likewise, pursuant to principles established by this court in previous constructions of similar immunity statutes, it cannot be ruled that Joseph Maniaci was imbued with immunity from criminal prosecution as a result of his delivery to the court of the corporate records of Mando, Inc. The basic principles involved in the construction of state immunity statutes were first discussed in the case of State v. Murphy (1906), 128 Wis. 201 , 107 N. W. 470 , and later solidified in Carehidi v. State (1925), 187 Wis. 438 , 204 N. W. 473 , wherein the court determined that the immunity granted by such st

1974Likewise, pursuant to principles established by this court in previous constructions of similar immunity statutes, it cannot be ruled that Joseph Maniaci was imbued with immunity from criminal prosecution as a result of his delivery to the court of the corporate records of Mando, Inc. The basic principles involved in the construction of state immunity statutes were first discussed in the case of State v. Murphy (1906), 128 Wis. 201 , 107 N. W. 470 , and later solidified in Carehidi v. State (1925), 187 Wis. 438 , 204 N. W. 473 , wherein the court determined that the immunity granted by such st

1974Likewise, pursuant to principles established by this court in previous constructions of similar immunity statutes, it cannot be ruled that Joseph Maniaci was imbued with immunity from criminal prosecution as a result of his delivery to the court of the corporate records of Mando, Inc. The basic principles involved in the construction of state immunity statutes were first discussed in the case of State v. Murphy (1906), 128 Wis. 201 , 107 N. W. 470 , and later solidified in Carehidi v. State (1925), 187 Wis. 438 , 204 N. W. 473 , wherein the court determined that the immunity granted by such st