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15 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burke v. McHenrygreen1 sentence2021Moreover, section 217.460 provides that a determined violation of the UMDDL will not support dismissal of an indictment, complaint, or information unless the court also finds "that the offender's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied." See also James, 552 S.W.3d at 597 ("[T]he plain language of the UMDDL mandates the dismissal of a complaint not brought to trial within 180 days unless the 180-day period is tolled, and if the court finds that the offender's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied." (quoting State v. McKay, 411 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) | 1 | 1 |
State v. McKaygreen1 sentence2021Moreover, section 217.460 provides that a determined violation of the UMDDL will not support dismissal of an indictment, complaint, or information unless the court also finds "that the offender's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied." See also James, 552 S.W.3d at 597 ("[T]he plain language of the UMDDL mandates the dismissal of a complaint not brought to trial within 180 days unless the 180-day period is tolled, and if the court finds that the offender's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied." (quoting State v. McKay, 411 S.W.3d 295, 302 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) | 1 | 1 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen1 sentence2020Under harmless error review, determined error of constitutional proportion must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a determination that "depends upon a host of factors," including, without limitation, the importance of the improperly admitted or excluded testimony, "whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, . . . and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 42 There is no basis in the record for us to find tha | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barrinergreen1 sentence2020"A finding of outcome-determinative prejudice expresses a judicial conclusion that the erroneously [excluded] evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all of the evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion but for the erroneously [excluded] evidence." State v. Barriner, 34 S.W.3d 139, 150 (Mo. banc 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).13 13 Even in Crane, where the determined claim of constitutional error was preserved, the United States Supreme Court noted that the | 1 | 1 |
Adoption of C.M. v. E.M.B.R.green1 sentence2019See In re Adoption of C.M., 414 S.W.3d at 659 (“There is no requirement that all seven of [the Section 211.447.7] factors must be negated; likewise, there is no minimum number of negative factors required for termination.”). | 1 | 1 |
R.J.N. Corp. v. Connelly Food Products, Inc.green2 sentences1998Corp. v. Connelly Food Products, Inc., 175 Ill.App.3d 655 , 125 Ill.Dec. 108, 110 , 529 N.E.2d 1184, 1186 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.1988), plaintiff brought an action against defendant for breach of contract, the terms of which provided that the contract was to remain in effect “as long as Connelly serves Rich’s [RJN’s] customers.” The court determined that this clause could not be construed as an objective event, the occurrence of which terminated the contract thereby making it sufficiently definite in duration. 1998Corp. v. Connelly Food Products, Inc., 175 Ill.App.3d 655 , 125 Ill.Dec. 108, 110 , 529 N.E.2d 1184, 1186 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.1988), plaintiff brought an action against defendant for breach of contract, the terms of which provided that the contract was to remain in effect “as long as Connelly serves Rich’s [RJN’s] customers.” The court determined that this clause could not be construed as an objective event, the occurrence of which terminated the contract thereby making it sufficiently definite in duration. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boundsgreen1 sentence1995In Johnson , the court determined that defense is not available in narcotics situations where the defendant denied making the actual “sale.” Id.; State v. Bounds, 644 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Mo.App.1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jefferson City
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 159-60 (citing Doe, 862 S.W.2d at 341 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Beck v. Fleming
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 159-60 (citing Doe, 862 S.W.2d at 341 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Crane v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2020"A finding of outcome-determinative prejudice expresses a judicial conclusion that the erroneously [excluded] evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all of the evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion but for the erroneously [excluded] evidence." State v. Barriner, 34 S.W.3d 139, 150 (Mo. banc 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).13 13 Even in Crane, where the determined claim of constitutional error was preserved, the United States Supreme Court noted that the | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Leonard v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2018In that case, the Court determined the rule was new as it "broke new ground by allowing claims that were procedurally barred under the prior case law." Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Johnson v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Witherspoon v. Guttierez
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 879 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Miller
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 471 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Derenzy
green
1 sentence2003Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Edwards
green
1 sentence2001Referring to this type of situation as “hybrid representation,” the Court determined that warning a litigant of the difficulties with representing oneself is the better practice, but “that Defendant, having requested and received hybrid representation, did not waive his right to counsel but in fact exercised it, and the trial court did not err in failing to warn defendant of the perils of self-representation.” 592 S.W.2d at 312 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Tolliver
green
1 sentence1998Id. at 298 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
James Perko v. Dr. Bowers, Unknown Medical Personnel, Gerald Wireman, Frederick T. Counterman, Dr. Cowles, Kenneth Watson
green
1 sentence1992Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jones v. State Highway Commission
green
1 sentence1990“We have considered the justifications for the continued validity of the doctrine and find them illogical, unconvincing and not compelled by constitutional mandate.” Jones, 557 S.W.2d at 230 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.