determined claim in Pennsylvania

2024Notably, while the trial court in that case cautioned the jury regarding the weight to be given the written charges, this Court determined the instruction was “wholly inadequate to cure any possible prejudice.” Id. at 1241 .

2024Notably, while the trial court in that case cautioned the jury regarding the weight to be given the written charges, this Court determined the instruction was “wholly inadequate to cure any possible prejudice.” Id. at 1241 .

2000Id.

2000Id.

2024Id. at 510 & 512.

2021Id. at 781-782 . 4 The court determined that this violation occurred because Appellant had been unsuccessfully discharged from sexual offender treatment for not appearing at some of the sessions, had possessed pornography on his cell phone, and had failed to notify his state parole officer that he possessed that particular cell phone. -3- J-S14021-21 On September 29, 2020, this Court vacated Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence and remanded for resentencing.5 Following a resentencing hearing, on November 23, 2020, the court reimposed a sentence of 1 to 5 years’ imprisonment.

2020As set forth by our Supreme Court in Tinsley, supra., a flight instruction is proper even when no direct evidence was presented at trial to establish the defendant had actual knowledge that he was wanted by police, when there was "unquestionably circumstantial proof of this fact." Id., at 793 8 Based upon the evidence presented, this Court determined that the standard instruction for Flight or Concealment as Showing Consciousness of Guilt (SSJI Crim. 3 .14) was appropriate for the jury's consideration.

2020As set forth by our Supreme Court in Tinsley, supra., a flight instruction is proper even when no direct evidence was presented at trial to establish the defendant had actual knowledge that he was wanted by police, when there was "unquestionably circumstantial proof of this fact." Id., at 793 8 Based upon the evidence presented, this Court determined that the standard instruction for Flight or Concealment as Showing Consciousness of Guilt (SSJI Crim. 3 .14) was appropriate for the jury's consideration.

2019Characterizing the case as a “relatively straightforward drug case,” the Court determined an analysis of appellant’s challenges to his drug trafficking and conspiracy convictions was proper, while recognizing that “in more complex criminal matters [] the common pleas court may require a more detailed statement to address the basis for a sufficiency challenge.” Id. at 1060 .

2019In Laboy, as in the instant case, “the common pleas court readily apprehended Appellant’s claim and addressed it in substantial detail.” Id.

2019Id. at 1274 . 2 Thus, based on both Foster and Boyd, I find it subject to debate whether Ford’s sentence implicates the legality of sentence.1 However, even assuming it does, I find the instant sentence permissible.

2018A mistrial was granted on the latter basis in Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983 (Pa.Super. 2014), where the court determined that the defense’s admission of forged documents perpetrated a fraud upon the court that so undermined the jury’s function that only a mistrial could cure the harm.

2017A.S., 88 A.3d at 263 n.9.

2014In this latter regard, Appellant references Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586 , 722 A.2d 657 (1998), a case in which this Court determined that defense counsel was at fault because he failed to inform the defendant that the Commonwealth’s only alleged aggravating circumstance — that the crime was committed in the perpetration of a felony, see 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(6) — could not be found for accomplices such as herself.

2014In this latter regard, Appellant references Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586 , 722 A.2d 657 (1998), a case in which this Court determined that defense counsel was at fault because he failed to inform the defendant that the Commonwealth’s only alleged aggravating circumstance — that the crime was committed in the perpetration of a felony, see 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(6) — could not be found for accomplices such as herself.

2011Id., 971 A.2d at 518 .

2011Central to the argument of the Fleming appellants (also insurance companies) was that, in National Bank of West Grove v. Earle, 196 Pa. 217 , 46 A. 268 (1900), this Court determined the privilege did apply to the advice of counsel.

2011Central to the argument of the Fleming appellants (also insurance companies) was that, in National Bank of West Grove v. Earle, 196 Pa. 217 , 46 A. 268 (1900), this Court determined the privilege did apply to the advice of counsel.

2011Id.

2011Id., 971 A.2d at 518 .

2011Policemen’s Ass’n v. PLRB, 695 A.2d 984 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), was controlling.

2010This Court determined the hearing officer erred in failing to hear the matter de novo and in failing to decide issues raised by the facility that were "fundamental to the entire proceeding." Id. at 1030 .

2010This Court determined the hearing officer erred in failing to hear the matter de novo and in failing to decide issues raised by the facility that were “fundamental to the entire proceeding.” Id. at 1030 .

2010Stroudsburg Univ. of Pa. of State Sys. of Higher Educ., 724 A.2d 427 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (transferring contract claim, which was originally filed with a court of common pleas, to the Board of Claims pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103, where this Court determined the claim fell within the Board of Claims’ original jurisdiction).

2006In the matter of Morgan v. McPhail, 449 Pa. Super. 71 , 672 A.2d 1359 (1996), the court was asked to review preliminary objections of the doctor regarding informed consent.

2006In the matter of Morgan v. McPhail, 449 Pa. Super. 71 , 672 A.2d 1359 (1996), the court was asked to review preliminary objections of the doctor regarding informed consent.

2006Describing the doctrine as a rule that preserves the exclusive role of a regulatory agency in approving rates, and focusing on the interaction between the rates an insurer charges and the reserves it accumulates, the court determined that the doctrine barred Appellants' claims because a decision from the trial court that IBC was holding excessive reserves would necessarily require a recalculation of rates that the Department had approved. 814 A.2d at 804-05 .

2006Describing the doctrine as a rule that preserves the exclusive role of a regulatory agency in approving rates, and focusing on the interaction between the rates an insurer charges and the reserves it accumulates, the court determined that the doctrine barred Appellants’ claims because a decision from the trial court that IBC was holding excessive reserves would necessarily require a recalculation of rates that the Department had approved. 814 A.2d at 804-05 .

2005Fumo, 719 A.2d at 14 .

2005Fumo, 719 A.2d at 14 .

2002Anderson, 743 A.2d at 474 . ¶ 14 In Thomas v. Thomas, 739 A.2d 206 (Pa.Super.1999), this Court determined that the factors outlined in Gruber should also be considered in a shared custody case.

2002Id. at 209 .

2002Anderson, 743 A.2d at 474 . ¶ 14 In Thomas v. Thomas, 739 A.2d 206 (Pa.Super.1999), this Court determined that the factors outlined in Gruber should also be considered in a shared custody case.