25 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Garzagreen2 sentences2023See State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 13, 40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (listing the factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice). 2023See State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 13, 40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (listing the factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice). | 8 | 11 |
Salandre v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Salandre, 111 N.M. at 425, 431 , 806 P.2d at 565, 571 (concluding that it was a “close case” but that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the prejudice was slight and the other three factors weighed in his favor “but not heavily”); State v. Johnson, 113 N.M. 192, 193-94 , 824 P.2d 332, 333-34 (Ct.App.1991) (holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the first three factors weighed in the defendant’s favor “but not heavily” and the prejudice suffered did not include impairment of the defense). 2006See Salandre, 111 N.M. at 425, 431 , 806 P.2d at 565, 571 (concluding that it was a “close case” but that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the prejudice was slight and the other three factors weighed in his favor “but not heavily”); State v. Johnson, 113 N.M. 192, 193-94 , 824 P.2d 332, 333-34 (Ct.App.1991) (holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the first three factors weighed in the defendant’s favor “but not heavily” and the prejudice suffered did not include impairment of the defense). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Samoragreen2 sentences2020See Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 (concluding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated where the sixty-two-month delay and reasons for delay weighed in the defendant’s favor, but the assertion of the right factor did not, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any particularized prejudice); Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 24, 30, 34, 40 (holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice). 2020See Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 22-23 (concluding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated where the sixty-two month delay and reasons for delay weighed in the defendant’s favor, but the assertion of the right factor did not, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any particularized prejudice); Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 24, 30, 34, 40 , (holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2006See Salandre, 111 N.M. at 425, 431 , 806 P.2d at 565, 571 (concluding that it was a “close case” but that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the prejudice was slight and the other three factors weighed in his favor “but not heavily”); State v. Johnson, 113 N.M. 192, 193-94 , 824 P.2d 332, 333-34 (Ct.App.1991) (holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the first three factors weighed in the defendant’s favor “but not heavily” and the prejudice suffered did not include impairment of the defense). 2006See Salandre, 111 N.M. at 425, 431 , 806 P.2d at 565, 571 (concluding that it was a “close case” but that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the prejudice was slight and the other three factors weighed in his favor “but not heavily”); State v. Johnson, 113 N.M. 192, 193-94 , 824 P.2d 332, 333-34 (Ct.App.1991) (holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated where the first three factors weighed in the defendant’s favor “but not heavily” and the prejudice suffered did not include impairment of the defense). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2018See Garza , 2009-NMSC-038 , ¶¶ 24, 30, 34, 40, 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (holding that the defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice); Montoya , 2011-NMCA-074 , ¶ 24, 150 N.M. 415 , 259 P.3d 820 (same); Wilson , 2010-NMCA-018 , ¶ 50, 147 N.M. 706 , 228 P.3d 490 (same). 2018See Garza , 2009-NMSC-038 , ¶¶ 24, 30, 34, 40, 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (holding that the defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice); Montoya , 2011-NMCA-074 , ¶ 24, 150 N.M. 415 , 259 P.3d 820 (same); Wilson , 2010-NMCA-018 , ¶ 50, 147 N.M. 706 , 228 P.3d 490 (same). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Montoyagreen2 sentences2018See Garza , 2009-NMSC-038 , ¶¶ 24, 30, 34, 40, 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (holding that the defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice); Montoya , 2011-NMCA-074 , ¶ 24, 150 N.M. 415 , 259 P.3d 820 (same); Wilson , 2010-NMCA-018 , ¶ 50, 147 N.M. 706 , 228 P.3d 490 (same). 2018See Garza , 2009-NMSC-038 , ¶¶ 24, 30, 34, 40, 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (holding that the defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice); Montoya , 2011-NMCA-074 , ¶ 24, 150 N.M. 415 , 259 P.3d 820 (same); Wilson , 2010-NMCA-018 , ¶ 50, 147 N.M. 706 , 228 P.3d 490 (same). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Woodgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Wood, 2022-NMCA-009, ¶ 21 , 504 P.3d 579 (“In a speedy trial analysis, if any one of the three Barker factors does not weigh heavily in favor of a defendant, as is the case here, [the d]efendant must show particularized prejudice in order to prove their speedy trial was violated.”). 2025See State v. Wood, 2022-NMCA-009, ¶ 21 , 504 P.3d 579 (“In a speedy trial analysis, if any one of the three Barker factors does not weigh heavily in favor of a defendant, as is the case here, [the d]efendant must show particularized prejudice in order to prove their speedy trial was violated.”). | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Wingogreen1 sentence2023See State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 13, 40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 (listing the factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and holding that the defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated when the first three factors weighed in his favor to some degree, but he failed to put on evidence of particularized prejudice). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Doraisgreen1 sentence2022State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 39-40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; see State v. Prieto-Lozoya, 2021-NMCA-019, ¶ 46 , 488 P.3d 715 (“Ordinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing particularized prejudice when claiming a speedy trial violation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State v. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 22 , 370 P.3d 771 (stating that a defendant’s failure to show particularized prejudice may preclude review of the Barker factors). {4} Here, following our review of the briefs and record, we conclude that the first three factors | 1 | 1 |
State v. Prieto-Lozoyagreen2 sentences2022State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 39-40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; see State v. Prieto-Lozoya, 2021-NMCA-019, ¶ 46 , 488 P.3d 715 (“Ordinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing particularized prejudice when claiming a speedy trial violation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State v. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 22 , 370 P.3d 771 (stating that a defendant’s failure to show particularized prejudice may preclude review of the Barker factors). {4} Here, following our review of the briefs and record, we conclude that the first three factors 2022State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 39-40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 ; see State v. Prieto-Lozoya, 2021-NMCA-019, ¶ 46 , 488 P.3d 715 (“Ordinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing particularized prejudice when claiming a speedy trial violation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State v. Dorais, 2016-NMCA-049, ¶ 22 , 370 P.3d 771 (stating that a defendant’s failure to show particularized prejudice may preclude review of the Barker factors). {4} Here, following our review of the briefs and record, we conclude that the first three factors | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gallegosgreen1 sentence2017See State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 40 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 2 P.3d 387 ; see also State v. Gallegos, 2016-NMCA-076, ¶¶ 33-34 , ___ P.3d ___ 3 (holding that where there was fourteen months and three weeks of negligent and 4 administrative delay—only exceeding the presumptively prejudicial period by a few 5 months—the defendant’s failure to make a particularized showing of prejudice did not 6 support a speedy trial violation), cert. denied, 2016-NMCERT-008 , ___ P.3d ___. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Manesgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Manes, 112 N.M. 161, 169 , 812 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Ct. App. 11 1991) (upholding the trial court’s determination that no speedy trial violation 12 occurred, even when the first three factors all weighed slightly in the defendant’s 13 favor, as a consequence of the defendant’s failure to make a compelling showing 14 under the fourth factor). 15 In response, Defendant contends that this Court errs by acknowledging that the 16 delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial, yet concluding that Defendant’s right 17 to a speedy trial has not been violated. [MIO 12] Defendant asserts that 2009See State v. Manes, 112 N.M. 161, 169 , 812 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Ct. App. 11 1991) (upholding the trial court’s determination that no speedy trial violation 12 occurred, even when the first three factors all weighed slightly in the defendant’s 13 favor, as a consequence of the defendant’s failure to make a compelling showing 14 under the fourth factor). 15 In response, Defendant contends that this Court errs by acknowledging that the 16 delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial, yet concluding that Defendant’s right 17 to a speedy trial has not been violated. [MIO 12] Defendant asserts that | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David B. Mitchellgreen1 sentence2009This presumed prejudice, although insufficient to carry a speedy trial claim absent a strong showing on the other Barker factors is nonetheless part of the mix of relevant facts in the ultimate balancing analysis” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Mitchell, 769 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he settled rule in this circuit is that unless the first three Barker factors all weigh heavily against the government, the defendants must demonstrate actual prejudice.”); Hill v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 375 , 379 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980) (“When the first three factors of | 1 | 1 |
Filimon Castillo Perez v. George E. Sullivan, Warden, and Attorney General, State of New Mexicogreen1 sentence2000See Perez, 793 F.2d at 256 (noting that necessity of showing substantial prejudice dominates the four-part balancing test in speedy sentencing ease). {21} We further note that even assuming the first three factors weigh in Defendant’s favor, the first two factors — the length of the delay and the reasons for the delay — weigh only slightly in his favor. | 1 | 1 |
Work v. Stategreen2 sentences1991See id. 110 N.M. at 423-24 , 796 P.2d at 1119-20 . 1991See id. 110 N.M. at 423-24 , 796 P.2d at 1119-20 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences1991See id. 110 N.M. at 423-24 , 796 P.2d at 1119-20 . 1991See id. 110 N.M. at 423-24 , 796 P.2d at 1119-20 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harveygreen2 sentences1989See State v. Harvey, 85 N.M. 214 , 510 P.2d 1085 (Ct.App.1973). 1989See State v. Harvey, 85 N.M. 214 , 510 P.2d 1085 (Ct.App.1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2023In addition, the Serros Court only addressed the prejudice factor “to clarify what [it] view[ed] as a misapplication of the law by the Court of Appeals majority.” Id. {97} Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals and would affirm its analysis of the prejudice factor in State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046 , 396 P.3d 171 . 2023In addition, the Serros Court only addressed the prejudice factor “to clarify 4 what [it] view[ed] as a misapplication of the law by the Court of Appeals majority.” 5 Id. 6 {97} Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals and would affirm its analysis of 7 the prejudice factor in State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046 , 396 P.3d 171 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Serros
green
2 sentences2023The Court indicated this by stating that it “already [had] determined that the first three factors weigh heavily in [the d]efendant’s favor, and [it] therefore need not consider whether [the d]efendant has made a particularized showing of prejudice.” Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 87 . 2023In addition, the Serros Court only addressed the prejudice factor “to clarify 4 what [it] view[ed] as a misapplication of the law by the Court of Appeals majority.” 5 Id. 6 {97} Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals and would affirm its analysis of 7 the prejudice factor in State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046 , 396 P.3d 171 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Zurla v. State
green
2 sentences2006Here, as in Talamante, we conclude that “the State demonstrated an ‘unacceptable indifference’ to its constitutional duty of bringing this case to trial within a reasonable time.” 2003-NMCA-135, ¶ 14 , 134 N.M. 539 , 80 P.3d 476 (quoting Zurla, 109 N.M. at 643 , 789 P.2d at 591 ). 2006Here, as in Talamante, we conclude that “the State demonstrated an ‘unacceptable indifference’ to its constitutional duty of bringing this case to trial within a reasonable time.” 2003-NMCA-135, ¶ 14 , 134 N.M. 539 , 80 P.3d 476 (quoting Zurla, 109 N.M. at 643 , 789 P.2d at 591 ). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Talamante
green
2 sentences2006Here, as in Talamante, we conclude that “the State demonstrated an ‘unacceptable indifference’ to its constitutional duty of bringing this case to trial within a reasonable time.” 2003-NMCA-135, ¶ 14 , 134 N.M. 539 , 80 P.3d 476 (quoting Zurla, 109 N.M. at 643 , 789 P.2d at 591 ). 2006Here, as in Talamante, we conclude that “the State demonstrated an ‘unacceptable indifference’ to its constitutional duty of bringing this case to trial within a reasonable time.” 2003-NMCA-135, ¶ 14 , 134 N.M. 539 , 80 P.3d 476 (quoting Zurla, 109 N.M. at 643 , 789 P.2d at 591 ). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Gonzales
green
2 sentences2023Because this is an unpublished memorandum opinion written solely for the benefit of the parties, see State v. Gonzales, 1990-NMCA-040 , ¶ 48, 110 N.M. 218 , 794 P.2d 361 , and the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background of this case, we omit a background section and leave the discussion of the facts for our analysis of the issues. 2023Because this is an unpublished memorandum opinion written solely for the benefit of the parties, see State v. Gonzales, 1990-NMCA-040 , ¶ 48, 110 N.M. 218 , 794 P.2d 361 , and the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background of this case, we omit a background section and leave the discussion of the facts for our analysis of the issues. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Patterson
green
1 sentence2021Patterson, 2017-NMCA-045, ¶ 16 . {48} The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 11-608(B) or Rule 11-403 when it excluded inquiry on cross-examination into Garcia’s kidnapping claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. v. Capital Terminal Co.
green
1 sentence2010However, the ease of legal research and the resources available to our courts, as well as to our litigants, have greatly increased, and thus “[t]he rationale for requiring [municipal ordinances] to be offered into evidence and proven — the practical difficulty of obtaining the necessary materials — has been undermined by developments in technology and open government practices that often make it easier to find the relevant law.” Getty Petroleum, 391 F.3d at 329 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Doggett v. United States
green
1 sentence2009The Court concluded, “When the Government’s negligence ... causes delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review, and when the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant’s acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief.” Id. (citation and footnotes omitted). {39} Thus, Doggett seemed to adopt the position of many lower courts, which generally require that defendants make an affirmative showing of particularized prejudice but excuse that requirement and presume prejudice if the other Bar | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Paul Clifford Hill v. Louie L. Wainwright, Etc.
green
1 sentence2009This presumed prejudice, although insufficient to carry a speedy trial claim absent a strong showing on the other Barker factors is nonetheless part of the mix of relevant facts in the ultimate balancing analysis” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Mitchell, 769 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he settled rule in this circuit is that unless the first three Barker factors all weigh heavily against the government, the defendants must demonstrate actual prejudice.”); Hill v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 375 , 379 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980) (“When the first three factors of | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gallegos Ex Rel. Gallegos v. Southwest Community Health Services
green
2 sentences2003To determine whether the relief is different, courts may consider “(1) whether the parties employed the same attorneys; (2) whether separate answers [or complaints] were filed; [and] (3) whether the [relief sought by the parties is] antagonistic.” See id. “[T]he trial court should [also] consider the extent to which the alleged diversity of [relief] will affect the choice of individual jurors when considered in light of the common interests of [one plaintiff as against another plaintiff] in the selection of jurors.” Id. {94} Applying these factors to the facts before the trial court, we find t 2003To determine whether the relief is different, courts may consider “(1) whether the parties employed the same attorneys; (2) whether separate answers [or complaints] were filed; [and] (3) whether the [relief sought by the parties is] antagonistic.” See id. “[T]he trial court should [also] consider the extent to which the alleged diversity of [relief] will affect the choice of individual jurors when considered in light of the common interests of [one plaintiff as against another plaintiff] in the selection of jurors.” Id. {94} Applying these factors to the facts before the trial court, we find t | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Lujan
green
2 sentences2003See Salandre, 111 N.M. at 431 , 806 P.2d at 571 (holding that although prejudice was slight, on balance speedy trial violation took place); Lujan, 2003-NMCA-087, ¶ 29 , 134 N.M. 24 , 71 P.3d 1286 (finding a violation of speedy trial rights where three factors were squarely for the defendant even though fourth factor of prejudice was only minimal). 2003See Salandre, 111 N.M. at 431 , 806 P.2d at 571 (holding that although prejudice was slight, on balance speedy trial violation took place); Lujan, 2003-NMCA-087, ¶ 29 , 134 N.M. 24 , 71 P.3d 1286 (finding a violation of speedy trial rights where three factors were squarely for the defendant even though fourth factor of prejudice was only minimal). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.