first three factors in Michigan

2017In Cress, 468 Mich at 692 , our Supreme Court stated the following: For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.] Because the parties agreed, and the trial court found, that the first three factors we

2017In Cress, 468 Mich at 692 , our Supreme Court stated the following: For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.] Because the parties agreed, and the trial court found, that the first three factors we

2017People v Smith, 488 Mich 193, 195 ; 793 NW2d 666 (2010). -8- we limit our analysis to whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Josephus’s recantation testimony does not make a different result probable on retrial.

2017People v Smith, 488 Mich 193, 195 ; 793 NW2d 666 (2010). -8- we limit our analysis to whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Josephus’s recantation testimony does not make a different result probable on retrial.

2004Katt, supra at 296 , 662 N.W.2d 12 .

2004Katt, supra at 296 .

2023The purported waiver of counsel was invalid and thus constituted plain error because the trial court had “failed to comply with the substance of [People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361 ; 247 NW2d 857 (1976),] and the court rule, [MCR 6.005(D)] . . . .” King, unpub op at 8.

2023The purported waiver of counsel was invalid and thus constituted plain error because the trial court had “failed to comply with the substance of [People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361 ; 247 NW2d 857 (1976),] and the court rule, [MCR 6.005(D)] . . . .” King, unpub op at 8.

2020Id.

2005The opinion states: Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort — the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, see 422 U.S., at 78 — are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent. [Id. at 575-576.] The language of the statute in question in Touche Ross 3 did not explicitly create a private remedy.

2005The opinion states: Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort -the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, see 422 U.S. at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent. [ Id. at 575-576, 99 S.Ct. 2479 .] The language of the statute in question in Touche Ross [3] did not explicitly create a private remedy.

2005The opinion states: Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort -the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, see 422 U.S. at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent. [ Id. at 575-576, 99 S.Ct. 2479 .] The language of the statute in question in Touche Ross [3] did not explicitly create a private remedy.

2005The opinion states: Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort -the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, see 422 U.S. at 78 , 95 S.Ct. 2080are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent. [ Id. at 575-576, 99 S.Ct. 2479 .] The language of the statute in question in Touche Ross [3] did not explicitly create a private remedy.