5 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Whisenantgreen2 sentences1992See Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d at 1007 . 1992See Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d at 1007 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Van Wootengreen1 sentence2011See Walker, 928 So.2d at 276 (“[W]e do not hold today ... that any weighting of the first three factors in an accused’s favor automatically *700 establishes presumed prejudice under the fourth Barker factor.”)- “[T]he precise weight afforded the delay and its effect on [Robinson] are dependent upon the prejudice to [Robinson] caused by the delay.” Van Wooten, 952 So.2d at 1178 . | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Walkergreen1 sentence2011See Walker, 928 So.2d at 276 (“[W]e do not hold today ... that any weighting of the first three factors in an accused’s favor automatically *700 establishes presumed prejudice under the fourth Barker factor.”)- “[T]he precise weight afforded the delay and its effect on [Robinson] are dependent upon the prejudice to [Robinson] caused by the delay.” Van Wooten, 952 So.2d at 1178 . | 1 | 1 |
Edward Garrett Hoskins v. Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Floridagreen2 sentences2005Instead, the Hoskins court held that the first three factors may weigh so heavily in the accused's favor that "[p]rejudice is simply no longer an issue." 485 F.2d at 1194 . 2005Instead, the Hoskins court held that the first three factors may weigh so heavily in the accused's favor that "[p]rejudice is simply no longer an issue." 485 F.2d at 1194 . | 1 | 1 |
Prince v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Regarding the fourth factor, the Turner court stated: "The record is silent with regards to whether [Turner] was prejudiced by the excessive delay in bringing him to trial. "`[H]owever, there is authority which holds that where the other three Barker factors weigh in favor of the accused, "prejudice — either actual or presumed — becomes totally irrelevant."'" 378 So.2d at 1179 (quoting Prince v. State , 354 So.2d 1186 , 1192 (Ala.Crim.App. 1977), quoting in turn Hoskins v. Wainwright , 485 F.2d 1186 , 1192 (5th Cir. 1973)). 2005Regarding the fourth factor, the Turner court stated: "The record is silent with regards to whether [Turner] was prejudiced by the excessive delay in bringing him to trial. "`[H]owever, there is authority which holds that where the other three Barker factors weigh in favor of the accused, "prejudice either actual or presumed becomes totally irrelevant."'" 378 So.2d at 1179 (quoting Prince v. State, 354 So.2d 1186, 1192 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), quoting in turn Hoskins v. Wainwright, 485 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir.1973)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Johnson
green
2 sentences2005In balancing the Barker factors, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the first three factors weighed against the State: the 25-month delay from Turner's indictment until his trial was presumptively prejudicial under the first factor; Turner asserted his right to a speedy trial less than five months after the indictment, which weighed in Turner's favor under the second factor; and the State's negligence — specifically, its failure to act and its ignorance of changes in the extradition procedure — was the reason for the delay in Turner's case. 378 So.2d at 1176 -78 . 2005In balancing the Barker factors, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the first three factors weighed against the State: the 25-month delay from Turner's indictment until his trial was presumptively prejudicial under the first factor; Turner asserted his right to a speedy trial less than five months after the indictment, which weighed in Turner's favor under the second factor; and the State's negligence specifically, its failure to act and its ignorance of changes in the extradition procedure was the reason for the delay in Turner's case. 378 So.2d at 1176-78 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
1 sentence1986Further, in its opinion on the direct appeal from the convictions, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the first three factors in the Barker test as follows: “In the present case, the delay of approximately four years and three months between indictment and trial was not ‘extraordinary.’ See Barker v. Wingo, supra, at 533 [ 92 S.Ct. at 2193 ]. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.