first three factors in Minnesota

2016“The first three factors are the primary factors, with the last two deserving lesser consideration.” Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 2007).

2016Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 592 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 ); Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn.1983). ' “The first three factors [of this test] determine whethér minimum contacts exist and the last two factors determine whether jurisdiction is "reasonable according to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 570-71 .

1988Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn.1978) The first three factors are primary, the last two receive less consideration.

1982Minnesota has determined that the first three factors are “primary factors.” Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn.1978).

1987Ros *157 tad v. On-Deck, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). 1.

1985Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn.Ct.App.1984).

2019The first three factors determine whether Ford has sufficient "minimum contacts" with Minnesota, and the last two factors determine whether jurisdiction is otherwise "reasonable" under concepts of "fair play and substantial justice." Juelich , 682 N.W.2d at 570 .

2018"The first three factors determine whether minimum contacts exist and the last two factors determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable according to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id.

1997The convenience of the parties is “of minor interest in comparison to the first three factors.” Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 722 .

1988Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006 , 106 S.Ct. 528 , 88 L.Ed.2d 460 (1985).

2026See Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d at 542 .

2018See id.

2016Uriach & CIA, S.A., 648 F.3d 588, 592 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 ); Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn.1983). ' “The first three factors [of this test] determine whethér minimum contacts exist and the last two factors determine whether jurisdiction is "reasonable according to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 570-71 .

2014See Juelich, 682 N.W.2d at 571 ; Rostad, 872 N.W.2d at 721. 1.

2011State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998); see also Minn. R.Crim.

2009The plain-error analysis requires the court to determine whether there was (1) an error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and, if the first three factors are satisfied, (4) whether the error should be addressed “to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Reed, 737 N.W.2d at 583 (quotation omitted).

2007State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Minn.2006).

2006He argues that the Spreigl evidence is inadmissible because the state’s case was not “weak.” We have previously held that “[e]vidence of other crimes is admissible only if the trial court finds that the direct or circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s identity is otherwise weak or inadequate, and that the evidence is necessary to support the state’s burden of proof.” State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178-79 , 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967) (emphasis added).

2006He argues that the Spreigl evidence is inadmissible because the state’s case was not “weak.” We have previously held that “[e]vidence of other crimes is admissible only if the trial court finds that the direct or circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s identity is otherwise weak or inadequate, and that the evidence is necessary to support the state’s burden of proof.” State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178-79 , 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967) (emphasis added).

2004Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice While the Asahi Court was split with respect to the proper test for determining minimum contacts, a majority of the Court held that “[t]he strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under circumstances that would offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. at 113 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339 ); see id. at 116 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, Black

2004Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice While the Asahi Court was split with respect to the proper test for determining minimum contacts, a majority of the Court held that “[t]he strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under circumstances that would offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. at 113 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339 ); see id. at 116 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, Black

2004Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.1981); see also Nodak Mut.

2004Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.1981); see also Nodak Mut.

2004Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice While the Asahi Court was split with respect to the proper test for determining minimum contacts, a majority of the Court held that “[t]he strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under circumstances that would offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. at 113 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339 ); see id. at 116 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, Black

2004Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice While the Asahi Court was split with respect to the proper test for determining minimum contacts, a majority of the Court held that “[t]he strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under circumstances that would offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. at 113 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339 ); see id. at 116 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, Black

2001Cf. Petrich v. Dyke, 419 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn.App.1988) (due diligence factor met where motion to vacate brought less than one week after judgment entered); Valley View, Inc., 399 N.W.2d at 185 (due diligence factor met where motion to vacate filed within six days of judgment). *420 Finally, although granting new trial does not appear to prejudice respondents, the fourth element of the Finden test, the first three factors weigh against granting rule 60.02 relief.

2001Cf. Petrich v. Dyke, 419 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn.App.1988) (due diligence factor met where motion to vacate brought less than one week after judgment entered); Valley View, Inc., 399 N.W.2d at 185 (due diligence factor met where motion to vacate filed within six days of judgment). *420 Finally, although granting new trial does not appear to prejudice respondents, the fourth element of the Finden test, the first three factors weigh against granting rule 60.02 relief.

1997Land-O-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338, 1340 (8th Cir.1983).

1997Mahoney v. Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn.App.1988), review denied (Minn. Feb. 10,1989).