first three factors in Washington

2008Spurgeon, 63 Wn.

2008Spurgeon, 63 Wash.App. at 506 , 820 P.2d 960 .

2026Id.

2025Gresham, 173 Wn.2d at 420 .

2020Hart v. Department of Social & Health Services, 111 Wn.2d 445, 448 , 759 P.2d 1206 (1988).

2020Hart v. Department of Social & Health Services, 111 Wn.2d 445, 448 , 759 P.2d 1206 (1988).

2018Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 61 -62 , 720 P.2d 808 . ¶ 19 The first three factors provide cogent grounds for finding article I, section 14 more protective than the Eighth Amendment.

2018Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 61 -62 , 720 P.2d 808 . ¶ 19 The first three factors provide cogent grounds for finding article I, section 14 more protective than the Eighth Amendment.

2018Id. at 11 .

2013State v. Buss, 76 Wn.

2005In addition, in Hughes, we rejected the argument that the "free crimes" factor fits within the "prior convictions" exception to the Blakely rule. 154 Wash.2d at 138-40, 110 P.3d 192 .

1999App. 408 , 773 P.2d 898 (1989).

1999Procedural History Following Gordon Strauss’ conviction of second degree rape in 1987, the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 120 months on grounds of deliberate cruelty, sophistication and planning, abuse of a position of trust, and future dangerousness. 1 On appeal, this court found the evidence insufficient to support the trial court’s findings on the first three factors, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Strauss’ prior criminal history for purposes of a future dangerousness finding. 2 State v. Strauss, 54 Wn.

1998The Emard court determined that the first three factors were not at issue and then rejected the contention that the California statute violated the fourth factor “by altering the administrative process for plans in California and by altering the designation of beneficiaries.” Emard, 153 F.3d at 958 . *325 Although ERISA preempts state laws affecting the administration of employee plans, RCW 11.07.010, like the California statute at issue in Emard , “does not affect the administration of plans; instead, it affects merely the ultimate ownership of distributed benefits.” Emard , 153 E3d at 959.

1997The first three factors are legally adequate under former RCW 9.94A.390(2), and the last was validated in State v. Stephens, 116 Wn.2d 238 , 803 P.2d 319 (1991).

1997The first three factors are legally adequate under former RCW 9.94A.390(2), and the last was validated in State v. Stephens, 116 Wn.2d 238 , 803 P.2d 319 (1991).

1984Senear, 97 Wn.2d at 155 . [2] The first three factors are the same in both a civil context and a criminal context.

1984The fourth factor, which requires this court to weigh the interest of allowing the press unfettered access to their sources against the interest in allowing courts and litigants unfettered access to testimony and relevant information, presents more difficulties in criminal prosecutions than in civil actions, Senear, 97 Wn.2d at 154 .